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BOSTON UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Dissertation

THE PROCESS OF FOREIGN POLICYMAKING  
IN JAPAN:  
THE CASE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA

by

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B.Ed., Nagasaki University, 1973  
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

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
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
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
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THE PROCESS OF FOREIGN POLICYMAKING  
IN JAPAN:  
THE CASE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA

(Order No.            )

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and explain the policy-making process of the Japanese government as reflected in its relations with China. Using an events-analysis approach, this study will create a typology contrasting cases in which the government is divided on an issue and cases in which no division exists. Three events have been chosen: peace treaty negotiations in 1974-78, the textbook controversy in 1982, and the Tiananmen incident in 1989.

When the ruling coalition is unified, Foreign Ministry officials enjoy a relatively free hand in shaping the nation's foreign policies without interference either from politicians or from other ministries. Few powerful interest groups take part in the process. Thus, the Foreign Ministry is able to promote pragmatic decisions. The policy process is relatively short.



However, when the bureaucracy and/or the ruling party are split, the divisions invite interference from many highly political and well organized groups. The issue becomes so volatile and rivalries within the ruling coalition so antagonistic that responsibility over the matter is relinquished by administrative agencies and given over to political leaders. Consequently, such a case becomes pluralistic, and the process protracted.

The maintenance of good relations with China is fundamental to Japanese foreign policy. Each incident discussed in this study demonstrates how Japanese officials are at great pains to achieve a result amenable to Beijing. When hawkish Liberal Democrats obstruct friendly overtures to China, political leaders make every effort to placate those militants. Still, Tokyo's overriding object remains conciliation with Beijing.

In addition, this study suggests that neither domestic opposition groups nor foreign influences, when acting independently, are sufficient to secure their preferred policy outcomes. Opposition from domestic groups outside the ruling coalition, unless allied with foreign influence, is often ignored by the government. On the other hand, it is crucial for any external actor to find allies among conservative ranks if it wishes to influence successfully the decisions of the Japanese government.

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

By the late 1980s the United States had become the largest debtor in the world, and Japan, the largest contributor of international aid. With this new ascendance as an economic superpower, the Japanese people were regaining confidence and beginning to realize that they could no longer be followers in the international community. Since that time, much debate has transpired concerning a new role for their nation. To date, however, the Japanese have not yet reached a clear consensus about what that role might be. Nor have they attained a leading political position on the world scene. Tokyo's unwillingness or inability to use its economic clout as a political tool has been the major characteristic of Japan's diplomatic position throughout the postwar period. Nowhere has this been more true than in Japanese dealings with China.

The economic relationship between Japan and China is complementary in character. For example, during the latter half of the 1970s, when negotiations for a peace and friendship treaty were underway between the two countries, more than 87% of Japan's energy requirements were imported.<sup>1</sup> By doubling its crude oil export to Japan in 1975, China became one of Japan's

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<sup>1</sup> Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Tsūshō Hakusho* (White Paper on International Trade); 1977, 1978, 1979 & 1980.

most promising energy suppliers.<sup>2</sup> Although it has failed to live up to expectations, China is still important to Japan because of its plentiful natural resources. The country is also highly attractive as a low-cost production site and, due to its huge population of 1.2 billion, as a market for Japanese products. On the other hand, Japan has the advanced technology and capital that China lacks. To carry out its modernization, Beijing must secure high technology and modern expertise such as complete plants, transportation systems, computation and communications equipment, resource assessment, and the like.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the bilateral trade between Japan and China increased more than tenfold from \$0.9 billion in 1971 to \$10.4 billion in 1981, and further doubled in the following decade (\$22.8 billion in 1991).<sup>4</sup>

It must be noted, however, that their bilateral relationship is by no means symmetrical. Ever since 1972 when diplomatic relations were normalized between them, Japan has been one of China's most important trade partners with about a 24% share of its total trade. Yet China's share in Japan's total trade was around 4% throughout 1980s.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, when

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<sup>2</sup> Data of International Trading Corporation cited in Chae-jin Lee, *China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy*, p. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Larkin, "Sino-Japanese Relations: Economic Priorities" in *Current History*, 81:475 (September 1982), p. 268.

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Tsūshō Hakusho*; 1972, 1982 & 1992. Also see Appendix H of this dissertation.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

Beijing decided to solicit Japanese assistance to successfully implement its ten-year economic plan for the years from 1976 to 1985, Japan became the first non-Communist aid donor to China, offering a 50 billion yen loan in December 1979. Its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1982 accounted for 80.4% of the total bilateral ODA received by China, leaping drastically from \$27.7 million in 1981 to \$368.8 million that year.<sup>6</sup> After steadily dropping to 56.3% in 1988,<sup>7</sup> Japan's share in total aid received by China remains at the same level to this day, falling somewhere between 50% and 60%. It can plausibly be argued that China needs Japan more than Japan needs China. To put it another way, Japan is in a position where it could use its economic power, if it so desired, to influence China's behavior.<sup>8</sup>

Nonetheless, Japan does not seem to be willing to use its economic muscle as a political tool. During the two decades after 1972, the two governments engaged in intermittent disputes. When Beijing might reasonably have been condemned, as in the cases of China's cancellations of plant contracts (1979-81) and the Tiananmen incident (1989), Tokyo refrained from overtly criticizing the Chinese government. Conversely, in such cases

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<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA: 1984 Annual Report*, p. 30. Also see Appendix H.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 1990 Annual Report, p. 163.

<sup>8</sup> For a discussion about the relationship between foreign trade and national power, see Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, particularly, pp. 17-33. Walter Arnold applies Hirschman's theory of the economic influence-effect to Sino-Japanese trade in his "Political and Economic Influences in Japan's Relations with China since 1978" in Kathleen Newland, ed., *The International Relations of Japan*, pp. 121-46.

as Japan's textbook revisions (1982) and cabinet members' official visits to Yasukuni Shrine<sup>9</sup> (1985), when the Chinese felt it necessary to speak out against the Japanese government, Beijing vigorously denounced Tokyo.

One important source of this Japanese diffidence in contrast to Chinese boldness is the role played by Japan as aggressor in World War II. In ruling out sanctions against Beijing after the Tiananmen incident, for example, Prime Minister Uno Sôsuke<sup>10</sup> reiterated that Japanese relations with China were, due to the past war, different from those of other nations.<sup>11</sup> It is, in fact, this burden of history or the sense of guilt on the part of the Japanese that the Chinese government effectively exploited to keep Tokyo on the defensive in all three cases discussed in this study: the peace treaty negotiations during 1974-78, the textbook controversy in 1982, and the Tiananmen incident in 1989. In doing so, Beijing was able to manipulate the media and opposition forces within Japan. This provoked the nationalistic feelings of conservative Japanese, which, in turn, alarmed pacifist elements of society. The result was

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<sup>9</sup> Yasukuni Shrine is the central shrine of state Shintô, which was Japan's state religion from 1867 to 1945. It is the place where some of the soldiers who died in W.W.II are enshrined and has been the symbol of militarism. Hence the action of the cabinet members drew criticism that their visits were a violation of the constitution, which proclaims the separation of Church and State.

<sup>10</sup> In this dissertation, Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are all spelled with a family name first and a given name second, as they are in their languages. The exception is citations for English-language works by Chinese and Korean researchers, where the name is given in Western fashion.

<sup>11</sup> *House of Representatives Minutes, No. 18, 114th Diet, p. 578.*

an involvement of a variety of Japanese interest groups to the advantage of China.

### Purpose of the Dissertation

The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain the decision-making process of the Japanese government in dealing with China following the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. Using an events-analysis approach, this dissertation will create a typology contrasting cases in which the government is split on an issue and cases in which no division exists. It will identify various actors, trace the sometimes complicated patterns of their involvement, and examine how these variables affect policy outcomes on each occasion. The investigation will also focus on the role of foreign pressures as an effective force in shaping government decisions in Japan. Particular attention will be drawn to the type of transnational coalitions to which the Japanese government is most susceptible.

In this thesis, Japanese press accounts will provide the main source of information. Although there are obvious disadvantages to relying on news bureau accounts as the basis of a scholarly study, in the case of Japan there are also compelling reasons for doing so. In contemporary Japan, for example, access to government information is relatively limited. Documents on the policymaking process and foreign policy issues, in particular, are not open to

the public. Governmental sources, such as the *Kampô*, provide only formal accounts of events bereft of any critical commentary or elaboration. Thus, as Kusano Atsushi argues, it is impossible to find a better source than the newspaper in tracing the policy process.<sup>12</sup> Martin E. Weinstein concurs: “the print media in particular is an extremely rich source in studying politics and foreign policy” in Japan.<sup>13</sup>

Another peculiarity in Japan is that memoirs by former policy makers--a valuable source of information in the United States--are almost unheard of. Instead, the common practice is for a journalist who closely covered the *Kantei*<sup>14</sup> to later write a book about the administration. These books constitute another vital source of information on such topics.

Supplementing these, interviews and questionnaires were submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Japan Teachers Union, and human rights groups in Japan. The groups outside the government were generally cooperative, but no response was obtained from MOFA officials.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Kusano, *Seisaku Katei Bunseki Nyûmon* (An Introduction to Policy Process Analysis), p. 54. Also see Bradley Richardson, “Policymaking in Japan: An Organizing Perspective,” in Pempel, ed., *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, p. 253.

<sup>13</sup> Weinstein, “Japan’s Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States” in Gerald Curtis, ed., *Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 221.

<sup>14</sup> *Kantei* is the official residence of the Japanese prime minister. It is often used to indicate the prime minister and his staff, just like the “White House” in the United States.

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix I.



The field of foreign policy has been chosen for this thesis because of its usefulness as a way to observe Japan's international behavior at this point of transition in its role in the post-Cold War era. Throughout the postwar years, its relations with the United States have always been central to Japanese diplomacy. With a relative decline in the economic power of the United States and an end to the Cold War, however, the Japanese government now faces the challenge of conducting its own diplomacy, dealing directly with a multitude of international counterparts.

In particular, the subject of Japanese-Chinese relations has been selected because these relations have come to acquire a greater importance in Asia as a consequence of smaller American and Russian presence in the region. Moreover, in issues relating to China, policy formation in Japan tends to involve a broad range of political actors--opposition parties, labor unions and intellectuals, as well as foreign interests. Hence, the making of its China policy provides a good case study for delineating the complicated and increasingly pluralistic nature of Japan's foreign policymaking process. Although the cases examined in this research concern the last two decades during the Cold War, these cases are still relevant as a guide to future behaviors because the policymaking process itself has not changed in any significant way.

## Hypotheses and Evidence

First, this dissertation suggests that regardless of whether domestic or external matters are involved, when there is an ideological split within the bureaucracy and/or the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the case becomes antagonistic and volatile. The divisions among conservative ranks invite interference from many societal groups that are highly political and well organized. This makes compromise extremely difficult. Bureaucrats and Liberal Democrats, unable to solve the issue themselves, turn to top political leaders for mediation. The locus of this resolution process is invariably the prime minister and his chief cabinet secretary. The two work as mediators between ministries or conflicting elements within the party. Their efforts are directed toward preserving friendly relations with China, which necessitates concessions by opposing members within the government. It is inevitable that an enormous amount of time and energy is consumed to reach a compromise solution. Thus, the policy process becomes protracted. Its outcome consistently gives rise to two results. First, it is conciliatory toward China. Second, it is constructed in such a way as to placate the conservative dissenters.

The peace treaty case provides a good example of this division among the ruling elites. This was a diplomatic issue under MOFA's jurisdiction. Japan and China began negotiations on a treaty for peace and friendship in

November 1974. However, it was disclosed in January 1975 that the inclusion of the so-called anti-hegemony clause<sup>16</sup> was a point of contention between the two countries. After this revelation, the pro-Beijing and pro-Taipei elements of the LDP took active parts in the process. This participation transformed the diplomatic issue into that of intense political confrontation, and the process became pluralistic. Although the Japanese government decided in November of 1977 to resume the treaty talks, six more months were required for Prime Minister Fukuda to secure the acquiescence of opponents within the LDP.

The textbook revision was initially a domestic matter, for which the Ministry of Education (MOE) was solely responsible. Still, the case provides another good example of divisions within the conservative camp. MOE had worked consistently since 1948 to tighten its examination of school textbooks. In the summer of 1982, however, this education policy provoked a storm of criticism from Asian neighbors, eventually developing into a diplomatic crisis. Prompted by Chinese and Korean protests, both the opposition camp and the media in Japan put enormous pressure on the government. MOFA took advantage of these domestic forces and external pressures to eliminate

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<sup>16</sup> Indicates Article 7 of the 1972 joint statement, which reads in part, "Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." See Appendix A.

an obstacle to their diplomatic efforts and to rationalize the process of making foreign policies.

Secondly, in contrast, when an issue is purely diplomatic and when there is neither interministerial cleavage nor LDP division, MOFA officials enjoy a relatively free hand in shaping the nation's foreign policies. They fully exercise their capacity as policymakers without interference either from politicians or from other ministries. Even though public awareness is high, not much public interest is involved in this type of issue. Despite the considerable media coverage of criticism from other political forces, therefore, few powerful interest groups take part in the process. The locus of the resolution process is the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, the policy process is relatively short. MOFA is able to promote pragmatic decisions. The outcome is again a solution that helps maintain friendly relations with China.

The Tiananmen incident is a case in point. Although media attention and public awareness were very high, MOFA faced no serious challenge either from government ministries or from the ruling party. Hence, the crisis team was led by the vice foreign minister, not by political leaders. MOFA officials played an unchallenged role in formulating the nation's foreign policies. With the support from the business community, the Uno cabinet went along with bureaucrat-made policies.

Thirdly, the findings of this dissertation also suggest that coalitions between domestic forces and foreign actors can have a significant impact on

the policy process.<sup>17</sup> When acting alone, in fact, neither domestic opposition forces nor external pressures are sufficient to secure their preferred policy outcomes. For one thing, unless allied with foreign influence, opposition from domestic groups outside the ruling coalition is often ignored by the government.

This characteristic is especially obvious in the textbook case. MOE and the Japan Teachers Union (JTU) had been in a fierce battle over public education throughout the postwar period. The ministry's practice of textbook censorship was one of the points in dispute. LDP conservatives worked closely with MOE officials, whereas JTU was supported by other labor unions, intellectuals, opposition parties, and the media. This was a long-standing ideological conflict between progressives and conservatives. The voices of opposition did not have much impact on the education policy. When Beijing and Seoul filed official protests, however, MOFA capitalized on them to deter MOE's influence on the conduct of its diplomacy. Had it not been for foreign protests, MOE would have paid no heed to the domestic opposition. Nor

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<sup>17</sup> For the importance of cross-national alliances, see Muramatsu Michio and Ellis Krauss, "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism" in Yamamura & Yasuba, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan*, vol. 1, p. 549; Kent Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*, p. 463; and T. J. Pempel, "Unbundling 'Japan, Inc.': The Changing Dynamics of Japanese Policy Formation" in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 13:2 (Summer 1987), pp. 293-306. Relevant arguments are also presented by Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games" in *International Organization*, 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60; and Leonard Schoppa, "Two-level games and outcomes: why *gaiatsu* succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others," *International Organization*, 47:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 353-86.

would MOFA have found a chance to step into a policy area that was normally considered to be under MOE's jurisdiction.

The same propensity of the Japanese government is observed also in the Tiananmen case. There was undoubtedly a widespread opinion in Japan that the government should clearly denounce actions taken by the Chinese government. Nonetheless, political and administrative officials remained firm in their position: Japan would take a stand on humanitarian matters but refrain from harsh condemnation or an imposition of sanctions. However, to avoid a clash on China policy at the upcoming G-7 summit meeting, it was imperative that Tokyo coordinate its policies with Western nations, in particular the United States. As a result, toward the end of June, Tokyo not only started to use harsher language but also took punitive measures against Beijing. The change took place only when a public outcry was combined with the government's diplomatic concerns.

Finally, this thesis argues that foreign pressures alone are not sufficient, either, for such a change. It is crucial for any external actor to find allies within the conservative establishment if it wishes to influence policy outcomes successfully.

This was amply illustrated during 1975-77 when peace treaty negotiations were at a standstill. The Chinese leadership, in an attempt to find allies among various segments of Japanese society, invited a variety of Japanese groups to China. These guests, who ranged from a ballet company to a

religious group, from business organizations to political delegations, came away with a clear understanding of the benefits a treaty would provide. Thus, in 1977, Japanese business leaders decided of their own accord to conclude a trade agreement with the Chinese government. Expecting that the peace treaty between the two governments would help secure new business opportunities in China, the business community used its influence to pressure Prime Minister Fukuda to conclude the treaty. Even though, at the same time, pro-Taipei Liberal Democrats made frequent use of Soviet opposition in their effort to obstruct the treaty process, they eventually gave into the coalition between the business community and the Chinese government.

The events after the Paris summit in the Tiananmen case also support this point. In an effort to coordinate its policies with Washington, Tokyo had put a hold on its aid programs. However, after the summit meeting of July 1989, Tokyo began to remove its sanctions against Beijing. The United States did not welcome a speedy resumption of Japanese loans to China, but business leaders were pressing the government for a restoration of relations with Beijing. The Finance Ministry and the LDP joined forces with the business community. Thus, Tokyo's second loan was fully disbursed by March 1990. Moreover, at the Houston summit in July 1990, Tokyo announced its decision to release its third aid program. Without any support from Japan's conservative establishment, American overtures failed.

## Foreign Policy Literature

During the first two decades after World War II when there was clear consensus in American society for the containment policy, developments in foreign affairs were often viewed as rational actions chosen by unified national governments. Hans Morgenthau's statesman contemplating what the national interest calls for in a certain situation, Thomas Schelling's game theorist calculating the requirements of stable mutual deterrence, Herman Kahn's strategic analyst playing out scenarios of nuclear war by a mathematical process of gain-to-cost reckoning--all use a form of Rational Actor Model.<sup>18</sup> However, "[t]reating national governments as if they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals," Graham T. Allison argued in 1971, obscures the fact that "the 'maker' of government policy is not one calculating decisionmaker but is rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors."<sup>19</sup> Allison thus suggested that the Rational Actor Model be supplemented by an Organizational Process Model and a Governmental Politics Model.<sup>20</sup>

Allison's second model defines governmental actions as outputs of large organizations whose behavior is determined primarily by standard

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<sup>18</sup> Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 13-18.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.



routine operating procedures. "Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control,"<sup>21</sup> their behavior. According to his third model, the decisions and actions of governments are "results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence."<sup>22</sup> The players are guided not by a strategic master plan, but rather by conflicting conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals. The outcome depends on the relative power and skill of the bargainers.<sup>23</sup>

Models II and III are important in the sense that foreign policies are conceived as outcomes of domestic politics. Yet, Allison fails to discuss *how* domestic politics and international relations interact each other. Moreover, both models assume that foreign policies are formulated by organizations and individuals within the government. For this reason, they are insufficient to explain an increasingly pluralistic nature of Japan's foreign policymaking process. Two-level games approaches that have developed since the late 1980s appear to remedy these faults.

Going beyond "the mere observation that domestic factors influence international affairs and vice versa,"<sup>24</sup> Robert D. Putnam discusses reciprocal

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* See its Introduction, pp. 1-9.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 144-45.

<sup>24</sup> Putnam, *op.cit.*, p. 433.

causation between the two spheres. Examining international negotiations, including the Bonn summit conference of 1978, Putnam argues that the politics of international negotiations is a two-level game in which “central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.”<sup>25</sup> Based upon the same proposition, Helen V. Milner maintains that international cooperation is the continuation of domestic politics by other means.<sup>26</sup> Here, both Putnam and Milner extend the actors of domestic politics to include societal groups outside the government.

Putnam’s comparison between a homogeneous case and a heterogeneous case has relevance to my study.<sup>27</sup> The former is the case in which some domestic constituents may be less demanding than others, but even their preferences are more distant than is the government’s position from that of the foreign country. Neither international negotiator is likely to find much sympathy for the enemy’s demands among his own constituents, nor much support for his constituents’ positions in the enemy camp. In such cases, domestic divisions “raise the risk of involuntary defection and thus impede”<sup>28</sup> international cooperation. To put it another way, domestic

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 460.

<sup>26</sup> Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> For the definition of, and the discussion on, the two cases, see Putnam, *op.cit.*, pp. 443-45.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 444.

divisions strengthen the country's bargaining position internationally. In contrast, in a heterogeneous conflict, a proposed international agreement will gain some domestic votes but lose others. The negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent's domestic table. Thus, transnational alignments may emerge. "In such cases, domestic divisions may actually improve the prospects for international cooperation."<sup>29</sup>

In Milner's study, however, domestic divisions did not necessarily lead to international cooperation. Five out of eight cases she examined were heterogeneous, of which three were successful and two failed.<sup>30</sup> She observes that divisions at home undermines a country's international bargaining strength.<sup>31</sup> When domestic groups are divided over an issue, she argues, their divisions can be exploited by the foreign country. They may end up being played against one another. This is exactly what happens when the Japanese government deals with China.

However, simplification is always a problem with theory-building and model-making. For example, Putnam's two-level analysis implies that the greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their domestic

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Milner, *op.cit.*, chapters 5, 6, and 7, pp. 135-202.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236. Successful cases are the Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement, the Anglo-American Oil Agreement, and the European Coal and Steel Community; failed cases are the International Trade Organization and the International Civil Aviation Agreement.

pressures, the larger their negotiating room and thus “the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally.”<sup>32</sup> This proposition cannot explain China’s strong position vis-à-vis Japan. In Milner’s model, on the other hand, three actors of domestic politics, namely the executive, the legislature and the interest group, are all assumed to be unitary. This is not very helpful in explaining the cases in this dissertation. In the case of peace treaty negotiations, for instance, the focus of my discussion is the division of the LDP. When the governing party is deeply divided ideologically, it is pointless to assume the whole legislature to be unitary. As Putnam admits, “simple ‘median-voter’ models of domestic influences on foreign policy may be quite misleading.”<sup>33</sup> Hence, this study is concerned less with models than with what Bradley M. Richardson calls “real-world political processes”<sup>34</sup> in Japan.

### Japanese Policymaking

Until the mid-1960s, the elitist model--a monopoly of policymaking by a ruling triumvirate of LDP politicians, senior bureaucrats and big business

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<sup>32</sup> Putnam, *op.cit.*, p. 449.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 458.

<sup>34</sup> Richardson, “Policymaking in Japan: An Organizing Perspective,” in Pempel, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 239.

leaders—seemed dominant among students of Japanese politics.<sup>35</sup> When Japan launched an all-out drive toward rapid economic growth in the 1960s, bureaucrats undertook the task of designing all industrial development for the nation. They attempted to coordinate domestic and foreign economic policies toward that goal. Hence, a school of thought developed which held that the bureaucracy had a dominant role among the three groups. They described Japan as a strong state led by a strong bureaucracy.<sup>36</sup> Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the influence of the LDP began to increase as it held the ruling position without interruption since 1955.<sup>37</sup>

As Japanese economic power grew to equal that of the advanced Western nations, its policy process became more diverse and complicated. Increasingly there were important conflicts of interest not only among the three groups but within each group of the triumvirate as well.<sup>38</sup> Moreover,

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<sup>35</sup> Nagai Yōnosuke, "Atsuryoku seiji no Nihonteki kōzō (The Japanese pattern of pressure-group politics)" and Ishida Takeshi, "Wagakuni ni okeru atsuryoku dantai hassei no rekishiteki jōken to sono tokushitsu (Pressure groups in Japan: Their formation and characteristics)" in Nihon Seiji Gakkai, ed., *Nihon no Atsuryoku Dantai* (Pressure Groups in Japan), 1960. Shinohara Hajime and Nagai, eds., *Gendai Seijigaku Nyūmon* (An Introduction to Contemporary Political Science), 1965. Robert Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, 1962.

<sup>36</sup> Pempel, "Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan" in *American Journal of Political Science*, 18 (November 1974), pp. 647-64; Pempel, *Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism*; and Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*.

<sup>37</sup> Masumi, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, pp. 251-55; and Muramatsu, *Sengo Nihon no Kanryōsei* (The Bureaucracy in Postwar Japan), pp. 137-68.

<sup>38</sup> Martin Weinstein, *Japanese Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*; William Steslicke, *Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association*; Gerald Curtis, "Big Business

since the late 1960s, citizens' movements developed into a political force, creating a significant impact on policy issues such as pollution control and welfare programs. In addition, opposition parties exercised a substantial influence during the 1970s, when the balance between the ruling party and the opposition was nearly equal in the Diet, Japan's parliament. Unable to function effectively during the early postwar years, the national assembly now began to assume a limited but meaningful role as both a formal public forum of debate and a lawmaking organ of the state.<sup>39</sup>

Reflecting these changes in Japanese politics, the focus of arguments had also shifted by the end of 1980s. T. J. Pempel now asserts that "Japan, Inc." has become "unbundled."<sup>40</sup> Margaret A. McKean argues that the increase in LDP influence vis-à-vis the bureaucracy is proof of the enhanced power of private interests.<sup>41</sup> She attributes Japan's economic success, not to a strong state, but to the encompassing nature of so many business organizations and the resulting corporatism.

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and Political Influence" in Ezra Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-making*.

<sup>39</sup> Ellis Krauss discusses the development of the Diet as an institution between 1955 and 1979 in his "Conflict in the Diet: Toward Conflict Management in Parliamentary Politics" in Krauss, et al., eds., *Conflict in Japan*, pp. 243-93.

<sup>40</sup> Pempel, "Unbundling 'Japan, Inc.'" in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 13:2 (Summer 1987), pp. 271-306.

<sup>41</sup> McKean, "State Strength and the Public Interest" in Gary Allinson and Sone Yasunori, eds., *Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan*, pp. 72-104.

Since the early 1980s, especially, an increasing number of writers have added pluralist explanations to the elitist triad model. For instance, in his 1983 work, Inoguchi Takashi calls Japan's policy process "bureaucracy-led mass-inclusionary pluralism."<sup>42</sup> Satô Seizaburô and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, in their 1986 study on conservative party politics, call it "mixed, party-bureaucracy-led, compartmentalized pluralism."<sup>43</sup> It is "mixed" because power is shared by the bureaucracy and the ruling party, and "compartmentalized" because policy issues are shaped by the jurisdictional arenas of government ministries. Yet another study by Muramatsu Michio and Ellis S. Krauss argues that a "patterned pluralism" emerged from a LDP strategy for staying in power.<sup>44</sup> It is "plural" in that many diverse actors participate and their coalitions may shift, but "patterned" in that the types of possible alliances and policymaking patterns are relatively fixed and institutionalized. They define Japan as a strong state that retains its own autonomous interests and an institutionalized accommodation among elites, while interacting with pluralist elements.

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<sup>42</sup> Inoguchi, *Gendai Nihon Seiji Keizai no Kôzu* (Paradigm of Political Economy in Contemporary Japan), Chapter 1.

<sup>43</sup> Satô and Matsuzaki, *Jimintô Seiken* (LDP Power), p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> Muramatsu and Krauss, *op.cit.*, pp. 516-54.

Daniel I. Okimoto and Kent E. Calder dismiss these pluralist explanations, as well as elitism, statism, and corporatism.<sup>45</sup> Examining industrial policies, Okimoto proposes instead a "segmented political configuration model."<sup>46</sup> A policy process in Japan, he argues, breaks down into four segmented policy domains based on the nature of political goods and services exchanged among the LDP, its interest coalition, and the bureaucracy. As is implied by terms such as "compartmentalized," "patterned," and "segmented," the process differs depending upon the institutions involved and the nature and area of the issue.<sup>47</sup> It is little wonder, therefore, that numerous differing models have been presented by various researchers.

On the other hand, Calder concludes in his extensive study on non-industrial policies between 1949 and 1986 that the central driving force in policy changes in Japan is the crisis and compensation dynamics.<sup>48</sup> When conservative leadership perceives political threats to its preeminence either from the opposition or from within conservative ranks, politicians take initiative in policymaking. In times of political crisis as such, government is highly responsive to a broad range of popular views and expands govern-

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<sup>45</sup> Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market*, pp. 193-206. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*. See its Introduction, pp. 3-35.

<sup>46</sup> Okimoto, *ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> For similar arguments, see Inoguchi, *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change*, pp. 117-9; and Pempel's "Conclusion" in Pempel, ed., *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, p. 311.

<sup>48</sup> Calder, *op.cit.*



mental programs.<sup>49</sup> In noncrisis periods, by contrast, politicians sense no need to take such initiative; the systematic, efficiency-oriented bureaucracy prevails. Government becomes less responsive to opposition views and begins to reduce its level of compensation to potential supporters.<sup>50</sup> Thus he contends: "The basic conditions of the pluralist model of democracy seem not to be clearly met."<sup>51</sup>

Here, Calder argues that political threats can be presented by either the opposition or the conservatives. However, the three cases in this thesis show that without a challenge from conservative ranks, government is unsympathetic to opposition views and the bureaucracy prevails in the policy process. Elsewhere, discussing two-level games, Leonard J. Schoppa claims that external pressure works most effectively when it is supported by the elite or the mass or both.<sup>52</sup> Yet, evidence in this dissertation suggests that only when divisions within the ruling coalition are triggered by foreign demands, do top political leaders perceive a threat and step into the policy process as mediators.

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* See its Chapter 11, pp. 440-80.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 473.

<sup>52</sup> Schoppa, *op.cit.*, p. 373.

In such cases, media coverage intensifies. A variety of political actors are given opportunities to express their views to which the decision makers by necessity pay sufficient heed. The system may fall short of ideal democracy, but it is an unmistakable fact that the policy process in Japan increasingly demonstrates pluralistic features. As Sone Yasunori summarizes, the shift is from a Diet-incompetent to a Diet-functioning system, from a bureaucrat-predominant polity to an increased influence of party politicians, and from elitist to pluralist processes.<sup>53</sup>

#### Japanese Foreign Policymaking

Japan's foreign policy and its policymaking process have been studied by a number of Japan specialists. For instance, Kent E. Calder calls Japan a "reactive state" that fails to undertake policy initiatives and responds to outside pressures for change.<sup>54</sup> Reviewing literature on Japanese foreign economic policies, Calder argues that dependence on the United States for capital, markets, and diplomatic support, thereby avoiding a pro-active global role, has been Japanese national strategy. Domestic constraints, such as the

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<sup>53</sup> Sone, "Nihon no Seiji Shisutemu to Gaikō (Japan's political system and diplomacy)" in Watanabe Akio, ed., *Kōza Kokusai Seiji: Nihon no Gaikō*, pp. 101-2. Also see Muramatsu and Krauss, *op.cit.*, p. 517.

<sup>54</sup> Calder, "Japanese Foreign Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State" in *World Politics*, 40:4 (July 1988). Walter Arnold supports Calder in his "Political and Economic Influences in Japan's Relations with China since 1978" in Newland, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 121-46.

fragmented character of state authority and its unusual sensitivity to domestic interest-group pressures, also intensify its reactive character, he argues.<sup>55</sup>

Another school of thought that focuses on Japan's economic and financial contributions in the world has a quite different view. Ezra F. Vogel predicted a decade ago that the Japanese "are prepared to increase their contributions" to nonmilitary public goods and would use their economic power and contributions "to gain leverage to represent their own interests."<sup>56</sup> Dennis T. Yasutomo concurs: Japan in the 1980s and 1990s "is exhibiting greater activism, assertiveness, and independence."<sup>57</sup> Through case studies on multilateral development banks, Yasutomo observes that Japan is "finally assuming what appears to be an international agenda-setting and rule-making role in the political as well as economic and financial arena."<sup>58</sup>

Susan J. Pharr sees both models as flawed. With defense burden sharing being the central focus of her debates, Pharr calls Japan's foreign policy "defensive-state strategy."<sup>59</sup> The Japanese, she argues, have pursued a strategy that is characterized by its activist character, its aversion to risks, and

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<sup>55</sup> Calder, *ibid.*, pp. 526-30.

<sup>56</sup> Vogel, "Pax Nipponica" in *Foreign Affairs*, 64:4 (Spring 1986), pp. 752-67.

<sup>57</sup> Yasutomo, "Japan and the New Multilateralism" in Curtis, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 323-46.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324.

<sup>59</sup> Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing" in Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 235-62.

its low cost. To call it “reactive” misses the fact that the Japanese state has actively and successfully maneuvered to advantage among a barrage of foreign pressures while seeking to avoid risks of all kinds.<sup>60</sup> Despite some indicators in the late 1970s and 1980s of an “assertive” Japan, she further argues, “evidence of a real change in Japan’s defense posture and approach to foreign policy is lacking.”<sup>61</sup> Thus, she concludes that Japan’s defensive approach has remained unchanged over the entire postwar era up to the present.

T. J. Pempel, too, disagrees with the notion that Japan only moves in response to external pressures. There is a highly differentiated set of responses, he maintains, all of which are the result of changes in the decision options and payoff structures for Japanese domestic political actors.<sup>62</sup> This study supports this position. Japanese responses may appear “reactive,” but it should be remembered that their responses are selective. Rather than indiscriminately responding to foreign pressures, certain domestic actors attempt to take advantage of those pressures that advance their position. Furthermore, all three cases in this study suggest that it is crucial for foreign

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>62</sup> Pempel, “From Exporter to Investor: Japanese Foreign Economic Policy” in Curtis, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 105-36.

actors to find allies among Japanese conservative ranks to affect policy outcomes effectively.

All in all, it appears that one can find as many models as there are issues or researchers. One may even start doubting the utility of simple generalization about the policy process in Japan. In fact, Yoshida Fumihiko, after testing eight models of Japan's foreign policy decision-making process, demonstrates that no existing conceptual model is adequate as a general model.<sup>63</sup> Hence, this study does not aim at finding a broad paradigm that explains the whole picture of Japanese foreign policymaking. Instead, it focuses on the making of Japanese policy toward China.

### Sino-Japanese Relations

When confined to the domain of bilateral relations between Japan and China, the literature is relatively scarce. Marius Jansen studied historical background from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 to the diplomatic normalization of the two countries in 1972.<sup>64</sup> Chae-Jin Lee and Allen

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<sup>63</sup> Yoshida identified eight models from the literature: the triumvirate, Japan, Inc., factional conflict, bureaucratic politics, central executive elite, diffused pluralistic, transnational, and black ship models. In testing these, he used the Iranian hostage crisis, Moscow Olympics boycott, and history textbook issue. See his Ph.D. dissertation, *Testing Models of Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Japan*, University of Hawaii, 1987.

<sup>64</sup> Jansen, *Japan and China, From War to Peace 1894-1972*.

Whiting presented excellent analyses of overall Japanese-Chinese relations.<sup>65</sup> Furukawa Mantarô, an *Asahi* reporter who extensively covered the China issue, provided a detailed historical overview of the postwar developments of the bilateral relations.<sup>66</sup> Although insightful and informative, none of these studies was concerned with policy process.

With regard to studies on policy process, those by Fukui Haruhiro and Ogata Sadako are exceptional. Fukui examined the 1972 normalization and observed that the process "was dominated and controlled almost exclusively by a very small ad hoc group ... Participating in significant ways were the prime minister and the foreign minister in a commanding position and a few individual LDP and opposition-party politicians and half a dozen Foreign Ministry officials in supporting roles."<sup>67</sup> In his study, the roles of big business and other actors were not conspicuous. Studying the same subject, however, Ogata Sadako provided a persuasive analysis of how the business community in Japan, sensing the changes in the international environment,<sup>68</sup> shifted its

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<sup>65</sup> Lee, *Japan Faces China* (1976) and *China and Japan, New Economic Diplomacy* (1984). Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (1989).

<sup>66</sup> Furukawa, *Nitchû Sengo Kankeishi* (A Postwar History of Japanese-Chinese Relations), 1988.

<sup>67</sup> Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking" in Pempel, ed., *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, p. 99.

<sup>68</sup> In 1970, Canada recognized the People's Republic of China on October 13, and the majority supported the Albanian Resolution at the 25th U.N. General Assembly on October 20. In 1971, the United States revoked its 21-year-old trade embargo on China in June, and the U.N. General Assembly voted on October 25 to seat the PRC, replacing Taiwan.

stance on China in the course of 1971. This shift, she argued, "helped accelerate the pro-Chinese trend within the mainstream of the LDP and drove the Satô and Fukuda factions out of power."<sup>69</sup>

The contradictory findings of the two studies resulted from the fact that Ogata examined ground-level activities by businessmen prior to political negotiations. By contrast, this political process was the only subject of Fukui's research. This suggests that issues should be observed in broader contexts and longer-range perspectives. Moreover, this was a time when Tokyo and Beijing did not have a formal channel for negotiations and, therefore, even opposition party politicians were allowed to act as intermediaries between the two governments. Since diplomatic normalization has totally changed this condition, we now need to accumulate a number of new detailed case studies after 1972.

K. V. Kesavan explains Japanese diplomacy in the case of Tiananmen incident.<sup>70</sup> His analysis revolves around the strong economic factor, the importance of China's role in a regional context, and a difference between Japan and the United States in their approaches to China's democratization. Yet, domestic actors and factors of Japanese policymaking do not seem to interest him.

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<sup>69</sup> Ogata, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the PRC" in Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, p. 203.

<sup>70</sup> Kesavan, "Japan in the Tiananmen Square Incident: Aspects of the Bilateral Relationship" in *Asian Survey*, 30:7 (July 1990).

Tanaka Akihiko and Quansheng Zhao provide excellent empirical works. Both works cover more than four decades from the immediate postwar years to the early 1990s. Tanaka analyzes various issues between Japan and China in the context of international politics.<sup>71</sup> As he admits in his postscript, however, his work is rather an interpretative, historical overview of bilateral issues. His interests have not led him to invest much labor in analyzing policy process. On the other hand, Zhao explores Japanese policy process in detail, using four case studies: two each in pre- and post-1972 years.<sup>72</sup> Except for the 1972 rapprochement, all the other three cases are economic issues. He elucidates informal mechanisms in Japan's policy-making process; namely, cultivating social networks, the activities of informal political actors and organizations, and consensus-building through personal connections. Zhao iterates the importance of these informal channels and practice, but the three factors are not totally integrated into the political process in his study.

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<sup>71</sup> Tanaka, *Nitchû Kankei* (Japanese-Chinese Relations) 1945-1990.

<sup>72</sup> Zhao, *Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics*.



## Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is concerned with both the formal and informal mechanisms of Japanese policy process, and how those mechanisms are interwoven in Japanese politics. Instead of singling out one component of the process, this study attempts to describe the whole process as a unit. It focuses on providing a typology between the case in which conservative ranks split on an issue and the case where no division exists. It examines how the presence or absence of divisions among the conservatives invites various types of political actors into the policy process. It investigates why certain processes lead to certain kinds of policy outcomes. By doing so, this study helps expand our knowledge of the relationship between the Japanese government and interest groups, both foreign and domestic. In each dispute between Tokyo and Beijing, it will identify which actor advocated which view, which segment of Japanese society tried to take advantage of which voice from abroad, and to which cross-national alignment did the Japanese government show its sensitiveness.

Since a large portion of the existing literature has been devoted to the areas of trade and finance, foreign economic policies have been excluded. This study attempts to provide a different perspective. It focuses on the policy process of non-economic issues between Japan and China. Three important events have been chosen: the prolonged negotiations on the peace treaty, the

textbook controversy, and the Tiananmen incident. These cases are particularly interesting because of their centrality to Sino-Japanese relations, and because they each exhibit an interaction of domestic and international concerns. Each of the following three chapters will discuss one case each.

Chapter 2 will discuss the process of peace treaty negotiations between Japan and China. The case began as a conventional diplomatic procedure. However, disclosure of a Chinese demand concerning anti-hegemony caused “participation expansion”<sup>73</sup> (to use Schoppa’s words) and transformed the case into that of an intense political confrontation. The LDP was divided along ideological lines into the pro-Beijing and pro-Taiwan camps. The Soviet Union was against the treaty and tried to galvanize the voices of pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats in an attempt to hinder treaty negotiations. At the same time, the LDP conservatives tried to exploit Soviet opposition to advance their interests. Meanwhile, Beijing fully utilized its “people’s diplomacy”<sup>74</sup> and found allies among business leaders and various segments of Japanese society. Thus, the case displayed pluralistic characteristics. Accordingly, bureaucrats turned to top political leaders for mediation, and the

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<sup>73</sup> Schoppa, *op.cit.*, p. 370-73.

<sup>74</sup> In the absence of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing, China tried to affect Japan’s China policy through semi-official activities ranging from cultural exchanges to political rallies. This people’s diplomacy, in the initial stage of the 1950s, was primarily directed at Japanese leftists and businessmen but various socio-political segments of Japan were targeted after the Cultural Revolution. This strategy contributed to promoting bilateral trade during the 1960s and to reestablishing their relations and concluding the peace treaty in the 1970s.

process became protracted. In the course of 1977, however, the business community went ahead by pursuing a trade agreement with China. This did “reverberate”<sup>75</sup> within Japanese politics and changed the domestic balance.

The textbook controversy in Chapter 3, in contrast, is a case in which “participation expansion” transformed a previously domestic issue into a diplomatic crisis. MOE’s textbook authorization system had been the constant target of criticism by labor unions and intellectuals for more than three decades. MOE officials and conservative *bunkyo-zoku* (education-clan)<sup>76</sup> members worked determinedly to protect the ministry’s vested authorities. Therefore, criticism from Asian neighbors greatly encouraged opposition forces at home. More importantly, however, MOFA took advantage of these domestic forces and external pressures to deter MOE influence on the conduct of its diplomacy. In addition to this interministerial rivalry between MOE and MOFA, the LDP was also divided. This necessitated mediation by top political leaders.

Chapter 4 will examine Tokyo’s aid policy after the Tiananmen incident—a typical example of bureaucratic dominance in the policy process.

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<sup>75</sup> Putnam, *op.cit.*, p. 454-56.

<sup>76</sup> LDP members who specialize education policy and have particular influence in this policy area are called *bunkyo-zoku*. For detailed accounts of *zoku*, see Inoguchi and Iwai Tomoaki, “*Zoku Giin no Kenkyū: Jimintō Seiken o Gysūjiru Shuyakutachi* (A study on “policy-clan legislators”); and Satō and Matsuzaki, *op.cit.*

A crisis management team was led by a top bureaucrat, the vice foreign minister. A small group of senior MOFA officials single-handedly formulated government policies. MOFA found a covert ally in the United States government, which employed strong rhetoric against China but in actuality desired to maintain strategic and economic relations with Beijing. Acting in concert with Washington, the Japanese government eventually decided to impose some sanctions on China. However, pressured by businessmen and influential LDP leaders, Tokyo lifted all the restrictions on its sanctions long before the other G-7 nations. With all the components of the ruling coalition thus unified, international pressures did not “reverberate” within Japanese politics. In such a case, MOFA was able to pursue pragmatic decisions through to the end.

This dissertation concludes with Chapter 5, in which the findings of this study will be summarized. This chapter will then discuss possible contributions of this study to the understanding of Sino-Japanese relations as well as of Japan’s foreign policy process.

## Chapter 2

### Peace Treaty Negotiations

Japan and China reestablished their diplomatic relations in September of 1972. Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signed a joint communiqué, ending "the abnormal state of affairs"<sup>1</sup> that had existed between the two countries since the early 1930s. Following its provisions, diplomatic missions were exchanged in 1973. Agreements on trade, aviation, and navigation were signed in 1974. In the expectation that an agreement on fisheries would be signed in the following year, Tokyo and Beijing began preliminary negotiations on a treaty of peace and friendship in November 1974.

Even though prospects seemed good for promptly concluding the treaty,<sup>2</sup> the negotiations soon reached a stalemate. The problem was the so-called anti-hegemony clause<sup>3</sup>--opposition to third countries' hegemonism. The Chinese claimed that anti-hegemonism, being part of the 1972 communiqué, should be incorporated in the peace treaty. However, since this phrase was generally interpreted to be directed against the Soviet Union at the time,

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<sup>1</sup> The preamble of the joint communiqué, see Appendix A of this dissertation.

<sup>2</sup> For optimistic comments by MOFA officials, see, for example, *Asahi Shimbun*, October 4, 23 & November 11, 1974.

<sup>3</sup> See Article 7 of the communiqué in Appendix A.

the Japanese government found it extremely difficult to accept the Chinese argument.

The negotiations were suspended for more than three years. After cabinet changes in Japan and serious political changes in China, the dialogue was finally resumed in July 1978. By that time, Fukuda Takeo, a pro-Taiwan conservative, had taken over from Miki Takeo, a pro-Beijing liberal, as head of government in Japan. It may appear ironic that pro-Beijing Miki deadlocked the negotiations and pro-Taiwan Fukuda successfully completed the treaty. The fact is, however, precisely because of his conservative standing, Fukuda was able to secure endorsement from conservative Liberal Democrats.

Originally, the case had been a diplomatic issue under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). After the Chinese demand on anti-hegemonism triggered a division within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), however, the case became politicized and the process, pluralistic and protracted. Opposition from pro-Taipei Liberal Democrats was the major impediment to the proposed treaty. To obtain party endorsement, the prime minister, his chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister worked as a decision-making body, with the prime minister in a commanding position. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union persistently lobbied against the Japanese-Chinese dialogue and attempted to galvanize the voices of the pro-Taipei

conservatives. Given its equi-distance diplomacy,<sup>4</sup> the Japanese government wished to avoid any provocative phraseology that would undermine its relations with Moscow.

Yet, Japan's business community, in an effort to expand economic relations, regularly sent missions to China and put pressure on the government. Particularly, in February 1978, the powerful business establishment concluded a trade agreement of its own accord with the Chinese government. Because economic matters were of overriding importance in Japanese policy, the preference of the alliance between Japanese business and the Chinese government was approved despite opposition from LDP conservatives and the Soviets. A 1977 move by the United States to improve its relations with Beijing also had an accelerating effect on this Japanese decision.

This chapter will examine the difficult conditions that hampered Miki's attempt to "solidify the foundation of long-lasting friendship"<sup>5</sup> with Beijing. It will also discuss the factors that drove pro-Taiwan Fukuda into pursuing a peace treaty with China. Finally, it will explore the process of placating conservative Liberal Democrats, a major factor that sharply distinguished Fukuda's success from Miki's failure. To understand why the anti-hegemony clause caused such a problem, however, let us first probe into

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<sup>4</sup> Japan had maintained a so-called "equi-distance" diplomacy toward the Soviet Union and China since the Sino-Soviet dispute began.

<sup>5</sup> Miki's policy speech at the opening of the 75th Diet on January 24, 1975. See MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō 1975*, vol. 2, p. 7.

the international context in which the concept of anti-hegemonism came into existence. This was, of course, the same circumstance in which Miki was designated president of the governing party.

### Background

There were two major impediments to the treaty. First was the Sino-Soviet conflict and the complications arising from it. When anti-hegemonism was interpreted as equal to anti-Soviet, it was extremely difficult for Tokyo to accept the controversial clause without endangering its relations with Moscow. Second was the more serious of the two obstacles--the political difficulties faced by Prime Minister Miki. His supporters being pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats, Miki faced strong resistance within both his own cabinet and the ruling party.

The Soviet Union and China had been in dispute with each other since the late 1950s. When the term "hegemony" appeared for the first time in the Chinese press, it indicated the political and military control of the "imperialist camp" by the United States.<sup>6</sup> However, after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet expansionism weighed more and more heavily, virtually replacing American imperialism, in the Chinese strategic

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<sup>6</sup> See the January 21 editorial of the *People's Daily* reprinted in the *Beijing Review*, No. 4, January 24, 1964, pp. 6-8.



thinking.<sup>7</sup> The tension between the two Communist giants intensified further when Soviet and Chinese troops clashed at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers in March 1969. Consequently, when China improved relations with the United States and restored diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972, Moscow faced the possibility of an anti-Soviet coalition among the United States, China, and Japan.

Refusing to fall behind the Chinese diplomatically, the Soviet Union took a series of calculated steps. The Kremlin first sent its foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, to Japan in January 1972. His purpose was to resume the Periodic Consultation of Foreign Ministers, which had been suspended for five years after its first meeting in July 1967.<sup>8</sup> At the meeting of 1972, both sides agreed to start negotiations on a peace treaty. Two months later, Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, called for an Asian collective security system.<sup>9</sup> Then, in October 1973, Brezhnev signed a joint communiqué with Tanaka, in which Japan made a commitment to support Siberian development projects. Yet, following these initial meetings,

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<sup>7</sup> Dong-sung Kim closely examines the development of anti-hegemonism as China's diplomacy. See his dissertation, *The Politics of Anti-Hegemonism and China's Foreign Policy toward Japan, 1971-1978*, University of Connecticut, 1982, pp. 13-73.

<sup>8</sup> See a chronological table in Appendix D.

<sup>9</sup> This proposal was made by Brezhnev in June 1969, and the Soviet leader renewed the call for the security system in March 1972. See *Pravda*, March 21, 1972 in *Current Digest of Soviet Press (CDSP)* 24:12, p. 8. For a detailed account of the Soviet proposal, also see Shibauchi Tadashi, "Haken mondai to tsunahiki sareru Nihon" in *Chūdō-kōron*, July 1975, pp. 160-61.

Japanese-Soviet talks broke down because of the difference between the two governments concerning the northern territories off Hokkaido.<sup>10</sup> While Tokyo demanded the return of all the four islands as a prerequisite for a peace treaty, Moscow refused to take up the territorial issue at their meetings.<sup>11</sup>

In the meantime, the Chinese press became more aggressive in their attack against socialist imperialism. Especially after Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in July and the India-Pakistan war in November, both of 1971, the Chinese harshly criticized the Soviets, while rarely mentioning United States imperialism.<sup>12</sup> Beijing presented its anti-hegemonism as an effective alternative to Moscow's collective security concept.<sup>13</sup> Particularly after China and the United States declared their opposition to hegemony in their 1972 Shanghai communiqué, the term "hegemonism," although originally used against both superpowers, was mainly directed at Soviet expansionism. In fact, meeting with Hori Shigeru in early 1975, former LDP secretary general, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that opposing superpower hegemony was a principle of utmost importance in Chinese foreign policy. In his view,

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<sup>10</sup> The northern territories are a group of islands off northeastern Hokkaido formerly held by Japan but occupied by the Soviets since the close of World War II: the Habomai islands, and Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu islands.

<sup>11</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 28 & October 3, 1974 and *Asahi Shimbun*, January 15, 17 & 18 (evening edition), 1975.

<sup>12</sup> Kim's dissertation, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-64.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p.160

closer Chinese-Japanese relations would have a mitigating influence upon Moscow's hegemonic desires.<sup>14</sup>

It was only natural that the Soviet Union, as we will later examine, strongly opposed the inclusion of such a clause. It is also for this reason that Japan, which maintained a posture of equi-distance diplomacy, tried to avoid being drawn into one side against the other in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The complexities of Sino-Soviet relations, however, were only the first obstacle to formulating the proposed treaty. Even if agreed upon by the two governments, the treaty still faced another obstacle--the capriciousness of Japanese politics.

In Tokyo, pro-Taipei conservatives were not happy in the first place about diplomatic normalization with China at the expense of Taiwan. They were particularly sensitive to the negotiation process of the aviation agreement between Tokyo and Beijing because it had the potential of ending the existing air route between Japan and Taiwan. When the aviation agreement was signed on April 20, 1974, the then Japanese foreign minister, Ôhira Masayoshi, announced that the Japan-Taiwan route would be preserved as a local, commercial one. In other words, Tokyo did not consider the China Airlines in Taiwan as China's state carrier any longer. Dissatisfied with this decision, Taipei announced the same day the suspension of the Japan-Taiwan

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<sup>14</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 25, 1975 and *Japan Times*, January 22, 1975. Also see Yung H. Park, "The 'Anti-hegemony' Controversy in Sino-Japanese Relations" in *Pacific Affairs*, 49:3 (Fall 1976), p. 477.

route. This intensified criticism of Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ôhira by pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats.<sup>15</sup> These so-called "hawks"<sup>16</sup> challenged the pro-Beijing moves and forcefully objected to the sacrifice of political and economic relations with Taiwan to achieve normalization of relations with Beijing.

Another constraint on Miki has to do with his selection as prime minister. The Miki cabinet was only possible with the support of pro-Taiwan conservatives within the LDP. When Tanaka resigned as prime minister in November 1974 amidst public furor over his money-power politics, Fukuda Takeo was regarded as the most probable successor. However, if a presidential election of the ruling party were to be held, a fierce challenge from the Tanaka and Ôhira factions was likely. Moreover, Miki Takeo and Nakasone Yasuhiro would also probably join the race. Factional rivalry would tear the party into irreconcilable divisions. To avoid such division and disorder, the party decided not to have an election. Instead, LDP Vice President Shiina Etsusaburô designated Miki as party president.<sup>17</sup> He passed over Fukuda and

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<sup>15</sup> For a detailed description of the negotiation process and arguments within the LDP, see Furukawa Mantarô, *Nitchû Sengo Kankeishi*, pp. 396-402.

<sup>16</sup> The anti-Communist and, as such, pro-Taiwan and/or pro-South Korea members within the LDP are dubbed "hawks" because of their nationalistic pride in the Japanese state and often militant disposition.

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed account of the Shiina Decision, see Masumi Junnosuke, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, pp.158-65. For an insider account by a reporter, see Fujita Yoshirô, *Shiina Saitei*.

Ôhira, the two major contenders for the premiership.<sup>18</sup> Miki, known for his zealous advocacy of party reform, was perceived by the public as one of the very few decent politicians in the Diet. To restore public confidence in the LDP, Liberal Democrats did not have much choice. Without this so-called "Shiina Decision," Miki, the head of a small faction, would have never had an opportunity to lead the ruling party.

During Miki's presidency, Shiina, a pro-Taiwan elder in the LDP, remained as vice president. In addition, the three top positions of the party were all held by conservative politicians: secretary general by Nakasone Yasuhiro, Executive Council chair by Nadao Hirokichi, and Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) chair by Matsuno Raizô. Nakasone, a war-time Navy officer, was well known for his nationalistic desire for a stronger Japanese state with full-fledged military capabilities. Nadao had led the Japan-Taiwan Parliamentarians Roundtable<sup>19</sup> since its inception in March 1973. Matsuno was a member of the pro-Taiwan Fukuda faction. The key posts of his cabinet were also occupied by politicians who were unfriendly to Beijing. Fukuda Takeo, whose faction constituted the core of the Roundtable, took part as deputy prime minister and director general of the Economic

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<sup>18</sup> From its formation in 1955 till 1993, the LDP's president automatically assumed the premiership given its largest number of seats in the lower house.

<sup>19</sup> When Tokyo and Beijing started negotiations on the aviation agreement in March 1973, 160-odd pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats formed the Roundtable (Jap. *Nikka Kankei Giin Kondankai*), the purpose of which was to maintain and develop friendly relations with Taiwan.

Planning Agency. The office of foreign minister was assumed by Miyazawa Kiichi. Miyazawa was not pro-Taiwan but, having been slighted during the Tanaka administration, was not enthusiastic about the Tanaka-Ôhira-led policy of improving Japanese-Chinese relations.<sup>20</sup> In short, Miki was surrounded both in his party and in his cabinet by politicians unfavorable to the treaty.

### Negotiations Stalemate

Treaty negotiations began in November 1974. Whether to include the anti-hegemony provision in the treaty was the main point of contention between Japan and China. This, in turn, invited intervention from a wide range of political forces, both foreign and domestic. The Soviet Union launched active diplomacy against it. The United States wanted to delay the process. Moreover, the domestic environment was not favorable to the treaty, either.

A first round of preliminary talks was commenced on November 13, 1974, when Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nierlung visited Japan to sign the navigation agreement. Han and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Tôgô Fumihiko agreed that the peace treaty should be based on the Tanaka-Zhou joint statement. They planned to focus on a future of friendship and

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<sup>20</sup> This is an observation by Furukawa Mantarô, an *Asahi* reporter who intensively covered Japanese-Chinese relations. See his *Nitchû Sengo Kankeishi*, pp. 402-3.

cooperation.<sup>21</sup> As Tôgô later wrote, Han suggested at this very first meeting that an anti-hegemony phrase in the 1972 statement be incorporated in the proposed treaty.<sup>22</sup> Yet both governments kept it secret at the time.

After interruption by the change of the Japanese cabinet in December, a second round was held on January 16, 1975 between Tôgô and Zhen Zhu, Chinese ambassador to Tokyo. It was reported that Tôgô's outline of the Japanese position had three parts: The treaty 1. would emphasize their long-range friendship and cooperation; 2. should be drafted on the basis of the 1972 joint statement and the Five Principles for Peace;<sup>23</sup> and 3. would make no reference to controversial territorial issues, such as Taiwan.<sup>24</sup> Yet, Ambassador Zhen withheld China's position, presumably because there was no progress in the Japanese position concerning the hegemony issue. After consulting with his government, Zhen responded on February 14: China would not raise any question on Taiwan. However, the principle of anti-hegemony should be incorporated in the main body of the treaty since both

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<sup>21</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, November 14, 15 & 16, 1975.

<sup>22</sup> Tôgô Fumihiko, *Nichibei Gaikô 30-nen*, p. 211.

<sup>23</sup> The Principles have always been an important pillar of Chinese foreign policy since Zhou Enlai, together with Asian leaders such as Nehru of India, announced them in 1954. They are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These principles are stipulated in Article 6 of the 1972 statement, too.

<sup>24</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, January 17, 1974.

sides had agreed to base the treaty on the 1972 communiqué. Article 7 of the communiqué read in part:

Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.<sup>25</sup>

The Japanese negotiators argued that it was inappropriate to oppose third country hegemonism in a bilateral treaty, which should concern only the contracting parties. They also maintained that while a communiqué is an expression of the views of individual politicians, a treaty dictates legal rights and obligations of the involved governments.<sup>26</sup> Tôgô informed Zhen that Japan could not accept an ill-defined and highly controversial concept like hegemony since it could arouse third countries' suspicion.<sup>27</sup> The Japanese were afraid that the inclusion of Article 7 into the treaty body could provoke the Soviet Union.<sup>28</sup>

On the other hand, the Chinese argued that anti-hegemony, being stipulated in both the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese communiqués of 1972, should not create a problem. They made it clear that they would not

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<sup>25</sup> For the text of the joint statement, see Appendix A.

<sup>26</sup> Takashima Masuo, director of the Asian Affairs Bureau, told the Diet on February 10, 1975. See *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 15, House of Representatives, 75th Diet, p. 22.*

<sup>27</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, March 5, 1975.

<sup>28</sup> MOFA sources were quoted in *Asahi Shimbun*, January 26 & February 15, 1975.



readily yield on this issue because opposition to hegemony was a principle of utmost importance to them.<sup>29</sup> The two sides exchanged draft texts on April 14, but the talks could not advance because of differences regarding the anti-hegemony clause. The negotiations were deadlocked thereafter.

Anti-hegemonism thus interpreted as anti-Sovietism, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union launched an active diplomatic offensive against the Japanese-Chinese treaty. Their new strategy became apparent when Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi visited Moscow in January of 1975. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko suggested the possibility of signing a treaty of amity and cooperation, instead of a peace treaty, between Japan and the Soviet Union.<sup>30</sup> Shortly after this, Soviet Ambassador Oleg Troyanovsky visited Shiina Etsusaburô and MOFA officials and proposed the conclusion of a Soviet-Japan amity treaty, putting aside the northern territory issue. Troyanovsky also requested that Japan not be hasty in signing a treaty with China.<sup>31</sup> Following on that, a formal proposal of the treaty was made in

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<sup>29</sup> Kyodo News Service, March 4, 1975 in U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (FBIS-APA) 75-44, C1.

<sup>30</sup> On January 30, 1975, Miyazawa disclosed this at the Budget Committee of the lower house. See *Budget Committee Minutes, No. 2, House of Representatives, 75th Diet*, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 4, 1975; *Kyodo News Service*, February 5, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-26, C1*; and *Asahi Shimbun*, February 6, 1975.

a personal letter from Brezhnev, which was delivered to Prime Minister Miki by the Soviet ambassador on February 13.<sup>32</sup>

Around the same time, Moscow released 15 Japanese fishermen who had been held by the Soviets for violating their territorial waters.<sup>33</sup> In addition, Brezhnev notified Miki on March 8 that the Kremlin would return Russian-held works of a late Japanese painter to Japan.<sup>34</sup> Beyond these gestures, Moscow made a major compromise on fishing quotas for 1975, as well. The two countries concluded their 44-day fishery meeting in mid-April. Their agreement on quotas of salmon and herring was much more favorable for Japan than earlier expected. Officials of both MOFA and the Japanese fishing industry attributed this result to the relatively flexible stand taken by the Soviet delegation.<sup>35</sup>

Despite all these diplomatic efforts and signs of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union, the Japanese government held firm on its position—Japan could not take any step, such as an amity treaty, before a peace treaty was signed.<sup>36</sup> Beyond that, the reversion of the four islands off Hokkaido was a

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<sup>32</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, February 14, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-32*, C1.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, February 5, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-25*, C2.

<sup>34</sup> For the details, see *ibid.*, March 8, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-47*, C2.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, April 14, 15 & 17, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-73*, 74, & 76, each on page C1.

<sup>36</sup> Foreign Minister Miyazawa told the Diet on January 30, 1975. See *Budget Committee Minutes, No.2, House of Representatives, 75th Diet*, p. 21. For his similar remarks, also see *Kyodo News Service*, February 14, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-32*, C1.

prerequisite for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup>

Nonetheless, Miyazawa made it clear that Tokyo wished to maintain good relations with Moscow by excluding the anti-hegemony clause from the Japanese-Chinese treaty.<sup>38</sup>

It is also important to remember that the United State government was not enthusiastic about the Japanese-Chinese treaty. It was reported that the United States had requested Miyazawa, during his visit to Washington in April, that Japan delay the conclusion of the treaty with China.<sup>39</sup> Although the report was denied by both Miyazawa and a U.S. State Department official,<sup>40</sup> the alleged request sounded very reasonable given the American retreat in Indochina at the time. In fact, by April 16 the U.S.-backed Cambodian government of Lon Nol had fallen to the communist Khmer Rouge, ending a five-year civil war. On May 1, Saigon was liberated by the North Vietnamese. In anticipation of those developments in Indochina, Asian nations such as Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea had earlier expressed mistrust of American commitment in the region. "The U.S.

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<sup>37</sup> Ueki Mitsunori, director general of the Prime Minister's Office, was quoted by *Kyodo News Service*, January 14, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-9*, C1.

<sup>38</sup> See Miyazawa's statement on April 3, 1975 in *Cabinet Committee Minutes, No. 11, House of Representatives, 75th Diet*, p. 11.

<sup>39</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 25 (evening edition), 1975.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* Also see *Kyodo News Service*, April 25, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-83*, C4.

government was apprehensive of the possibility that a peace and friendship treaty between Japan and China might deepen anxieties of these and other Asian allies,"<sup>41</sup> wrote a *Yomiuri* reporter from Washington on April 24.

Miki had been a long-time advocate of promoting friendly relations with China. In fact, it was on the promise that Tanaka Kakuei would normalize relations with Beijing that Miki had supported Tanaka in his 1972 bid for the premiership.<sup>42</sup> Miki told the Diet in his first policy speech as prime minister that he would honor the joint statement of 1972 and work for the conclusion of a peace treaty.<sup>43</sup> Even after the treaty talks were deadlocked, the prime minister was still eager to conclude the treaty at an earliest possible time.

Despite Miki's enthusiasm, however, considerable doubts and reservations prevailed in Japan. For instance, the media took a very cautious view toward the hegemony clause. On January 23, the *Mainichi Shimbun* called on the government for careful handling of the clause. In its editorial, the paper maintained that an expression that would offend and invite suspicions from third countries should be excluded. It raised a question about including

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<sup>41</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 25 (evening edition), 1975.

<sup>42</sup> Fukui Haruhiro, "Tanaka Goes to Peking" in T. J. Pempel, ed., *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, p. 73.

<sup>43</sup> MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō* 1975, vol. 2, p. 4.

such a phrase into a treaty of "friendship."<sup>44</sup> Three months later, most major newspapers printed editorials that were critical of the inclusion of anti-hegemony language into a treaty with China.<sup>45</sup> The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Japan's equivalent for the *Wall Street Journal*, was the only paper that welcomed the clause.<sup>46</sup>

Opposition parties were unable to create a unified force on this issue. Prime Minister Miki met leaders of the opposition parties on March 29. At the time, Narita Tomomi of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Miyamoto Kenji of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) expressed their disapproval of the inclusion of anti-hegemonism in the treaty.<sup>47</sup> The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) also opposed the Chinese position because China intended to use the treaty as a weapon in its anti-Soviet policy.<sup>48</sup> Kōmeitō Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu was the only leader who supported the treaty. Takeiri thought

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<sup>44</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun* is the third largest paper in Japan, following *Yomiuri* and *Asahi*. The paper often presents candid views that might be inconvenient to the conservative establishment. See its editorial, January 23, 1975, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> See editorials in *Asahi Shimbun*, April 20, p. 5, *Tokyo Shimbun*, April 22, p. 4, *Sankei Shimbun*, April 24, p. 6, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 25, p. 5, and *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 27, p. 5, all in 1975.

<sup>46</sup> The paper has the fourth largest circulation after the *Mainichi* and is regarded as well informed on conservative politics. See its editorial, February 17, 1975, p. 2.

<sup>47</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 29 (evening edition), 1975, p. 1. *Asahi Shimbun*, March 29 (evening edition), p. 1 & March 30, p. 1, 1975.

<sup>48</sup> See the statement by Kawamura Masaru, the party's international affairs chief, in *Asahi Shimbun*, May 22, 1975.

that the inclusion of the provision was a natural consequence of the 1972 joint statement.<sup>49</sup>

However, the JSP changed its stand in mid-April. JSP officials now said the party was for the inclusion unless the clause was directed at specific third countries.<sup>50</sup> Kōmeitō, by contrast, moved in the opposite direction. Yano Junya, secretary general of the party, corrected Takeiri's words in late May. Yano told the party's Central Executive Committee that the joint statement should be respected—but only so long as it was compatible with the party's policy of equi-distant and completely neutral diplomacy.<sup>51</sup> Out of concern for relations with the Soviet Union, the party decided not to take any stance and leave the issue to the two governments.

More importantly, Miki faced opposition within his own party. On January 23, 1975, the *Tokyo Shimbun* disclosed that anti-hegemonism was the main point of contention between Tokyo and Beijing. The paper quoted government sources: "If the Chinese side should propose the inclusion of opposition to hegemony by third countries, the Japanese government would reject such an idea."<sup>52</sup> The government was concerned, the article explained,

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<sup>49</sup> Takeiri expressed this as his personal view, not as the party's official position. See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 30, 1975, p.2 and *Asahi Shimbun*, May 28, 1975.

<sup>50</sup> See comments by Kawasaki Kanji, International Affairs Bureau chief, and Hirabayashi, Diet Policy Committee chief, in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 16 (evening edition), 1975.

<sup>51</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 28 & June 2, 1975.

<sup>52</sup> *Tokyo Shimbun*, January 23, 1975, p. 1.

that the Soviet Union might view the suggested treaty as an anti-Soviet pact. Pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats seized upon this article to voice their objection to the peace treaty. The conservatives contended that the term "peace" in the treaty was inappropriate.<sup>53</sup> They claimed that the state of war between Japan and China was terminated when a peace treaty was concluded in 1952 with the Republic of China in Taiwan. Since the Senkaku islands<sup>54</sup> were Japanese territory, they further argued, there was no territorial issue to be solved by a "peace" treaty.

Though indirectly, conservative leaders also expressed their opposition. When Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky lobbied Shiina for a Soviet-Japan amity treaty on February 3, for example, Shiina leaked the content of their meeting to a *Mainichi* reporter "with the intent of creating an atmosphere in society against a hasty conclusion of the treaty."<sup>55</sup> Shortly after that, the LDP vice president met Nakasone Yasuhiro, secretary general of the party, and the two reportedly agreed to support the treaty on the condition that territorial issues and third countries' hegemonism be excluded from the treaty.<sup>56</sup> Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda met with Foreign

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<sup>53</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, January 28 & 31, 1975.

<sup>54</sup> Uninhabited tiny islands near the Ryūkyū chain, over which Japan, China and Taiwan have been involved in a three-way territorial dispute since 1971.

<sup>55</sup> Furukawa, *op.cit.*, p. 404.

<sup>56</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, February 15, 1975.

Minister Miyazawa on March 20 and urged caution in concluding the treaty with China. Fukuda was quoted as saying that the Soviet Union appeared to be seriously concerned about the treaty.<sup>57</sup> It was also reported that Nadao Hirokichi, Executive Council chair, was not against concluding the treaty but against abandoning relations with Taiwan and provoking the Soviet Union.<sup>58</sup> No one of these leaders spoke directly against the treaty. Instead, they imposed difficult conditions at times. At other times, they used the Soviet opposition and/or relations with Taiwan as pretexts to hinder the negotiation process of the peace treaty.

Against this backdrop, advocates for an early conclusion of the treaty became active. On April 17, Hori Shigeru, former LDP secretary general, and Kôno Kenzô, upper house president, strongly insisted that Miki should make a decision.<sup>59</sup> Okazaki Kaheita, ex-chief of the now defunct Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office,<sup>60</sup> also met Miki prior to his visit to Beijing. He encouraged the prime minister to carry out negotiations in line with the Tanaka-Zhou statement.<sup>61</sup> Adding their voices, four major pro-Beijing

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<sup>57</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, March 20, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-55*, C1.

<sup>58</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, April 18, 1975.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> During the two decades before the diplomatic normalization in 1972, Japan-China trade was carried on based on memoranda between Japanese businessmen and the Chinese government, which was called Memorandum Trade after 1968.

<sup>61</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, April 18, 1975.



figures of the party—Tanaka Kakuei, Finance Minister Ôhira, Hori, and Kôno—met on April 30. They pressured Miki so the treaty could be ratified during the 75th Diet that would be closed in late May.<sup>62</sup>

Yet, Miki maintained that it would be premature for him as prime minister to clarify his position on a matter which yet had to be fully discussed by LDP organs.<sup>63</sup> The fact is, adverse circumstances were such that Miki was unable to back up his words by his deeds.

#### No Breakthrough Found

During the stalemate, the Chinese utilized “people’s diplomacy”<sup>64</sup> to foster supporters for their position among Japanese societal and political groups. Tokyo made some concession, but Beijing was uncompromising. Moreover, forced to deal with serious political turmoil at home, neither government was able to pursue diplomatic issues any further.

When official negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing came to a halt, Chinese leaders capitalized on meetings with various Japanese visitors to express their stand. For example, at a meeting on April 16 with Ikeda

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<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, May 1 (evening edition), 1975.

<sup>63</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, May 1, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-85*, C4.

<sup>64</sup> See footnote 73 in Chapter 1.

Daisaku, president of Soka Gakkai,<sup>65</sup> Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping showed flexibility about where to incorporate the hegemony clause.<sup>66</sup> Again in May, the Association for China-Japan Friendship<sup>67</sup> invited the JSP and announced a joint communiqué with Japan's largest opposition party. Reversing his earlier position, Narita, the delegation head, now agreed to explicitly oppose "the hegemonism of the two superpowers"<sup>68</sup> in the statement.

Miki promptly called back Ogawa Heishirô, ambassador to Beijing. Vice Foreign Minister Tôgô and Takashima Masuo, bureau chief for Asian affairs, joined their meeting on May 15.<sup>69</sup> Shortly afterwards, MOFA raised the possibility of referring to anti-hegemony in the treaty's preamble. Miki favored the idea and made a concession to China: The hegemony clause can be included in the treaty preamble if the Chinese government agrees that the clause is not directed at any specific third country. Along with that, anti-hegemonism must be interpreted as a universal principle, like the U.N.

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<sup>65</sup> A Buddhist lay organization whose self-claimed mission is to contribute to peace, culture and education based on the philosophy and ideals of Nichiren, a 13th century Buddhist reformist. The group created Kômeitô in 1964.

<sup>66</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, April 17, 1975. Also see *Kyodo News Service*, April 16, 1975 in *FBIS-CHI-75-76*, A-17&18.

<sup>67</sup> A tool of China's people's diplomacy, the Association handles issues related to Japan.

<sup>68</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>69</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 15 (evening edition), 1975 and *Kyodo News Service*, May 15, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-95*, C1.

Charter and the Five Principles for Peace.<sup>70</sup> Miki's proposal was conveyed to China on May 23, but Beijing contended that the hegemony issue should be stipulated in the main part of the treaty.<sup>71</sup> No official contacts were made between Japan and China thereafter.

During this deadlock, China continued to use people's diplomacy to express its views. When the idea of "anti-hegemony in the preamble" surfaced, the Chinese vice premier, Li Xiannian, quickly responded even before official exchanges were made. On May 19, Li told Sasaki Kôzô, former JSP chairman, that the clause should be located in the main text, not in the preamble.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, when Tokyo did not seem to regard China's rejection as an official response, Zhou Enlai, ailing premier, met Fujiyama Aiichirô, the head of the Parliamentarians League for Japan-China Friendship (*Nitchû Giren*),<sup>73</sup> and emphatically stated that the message conveyed to Ambassador Ogawa by Han Nienlung had been Beijing's official position.<sup>74</sup> This point was reiterated by Liao Zhengzhi, president of the China-Japan Friendship Associa-

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<sup>70</sup> Furukawa, *op.cit.*, pp. 407-8. Tanaka Akihiko, *Nitchû Kankei 1945-1990*, p. 95.

<sup>71</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, June 15, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-116*, C1-2.

<sup>72</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 20, 1975.

<sup>73</sup> In the fall of 1970 when a majority of the U.N. General Assembly voted to offer a seat to the People's Republic of China, a movement for reestablishing diplomatic relations with China gained popular ground in Japan. On December 9, 1970, 379 Diet members from both ruling and opposition parties formed the Parliamentarians League for Restoration of Japan-China Relations. After the diplomatic normalization of September 1972, the League was renamed that for "Japan-China Friendship." (Jap. *Nitchû Yûkô Giin Renmei*)

<sup>74</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 13 (evening edition), 1975.

tion, when he met Shimizu Masao, president of a Japanese ballet company, on June 20.<sup>75</sup>

In the mean time, the Soviet Union, presumably concerned about the Japanese concession, stepped up its campaign against the Japanese-Chinese talks. On June 12, Gromyko forwarded a Soviet government statement to Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu Akira. The Soviets expressed opposition to the inclusion of an anti-hegemony provision in the Japanese-Chinese treaty and urged Japan to take a cautious stand in the negotiations with China.<sup>76</sup> The Soviet foreign minister further requested prudence on the part of the Japanese government at a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Miyazawa, on September 24. They were in New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly. The provision, Gromyko insisted, was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. Because of that, it could be detrimental to the development of Russo-Japanese relations.<sup>77</sup>

In New York, however, Miyazawa also met the Chinese foreign minister, Qiao Guanhua and relayed four conditions for resuming the treaty talks. They were based upon Miki's proposal:

1. opposition to hegemony should not be directed against any specific third country

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<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, June 21 (evening edition), 1975.

<sup>76</sup> The statement was made public by the *TASS News Agency* on June 18. For the text, see *FBIS-SOV(Soviet Union)-75-118, M2*.

<sup>77</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, September 25 (evening edition), 1975.

2. opposition to hegemony does not mean any joint action by the two countries
3. anti-hegemony should be applied to any part of the world, not just the Asia-Pacific region
4. anti-hegemony should be in agreement with the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter<sup>78</sup>

If the Chinese accepted this interpretation of anti-hegemony, Miyazawa informed Qiao, Japan was prepared to include the clause in the treaty. Yet, he did not specify which part of the treaty it would be. Moreover, the first point was unacceptable to the Chinese.<sup>79</sup> The two failed to break the deadlock. Chinese Ambassador Zhen Zhu left Tokyo on October 7, purportedly to hold consultations with his home government, but did not come back to Tokyo until mid-February of 1976.<sup>80</sup>

In the meantime, the Japanese government made another concession. Prime Minister Miki reportedly decided in August to include the hegemony clause in the main text of the treaty.<sup>81</sup> In November, Miyazawa told the Diet that if China agreed to the so-called four Miyazawa principles, the issue of whether the clause should be incorporated in the preamble or in the main

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<sup>78</sup> Miyazawa's statement in the Diet on November 7, 1975. See *Budget Committee Minutes, No. 8, House of Councilors, 76th Diet*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>79</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, September 25 & 28, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-188, C2 & -189, C5*, respectively.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, October 7, 1975 in *FBIS-APA-75-196, C3*. Also see Furukawa, *op.cit.*, p. 409.

<sup>81</sup> *Tokyo Shimbun*, August 31, 1975.

text was merely a technical question.<sup>82</sup> This was a time when official contacts between the two governments were suspended. China's people's diplomacy seemed to be producing its desired effect. In spite of Tokyo's concession, however, Beijing showed no sign of compromise.

The stalemate over the treaty negotiations continued throughout 1976. In February, it was disclosed in the United States Senate that high Japanese officials, including Tanaka Kakuei, had accepted secret donations from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Miki showed a strong commitment to conduct a thorough probe of the case, disregarding consensual party procedures. This caused grave concern among many Liberal Democrats.<sup>83</sup> Distrust of the prime minister developed into an oust-Miki drive in the spring of 1976 and persisted throughout the year. This intra-party rift created the worst-ever crisis of the LDP since its inception in 1955. Preoccupied with this factional infighting, Miki was unable to pursue the treaty issue further.

For reasons of their own, the Chinese were also unable to take up this controversial foreign policy issue during 1976. Zhou Enlai died in January, followed by the deaths of Marshal Zhu De<sup>84</sup> in July and Chairman Mao

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<sup>82</sup> For Miyazawa's statement on November 7, see *Budget Committee Minutes, No. 8, House of Councilors, 76th Diet*, p. 5.

<sup>83</sup> Shiina, for example, pointed out Miki's attitude toward the Lockheed case as one of the reasons for his demanding the prime minister's resignation. See his interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, June 27, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>84</sup> Zhu De, the father of the Red Army, was China's formal head of state at the time in his capacity as chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress.

Zedong in September. The deaths of these top leaders raised the question of political succession and inflamed the factional strife. Adding to this political turmoil were the catastrophic effects of the massive Tangshan earthquake of July 28. Thus, the Chinese leadership had little time to concentrate on diplomatic problems.

Moreover, Chinese leaders seemed to be greatly disturbed by a series of statements by Miyazawa that summer. When a Chinese goodwill delegation had visited Japan in spring, delegation leaders repeatedly expressed their support for "the just struggle of the Japanese people to recover their northern territories."<sup>85</sup> Commenting on this, the foreign minister told the upper house on July 9: "China's discussing this issue is not helpful for the settlement of the dispute."<sup>86</sup> Three days later, it was reported, Miyazawa told U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield that Japan did not favor early normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing.<sup>87</sup> The Chinese expressed strong regret over these remarks. Liao Zhengzhi later condemned the four Miyazawa principles

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<sup>85</sup> For statements by delegation leaders, Wang Pingnan and Li Xifang, see *Xinhua News Agency*, March 23, 26 and April 6, 1976 in *FBIS-CHI-76-58*, A4; -62, A14; and -68, A5.

<sup>86</sup> Miyazawa's statement on July 9, 1976. See *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, Extra #1, House of Councilors, 77th Diet*, p. 6.

<sup>87</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, July 20, 1976 in *FBIS-APA-76-133*, C4. Also see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 16, 1976, p. 2.

and his July 9 statement as impediments to treaty negotiations.<sup>88</sup> Thus, the Chinese government eagerly awaited a change in the Japanese cabinet.

### Changing Environment

The change came in December 1976 when Miki left office after the LDP failed to keep a majority of seats in the lower house.<sup>89</sup> The anti-Miki coalition chose Fukuda Takeo, a pro-Taiwan conservative, as Miki's successor. Fukuda was reluctant to take steps for resuming the talks with the Chinese. However, the changing environment in 1977, both domestic and international, compelled Fukuda to pursue the pending peace treaty.

In his policy speech of January 31, 1977, Fukuda expressed his commitment to an early conclusion of the treaty.<sup>90</sup> Shortly before this, Fukuda had entrusted Takeiri Yoshikatsu, Kômeitô chairman, with a message to Chinese leaders: His government would abandon the so-called Miyazawa conditions and sincerely observe the 1972 joint statement.<sup>91</sup> The new prime minister further made clear in the Diet that if China understood the limits of the

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<sup>88</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, January 27 (evening edition), 1977, p. 2.

<sup>89</sup> At the lower house election on December 5, 1976, the LDP gained only 41.8% of the votes and 249 seats, or 48.7% of the total 511 seats. The figures for the previous election in 1972 were 46.9% and 271 seats (55.2% of 491 seats).

<sup>90</sup> MOFA, *Waga Gaikô no Kinkyô* 1977, vol. 2, p. 10.

<sup>91</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, January 19 & 23, 1977.



Japanese constitution, he was prepared to accept the anti-hegemony clause in the preamble or in the main text of the treaty.<sup>92</sup> On May 29, Fukuda suggested the possibility of asking Hori Shigeru, now speaker of the lower house, to deliver his letter to Hua Guofeng.<sup>93</sup>

However, entrusting an opposition party leader with an important message was strongly criticized at the LDP's Executive Council meeting on January 21.<sup>94</sup> When the idea of Envoy Hori was surfaced, furthermore, conservative leaders of the party promptly voiced their opinions against hastily concluding the treaty at various meetings, both private and official.<sup>95</sup> Representing these cautious members, Shiina met Fukuda on June 3 and supposedly urged the prime minister to be prudent. As a result, Fukuda drew back on June 4, saying that whether Hori should carry his letter or not was yet to be decided.<sup>96</sup>

In fact, Fukuda was unwilling to conclude the peace pact. Since most of the opponents to the treaty were Fukuda affiliates, Fukuda would be the only prime minister who could disarm opposition within the ruling party. In

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<sup>92</sup> Fukuda's speech on February 3, 1977. See *House of Representatives Minutes, No.3, 80th Diet*, p. 43.

<sup>93</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 29 & 30, 1977. Also see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 5, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, January 22, 1977.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, May 31(morning & evening editions) & June 1, 1977.

<sup>96</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 5, p. 2 & June 10, p. 1, 1977; and *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 1977.

other words, the longer the treaty process, the longer the term of office for Fukuda. "Completing the treaty means to clear the way for the Ôhira government. This is the ABC of politics,"<sup>97</sup> Hamada Kôichi, who was close to Fukuda, told Tahara Sôichirô, a well-informed journalist. Hence, Fukuda supporters repeatedly advised him to delay the conclusion of the treaty. An anonymous MOFA official was quoted as saying, "the prime minister, though publicly expressing eagerness for the treaty, covertly instigated the members of his faction and the *Seirankai*<sup>98</sup> to vigorous opposition."<sup>99</sup>

The domestic environment was nonetheless gradually changing. First and foremost, the Japanese business community was steadily building a foundation for more expansive economic relations with China. Beginning with the breakdown of the textile negotiations in 1971, the Japanese were experiencing waves of trade tension with the United States.<sup>100</sup> Moreover, the Japanese economy had stagnated in the wake of the introduction of floating exchange-rate in February 1973 and the first oil crisis of 1973-74. Japan needed

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<sup>97</sup> Tahara Sôichirô, *Nihon no Kanryô* 1980, pp. 22-23.

<sup>98</sup> Out of 160-odd pro-Taiwan members of the LDP who formed the Japan-Taiwan Parliamentarians Roundtable in March 1973, about 30 younger and more radical members organized the *Seirankai* (Blue Tempest) in July 1973.

<sup>99</sup> Tahara, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>100</sup> For the textile dispute, see I.M. Destler, et al., *Managing an Alliance*, pp. 35-45.

to increase exports to boost its economy.<sup>101</sup> It appeared imperative that they find alternative markets other than the United States and Europe. It was quite a natural consequence, therefore, that Japan's business circles eagerly tried to expand trade with China. After the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, bilateral trade between Japan and China more than tripled from \$1.1 billion in 1972 to \$3.79 billion in 1975.<sup>102</sup>

The trade suffered a setback in 1976 because of the politico-social turmoil in China, but the giant neighbor under Hua Guofeng appeared to be a promising market for Japanese products. The Hua leadership, in the process of consolidating its power, set up an ambitious economic plan for a decade from 1976, whose goal was to double China's electric output by 1985. Hoping the plan would contribute to a sharp increase in Japan's industrial exports, the business community sent several delegations to China in 1977. In February, Inayama Yoshihiro, Shin-Nihon Steel president, led a delegation from the Japan-China Economic Association (JCEA).<sup>103</sup> Among topics

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<sup>101</sup> For detailed analyses of Japanese economy during the 1970s, see Kanematsu Hideo, "Changes in the International Economic Environment" and Komiya Ryūtarō, "The U.S.-Japan Trade Conflict" in Daniel Okimoto, ed., *Japan's Economy*, pp. 7-20 and pp. 197-230, respectively.

<sup>102</sup> MITI, *Tsūshō Hakusho*, 1973 and 1976. Also see Appendix H of this dissertation.

<sup>103</sup> The Association was formed in November 1972 to take over the responsibilities of the Memorandum Trade Office and consistently engaged in exchanges of economic and trade delegations.

between the mission and the Chinese included an early conclusion of a peace treaty and a long-term trade agreement.<sup>104</sup>

Two months later, *Keidanren's*<sup>105</sup> (Federation of Economic Organization) delegation led by Chairman Dokô Toshio reached a basic agreement with the Chinese government for arranging a long-term trade agreement. On his return from Beijing, Dokô, together with all of the eight *Keidanren* vice chairmen, met Fukuda and urged the prime minister to quickly conclude the treaty.<sup>106</sup>

What is more, on September 19, a committee for promoting a long-term trade agreement was formed, and Inayama Yoshihiro, JCEA chair and *Keidanren* vice chair, assumed committee head.<sup>107</sup> After another trip to Beijing in November, Inayama announced that the trade pact would be signed early the following year.<sup>108</sup> The agreement called for two-way trade of \$20 billion for the next eight years. The peace treaty between the two governments, when concluded, would help secure business opportunities provided

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<sup>104</sup> See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, February 2 (evening edition), 1977, p. 3; and *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 9, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>105</sup> A peak organization that represents various industries, including steel, automobile, chemical, energy, electric, shipbuilding, financial, and trading companies. With almost all the major corporations in Japan in its membership, the Federation's chairman is dubbed "president of the business community." *Keidanren* regularly provides the Government, political parties and the Diet with its opinions and advice.

<sup>106</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, April 3, p. 1 & April 4, 1977.

<sup>107</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 19 (evening edition), 1977, p. 2.

<sup>108</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, December 1, 1977, p. 7.

by China's modernization programs. These moves had a "reverberation"<sup>109</sup> effect (to use Putnam's terminology) on the political climate in Japan.

Following this businessmen's lead, the media shifted their arguments by the end of 1977. In addition to the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, which had consistently supported the treaty from the very beginning, Japan's two largest papers, the *Yomiuri* and *Asahi*, now argued for the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause.<sup>110</sup> The *Mainichi* still urged the government to make a deliberate effort not to invite suspicions from third countries, but the paper did not oppose the phrase any longer.<sup>111</sup> Now the *Sankei* was the only paper that explicitly argued against the treaty.<sup>112</sup>

Opposition parties changed their positions as well. The JSP incorporated opposition to superpowers' hegemonism in its Action Policy of 1976, but the pro-Moscow faction of the party successfully eliminated the phrase at the party convention in early 1977.<sup>113</sup> As a result, the Socialists disappointed the

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<sup>109</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games" in *International Organization*, 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 454-56.

<sup>110</sup> See their editorials: *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 1 & November 17, 1977, p. 5; and *Asahi Shimbun*, December 19, 1977, p. 5. Japan's largest newspaper, *Yomiuri*, is regarded as conservative, whereas the second-largest, *Asahi*, relatively liberal. However, the cozy relationship between the government and the media in Japan is well known. For various views on the Japanese media, see Susan Pharr, "Media as Trickster in Japan," in Pharr and Krauss, eds., *Media and Politics in Japan*, pp. 19-43.

<sup>111</sup> See *Mainichi Shimbun*, editorial, October 1, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>112</sup> *Sankei Shimbun* is the smallest of the five major newspapers in Japan. Its views are conservative and often nationalistic. See its editorial, October 11, 1977, p. 6.

<sup>113</sup> A JSP member, Okada Haruo, was quoted by *Asahi Shimbun*, February 19, 1977, p. 2.

Chinese. Still the party's pro-Beijing posture remained unchanged. On the other hand, Kōmeitō, which decided in May 1975 not to take any stance on the issue, was now totally committed to the treaty.<sup>114</sup> Chairman Takeiri and Secretary General Yano would be among the key players in reopening the treaty negotiations. The DSP moderated its opposition to the Chinese position and requested the Chinese embassy in April to accept its delegation to Beijing.<sup>115</sup> The New Liberal Club, which split from the LDP the previous year, expressed its support for the treaty and sent its mission in September. Thus, by the fall, all opposition parties except the JCP were promoting the treaty.

The year of 1977 was the fifth anniversary of the normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations. Commemorating this, *Nitchū Giren* sent a 17-member delegation to Beijing in September. Meeting with them, Deng Xiaoping, who had made his third political comeback in July, showed readiness for treaty talks. He told the mission that the treaty could be signed in one second if only Prime Minister Fukuda so decided. Since Deng carried great weight in the Hua leadership, delegation leaders were convinced that a good

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<sup>114</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 12, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, May 1, 1977, p. 2.

opportunity had arrived to conclude the proposed treaty. They urged Fukuda to resume negotiations with China.<sup>116</sup>

A substantial change was observed on the other side of the Pacific, too. Jimmy Carter had been sworn in as president in January 1977. Normalization of relations with China was a key strategic goal of the Carter administration.<sup>117</sup> As a first step, the American secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, made a five-day trip to Beijing in August. On his way home, Vance stopped over in Tokyo and held a two-hour meeting with the Japanese prime minister, Fukuda. He briefed Fukuda on the readiness of the Chinese government for the Sino-Japanese treaty. The secretary of state reportedly told the prime minister that any decision on treaty talks should rest with the Japanese government, to whose decision Washington would not object.<sup>118</sup> One MOFA official was quoted by a *Mainichi* reporter without being identified: "At a time when the Taiwan issue was obstructing diplomatic normalization between the United States and China, improved relations between Tokyo and Beijing would be beneficial to American strategy in Asia and toward the Soviet

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<sup>116</sup> Deng's words were made public by the delegation on September 16. See *Tokyo Shimbun*, September 17, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>117</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 196.

<sup>118</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, December 31, 1977.

Union."<sup>119</sup> Unlike in the spring of 1975, a conclusion of the Japanese-Chinese peace treaty was now desirable for the United States.

That summer, an American scholar who was close to the Carter administration visited Japan and predicted that the United States would establish formal diplomatic relations with China within a year.<sup>120</sup> The political repercussions of this statement were fairly big in Japan because the Japanese clearly remembered a Nixon shock from six years before. Richard Nixon announced on July 15, 1971 that his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, had met Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and that the president would himself visit China at a proper time before May 1972. The announcement was made at 10:30 p.m. on television (11:30 a.m., July 16, Japan Time). The Japanese ambassador to Washington was informed of its content an hour prior to the broadcast. The information ultimately reached the then Japanese prime minister, Satô Eisaku, at 11:27 a.m., only three minutes before the announcement.<sup>121</sup>

Hostile relations between the United States and China had thus come to an end in utter secrecy. The dismay of Japanese officials was openly expressed as "U.S. diplomacy over the head of Japan." The embarrassed

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<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> See a press conference by Richard Barnett, director of the Policy Research Institute, in *Tokyo Shimbun*, July 30, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>121</sup> For the development of the events and the magnitude of the shock the Japanese government experienced, see Furukawa, *op.cit.*, pp. 332-8.



foreign ministry was headed by none other than Fukuda Takeo at the time. Now that the Carter administration was taking another step toward normalization of its relations with Beijing, it is little wonder that Japanese officials definitely hoped to avoid another setback analogous to the Nixon shock. Events were compelling them to conclude the pending treaty.<sup>122</sup>

Hence, in the fall of 1977, the Japanese government finally decided to pursue the peace pact with China. Pro-Taipei LDP members were against this move, but two arch-conservative elders had changed their position by this time. Kishi Nobusuke, former premier and Fukuda's predecessor as his faction head, visited Taiwan in October and explained to Taiwanese officials that a conclusion of the treaty would not affect the existing Japanese-Taiwanese relations.<sup>123</sup> Shiina, on the other hand, made a trip to South Korea toward the end of November to remove similar anxieties of the Korean government. In fact, Kishi had visited the United States and met President Carter in September. A change in the U.S. policy may have been responsible for the positive posture of these elders.

Needless to say, business pressure was another reason. According to MOFA officials, the decision was based on three factors: 1. the political foundation of the Hua Guofeng regime was firm and stable; 2. the peace

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<sup>122</sup> Robert E. Bedeski also views that the imminent U.S.-Chinese rapprochement quickened the Japanese-Chinese negotiations. See his *The Fragile Entente*, particularly chapter 3, pp.19-43.

<sup>123</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, November 12, 1977.

treaty was a necessary step to signing a long-term trade agreement; and 3. if Japan accepted the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the main text of the treaty, China would accommodate the Japanese desire to dilute the political implications of the clause.<sup>124</sup> The second point clearly showed that business interests were a major factor of the government decision.

In addition, the last point indicates that, by the fall of 1977, the Chinese leadership had also moderated its position. Owada Hisashi, secretary to the prime minister, sensed that the Chinese were ready for a compromise. After the Vietnam war, in his analysis, improving relations with Japan became more important for the Chinese than anti-Sovietism.<sup>125</sup>

As was the case in diplomatic normalization in 1972,<sup>126</sup> the business community took the lead in changing the domestic climate surrounding the issue. At the same time, the shift in the American China policy had a significant impact on Japan's decision-making as well.

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<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, November 7, 1977, p. 2. Also see Hong N. Kim, "The Fukuda Government and the Politics of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty," in *Asian Survey*, 19:3 (March 1979), p. 301.

<sup>125</sup> Owada, *Gaikō towa Nanika* (What is Diplomacy?), p. 196.

<sup>126</sup> The impact of the business community on the normalization process, see Ogata Sadako, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy" in Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, pp. 175-203.

## Surmounting Impediments

Determined to resume talks with Beijing, Prime Minister Fukuda reshuffled his cabinet on November 28, 1977. He appointed as foreign minister Sonoda Sunao, a passionate advocate of the peace treaty. The trade pact was concluded in February, and Washington was urging Tokyo to hasten the peace treaty. Yet, the Japanese government faced delicate issues in the spring of 1978, such as a territorial dispute with the Chinese fishermen over the Senkaku islands and fishery negotiations with Moscow. The most difficult task of all, however, was to obtain endorsement from the LDP.

When the moves for treaty negotiations became public, the Soviet Union once again tried to check those moves in Japan. *Pravda*, the organ of the Soviet Communist Party, warned in its November 26 article that a signing of a treaty with an anti-Soviet provision would be detrimental to Soviet-Japanese relations as a whole, and that third states "are entitled to take retaliatory measures."<sup>127</sup> The Japanese Foreign Ministry dismissed this warning as arbitrary and unfounded. The ministry repeated its vow to renew efforts to convince the Soviets that the hegemony clause was not to be directed against them.<sup>128</sup> Foreign Minister Sonoda conferred with Satô Shôji

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<sup>127</sup> The full text of the article was released by the TASS News Agency on November 25 near midnight. See FBIS-SOV-77-228, M1-3.

<sup>128</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, November 27, 1977 in FBIS-APA-77-228, C3.

and Shigemitsu Akira, ambassadors to Beijing and Moscow, respectively, on December 20. The three reportedly agreed that even if the Japan-China treaty was signed, it was unlikely that the Soviets would take any strong action that would impair their relations with Japan.<sup>129</sup>

In early January of 1978, Sonoda visited Moscow for the Periodic Consultation of Foreign Ministers. When Soviet leaders expressed apprehension over the development of the Japanese-Chinese treaty, the foreign minister explained that it was neither directed against any third country nor would it result in any action against the Soviet Union.<sup>130</sup> Although the Soviets were not convinced, MOFA believed that, with this explanation made, an important step was completed toward resuming negotiations with China.<sup>131</sup> Thus, on February 14, Ambassador Satô visited Vice Foreign Minister Han Nienlung to investigate the Chinese position.

The situation was urgent. The earlier announced trade pact was signed on February 16, 1978. By its provisions, Japan would export \$7-8 billion of industrial plants and technology and \$2-3 billion of construction materials

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<sup>129</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, December 21, 1977.

<sup>130</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, January 10 & 11, 1978 in *FBIS-SOV-78-7*, M1&3. Also see *Asahi Shimbun*, January 10, 1978.

<sup>131</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, January 11, p. 2; and *Asahi Shimbun*, January 10 (evening edition) & 12, in 1978.

and machinery in exchange for \$10 billion of Chinese crude oil and coal.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, on March 6, the Chinese foreign ministry made a complete announcement on its ten-year plan (1976-85). Unlike previous announcements, which were only sketchy and preliminary, this one was elaborate in its detail. It laid out a highly ambitious plan that could cost as much as \$100 billion.<sup>133</sup> It seems obvious that these developments convinced Japanese business leaders and the Fukuda government that the time was fully ripe for the projected treaty of peace and friendship to be concluded. It would lay a foundation for a further expansion of their trade relations.<sup>134</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the prime minister entrusted his message once again to Kômeitô. Fukuda, together with Sonoda and Abe, met Takeiri and Yano on March 8. Fukuda asked Yano, who was to lead the party's sixth delegation to China, to convey his message to Chinese leaders.<sup>135</sup> The Japanese government was ready to take flexible measures: 1. if Beijing agreed that opposition to hegemonism did not mean joint actions by the two countries; and 2. if it understood Japan's peaceful constitution and omni-

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<sup>132</sup> For the full text, see *Tokyo Shimbun*, February 16 (evening edition), 1978, p. 2 in U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, *Daily Summary of Japanese Press (DSJP)*, February 24, 1978, pp. 5-6.

<sup>133</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, March 7, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-46*, C3.

<sup>134</sup> See, for example, a speech by Inayama Yoshihiro in a Beijing hotel after he signed the Long-Term Trade Agreement; *Kyodo News Service*, February 17, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-34*, C1.

<sup>135</sup> Media reports were not clear about Fukuda's message, but Deng-Yano talks on March 14 suggest that these two were the content of his message. For the detail of their conversation, see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 16, 1978, p. 4.

directional diplomacy.<sup>136</sup> In reply, Liao Zhengzhi, president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, dispatched China's four-point platform: 1. There had been no change in China's commitment to the treaty; 2. developing friendly relations between the two countries was not directed against any third country, but both countries were against any country or group of countries that sought hegemony; 3. anti-hegemony did not mean joint actions by China and Japan because each had its own foreign policy; and 4. there was no impediment in China to reopening treaty negotiations.<sup>137</sup> The third point was particularly encouraging to the Fukuda government because it would allow Japan to act on its own judgment concerning hegemonism.

After this, therefore, Fukuda stepped up his efforts. A top government conference was held on March 22. Present were Sonoda, Abe and senior MOFA officials--Arita Keisuke, vice minister, Takashima Masuo, deputy minister for political affairs, Nakae Yôsuke, director of the Asian Affairs Bureau, and Ômori Seiichi, director of the Treaty Bureau. This was the first meeting in which treaty substance was actually discussed.<sup>138</sup> The following

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<sup>136</sup> This term was used by the Fukuda government to make it clear that Japan's diplomacy was based upon its constitution and not against any third country. The preamble of the constitution declares that Japan will secure for its people "the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations."

<sup>137</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, March 15, 1978.

<sup>138</sup> Nagano Nobutoshi, *Tennô to Tô Shôhei no Akushu* (The Emperor and Deng Xiaoping shake hands), pp. 216-17.

day, the prime minister requested Ôhira Masayoshi, LDP secretary general, to work for a party consensus. Then, on March 24, Fukuda publicly announced that he had made up his mind to resume the long-stalled negotiations with China. The prime minister told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the lower house that a formal decision would be made after the government obtained assent of the LDP.<sup>139</sup>

When the government decision was made and the secretary general started to elicit party opinions, pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats quickly held meetings. Twelve *Seirankai* members, including Agriculture Minister Nakagawa Ichirô, met in the evening of March 23. The following day, about 30 Diet members gathered at a meeting of the Asian Issues Study Group (*A-Ken*).<sup>140</sup> The gist of their argument was: 1. The hegemony clause should not be incorporated because it would entangle Japan in the Sino-Soviet conflict; 2. Taiwan's international status should be secured; 3. the treaty should not be concluded till the Sino-Soviet treaty,<sup>141</sup> which was hostile to Japan, expired; and 4. Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku islands should be ensured.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 8, House of Representatives, 84th Diet, p. 13.*

<sup>140</sup> A-Ken was formed in December 1964 by pro-Taipei elements within the LDP. Composed mostly of the mainstream factions, such as Kishi, Satô and Ishii, its purpose at the time was to prevent Prime Minister Satô from taking a pro-Beijing course.

<sup>141</sup> The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance became effective in April 1950 and would expire in April 1980 if the Chinese or the Soviets announced by April 1979 their intention to abrogate. Its Article 1 stated that the two countries will jointly take "all necessary measures" against aggression by Japan or any country that may collaborate with Japan.

Realizing the necessity of some more spadework, Fukuda invited Nadao Hirokichi on March 25 to his private residence.<sup>143</sup> Nadao was accompanied by three radical members of the Fukuda faction—Machimura Kingo, Tamaki Kazuo and Fujio Masayuki. The prime minister argued that if the treaty remained unsettled indefinitely, Japan would not only allow political maneuvers by the Chinese and the Soviets, but the opposition parties at home might also exploit the situation to criticize his government.<sup>144</sup> Yet the hawks seemed unconvinced.

On March 27, Ôhira arranged a meeting of the Government-LDP top officials. Fukuda, Sonoda and Abe attended from the government and the five top officers from the LDP—Ôhira, Funada Naka, vice president, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Executive Council chief, Esaki Masumi, PARC chair, and Tokunaga Masatoshi, the head of Liberal Democrats in the upper house. The following day, they invited party elders—Shiina, Nadao and Ishii Mitsujirô from cautious groups and Miki and Nishimura Eiichi from pro-treaty groups. After expressing his determination, Fukuda asked them to coordinate intra-

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<sup>142</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23 and 24 (evening edition), 1978; and *Tokyo Shimbun*, March 25, 1978, p. 2.

<sup>143</sup> Nagano, *op.cit.*, p. 218.

<sup>144</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, March 26, 1978.



party views on the subject, but each elder simply presented his own cherished view.<sup>145</sup> In short, the prime minister failed to secure their endorsement.

The coordination efforts still continued. Ôhira and Sonoda attended the party's Executive Council meeting on March 28 and a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Division on March 30 to seek a support.<sup>146</sup> After a stormy discussion, the Foreign Affairs Division continued its meetings on April 7 and 11 but was unable to reach a consensus. In fact, the party was still divided over this issue. According to a survey of all LDP Diet members in early April, 34.8% (118 out of 339 respondents) favored an immediate conclusion of the treaty, whereas 46.6% (158 members) were against an early settlement.<sup>147</sup> Party consensus seemed to be still a long way off.<sup>148</sup>

While the treaty issue was undergoing heated debate in the ruling party, the Maritime Safety Agency, Japan's coast guard, reported on April 12 that about 100 Chinese fishing boats were operating inside and around Japan's territorial waters off the disputed Senkaku islands.<sup>149</sup> The ships were armed

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<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, March 24 (evening edition), 1978; and *Kyodo News Service*, March 28, 1978 in FBIS-APA-78-60, C1.

<sup>146</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 27 (evening edition), 1978; and *Asahi Shimbun*, March 31, 1978.

<sup>147</sup> The *Asahi Shimbun* conducted interviews with 339 Liberal Democrats (222 in Lower House and 117 in Upper House) during April 5-9. This constitutes 89.7% of 378 LDP members in the Diet. See *Asahi Shimbun*, April 12, 1978.

<sup>148</sup> For the LDP division over this issue, see Appendix E.

<sup>149</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, April 12, 1978 in FBIS-APA-78-71, C2.

with machine guns and carried signs which read that they had the right to conduct fishing within Chinese territorial waters. The Japanese government lodged a protest with the Chinese government. MOFA demanded that the Chinese fishing boats immediately leave the area and that China not repeat such illegal actions in the future.<sup>150</sup> In response, Wang Xiaoyun, deputy chief of China's Asian Affairs Bureau, insisted that operations by Chinese fishing boats in the area did not constitute a violation of Japan's territorial waters because the islands were China's inherent territory.<sup>151</sup>

In the wake of this so-called Senkaku incident, the LDP hawks hardened their stance. At a meeting of the party's top officers on April 14, for example, Executive Council Chairman Nakasone strongly argued that measures should be taken so as to ensure Japan's effective control over the islands. He reiterated the suggestions by the Council, such as building a lighthouse, a heliport and other facilities on the islands. His faction, in fact, later decided to oppose the resumption of treaty talks if this issue was not resolved. However, the party as a whole was not swayed by this move. The conclusion of the April 14 meeting was to cope with the issue calmly and to support measures to be taken by the government.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, April 13, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-72*, C6.

<sup>151</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, April 15 (evening edition), 1978, p. 2.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, April 14 (evening edition), p. 1 and April 26, in 1978.

Nor was the government. Tokyo handled this delicate issue with considerable restraint, attempting to separate it from treaty negotiations.<sup>153</sup> When Wang Xiaoyun explained on April 21 that the incident had not been intentional but accidental, Foreign Minister Sonoda immediately expressed that the Japanese government would accept this official explanation by the Chinese government.<sup>154</sup> Liao Zhengzhi further told a visiting Japanese Dietman that China would try to avoid recurrence of similar incidents.<sup>155</sup> Both sides were determined not to allow this incident to impair their friendly relations as a whole.

The month of April was a delicate time also in terms of Japan-Soviet relations. Negotiations for salmon and trout fishing, which had started in mid-February, were still underway at the time. The rough negotiations had finally reached the point where a political settlement was foreseeable during the upcoming Moscow visit by Agriculture Minister Nakagawa Ichirô.<sup>156</sup> Although Japanese officials publicly discounted the possibility of a Soviet retaliation, Japan-China negotiations and Japan-Soviet relations were by no means separate and unrelated. Sonoda admitted in the Diet that the two

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<sup>153</sup> See Fukuda's statement at the upper house plenary session on April 17 in *House of Councilors Minutes, No. 16, 84th Diet*, p. 445.

<sup>154</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, April 22, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-79*, C1.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, April 28, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-83*, C7.

<sup>156</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, April 4, 1978, p. 2.

issues would inevitably affect each other.<sup>157</sup> Fukuda also hinted on April 5 at the possibility that the resumption of Japan-China talks would be postponed until the fishery negotiations were over.<sup>158</sup> Despite its bold front, the Japanese government was nervous after all about what demands the Soviets would make and what amount of fish-catch could be secured for the year. To put it another way, relations with the Soviet Union were casting a shadow over the negotiation process of the Japanese-Chinese treaty. When the fishery talks ended on April 21, in fact, the salmon catch quota was reduced drastically from 62,000 tons in 1977 to 42,500 tons for 1978.<sup>159</sup>

Japan-U.S. summit talks, it appears, helped clear away those dark clouds. Meeting with Fukuda on May 3, President Carter not only endorsed treaty negotiations with China, he rather strongly urged their completion. A Japanese government official was quoted by the *Asahi Shimbun* as saying that U.S. leaders, including the president, had expressed this position fairly clearly.<sup>160</sup> This was later verified by Zbigniew Brzezinski, security advisor to the president. On his way home from Beijing in late May, according to his

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<sup>157</sup> For Sonoda's comments on March 28, 1978, see *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 8, House of Councilors*, p. 19; for those on April 5, see *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 11, House of Representatives*, p. 14; both in 84th Diet.

<sup>158</sup> For Fukuda's words at a meeting with five former cabinet ministers, see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 6, 1978, p. 2.

<sup>159</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, April 22, 1978 in *FBIS-SOV-78-79*, M1.

<sup>160</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 8 (evening edition), 1978, p. 1.

memoirs, Brzezinski not only urged Fukuda and Sonoda to settle the treaty with the anti-hegemony clause but he also added that the United States "favored an expeditious conclusion of the treaty."<sup>161</sup>

At a meeting on June 20, in fact, American top officials chose December 15 as a target date for public announcement, and their first talks with the Chinese took place on July 15.<sup>162</sup> Considering these subsequent rapid developments, it can plausibly be argued that the Japanese government was more or less informed of the prospect for Sino-U.S. relations when the security advisor briefed Fukuda on the substance of his meetings with Chinese leaders. If the Washington-Beijing talks were making progress at all, it goes without saying that Tokyo would accelerate its negotiations, which had been at a standstill for three years.

Now the last task to be surmounted was LDP hawks. After formally settling the Senkaku incident on May 10,<sup>163</sup> Fukuda met Ôhira on May 18. He requested a prompt assurance of party consensus. Accordingly, Ôhira arranged another Government-LDP meeting on May 22. There, the prime minister announced that he would reopen talks with China in about a week and that Foreign Minister Sonoda would be dispatched to Beijing at an

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<sup>161</sup> Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p. 218.

<sup>162</sup> For the developments of the U.S.-Sino negotiations, see *ibid.*, pp. 223-233.

<sup>163</sup> Ambassador Satô met Han Nienlung on May 10 and officially accepted China's explanation that the incident was "accidental."

appropriate time.<sup>164</sup> Being asked to wrap up their coordination efforts within the party, the five top party officers agreed to reach a final consensus at an Executive Council meeting on May 26.<sup>165</sup>

In his effort to secure support from hawkish Liberal Democrats, Fukuda also met two members of the *A-Ken* on May 18 and six representatives of the *Seirankai* on May 23. He obtained their tacit consent by arguing that reopening negotiations and concluding the treaty were two different matters: "You can leave it to me because I will not sign the treaty until an arrangement is made that will satisfy both countries."<sup>166</sup> By this time the Fukuda faction, which constituted the largest element within the pro-Taiwan group, had decided to cooperate towards the resumption of dialogue.<sup>167</sup> When the environment did not allow the prime minister to prolong the negotiations any longer, it was difficult for the hawks, who were mostly Fukuda supporters, to embarrass their champion by persisting in their opposition.

Fukuda's groundwork thus reached its final stages at long last. At a cabinet meeting on May 23, the prime minister secured unanimous support

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<sup>164</sup> Kiyomiya Ryû, *Fukuda Seiken 714-nichi* (714 Days of the Fukuda Administration), p. 214.

<sup>165</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, May 22, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-100*, C1.

<sup>166</sup> Kiyomiya, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

<sup>167</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 19, 1978.

for reopening negotiations.<sup>168</sup> This was followed by the party's Foreign Affairs Division meeting on May 24. Although opposing views were expressed there, the chairman, Kosaka Zentarô, successfully won the Division's consent to the government policy without dissent.<sup>169</sup> Finally, the Executive Council—whose approval is a required formality in party decision-making—held its meeting on May 26. The conference was by no means amicable. Tamaki Kazuo, a *Seirankai* member who also belonged to the Fukuda faction, for example, was against treaty talks till the very last moment. Nonetheless, Chairman Nakasone was able to declare Council approval of the government plan on conditions that Japan: 1. maintain its autonomy by avoiding involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict; 2. defend its territorial integrity and national security; and 3. preserve peace and stability in Asia.<sup>170</sup> Endorsement from the cabinet and the ruling party having been thus acquired, the Japanese embassy in Beijing informed the Chinese foreign ministry on May 27 of Japan's wish for a meeting between Satô and Han.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, May 23, 1978 in FBIS-APA-78-100, C1; and *Asahi Shimbun*, May 23 (evening edition), 1978, p. 2.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, May 24, 1978 in FBIS-APA-78-101, C2.

<sup>170</sup> For the details of this meeting, see Kiyomiya, *op.cit.*, p. 215 and *Sankei Shimbun*, May 27, 1978, p. 2.

<sup>171</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, May 27, 1978 in FBIS-APA-78-104, C1; *Asahi Shimbun*, May 27 (evening edition), 1978.

## Negotiations Resumed, Treaty Signed

The official proposal was made by Ambassador Satô through Vice Foreign Minister Han Nienlung on May 31. The Soviet Union filed a protest. Pro-Taiwan Liberal Democrats were not happy, either. Yet the Fukuda government, despite the prime minister's promise of not signing the treaty, decided to aim at concluding the pact. Before taking each step--whether it be dispatching Sonoda to Beijing or signing the treaty--Fukuda made sure that the issue was approved by the officials, elders, and conservative members of the ruling party.

Now that a resumption of Japan-China dialogue seemed imminent, the Soviet ambassador, Dmitry Polyansky, delivered a statement of protest by his government on June 19. This was the first official protest by the Soviet Union since June of 1975 when Gromyko presented the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Shigemitsu Akira, with a Soviet protest against the anti-hegemony provision. However, Fukuda, Abe and Sonoda all repudiated the new Soviet objections.<sup>172</sup> Moreover, despite the prime minister's assurance that a resumption would not necessarily lead to signing the treaty, it was decided on June 22 that they would aim at a conclusion of the treaty. At this meeting, the three leaders were joined by Mori Yoshirô, deputy cabinet

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<sup>172</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, June 19, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-119, C1*; *Asahi Shimbun*, June 20, 1978.



secretary, Ambassador Satô, Vice Minister Arita, Asian Affairs Bureau Chief Nakae, and Treaty Bureau Chief Ômori.<sup>173</sup> Negotiations were formally commenced on July 21. Satô Shôji led the eight-member Japanese delegation, with Nakae second in charge. China's nine-member negotiating team included Han Nienlung and Wang Xiaoyun, deputy director of the Asian Affairs Bureau.<sup>174</sup>

China's position had not changed from its 1975 draft proposal: "The establishment and development of friendly relations between the two countries are not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."<sup>175</sup> The Japanese made a major compromise by accepting the anti-hegemony clause in the main text of the draft. However, they wanted to make it clear that the treaty was not directed against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it should be indicated that the treaty was intended to oppose hegemony as a universal principle, and did not imply joint actions by Japan and China. Hence, their draft treaty proposed on July 22 read. "The present Treaty is not directed at any specific third country. Neither of the two

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<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, June 22, 1978 in FBIS-APA-78-121, C1. Also see Kiyomiya, *op.cit.*, p. 216 and Nagano, *op.cit.*, pp. 242-44.

<sup>174</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 19, 1978. Also see Nagano, *op.cit.*, p. 248.

<sup>175</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 26, 1978. *Yomiuri Shimbun & Japan Times*, August 6, 1978.

Contracting Parties should seek hegemony in any region in the world and each expresses opposition to efforts by ..."176

The Chinese appreciated the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause. Yet, they objected that the first sentence was another way of saying that the treaty was not directed against Soviet hegemonism.<sup>177</sup> They insisted that it was illogical to express anti-hegemony on one hand and to claim on the other that the objection was not directed at any specific nation.<sup>178</sup> The Japanese gave up the word "specific" and proposed to add a new expression: "The present Treaty shall not be interpreted to affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries."<sup>179</sup> The Chinese were reluctant to accept the word "interpreted" but showed willingness to compromise in line with this latest Japanese proposal.<sup>180</sup>

With the working-level talks almost completed by August 4, Nakae Yôsuke returned from Beijing to brief top leaders. Fukuda convened a final top meeting on August 6, at which he was joined by Sonoda, Abe and Mori as

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<sup>176</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 23, 1978. Nagano, *op.cit.*, pp. 251-52. (Underlines added. Tokyo wanted to make it clear that the treaty was not directed against the Soviet Union but a universal principle that can be applied to any region in the world. It also tried to show that the treaty would not lead to any action.)

<sup>177</sup> Nagano, *op.cit.*, p. 253.

<sup>178</sup> See an interview of Zhang Xiangshan, vice president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, with *Kyodo News Service* in *Asahi Shimbun & Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 6, 1978.

<sup>179</sup> Chae-jin Lee, "The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty" in *Pacific Affairs*, 52:3 (Fall 1979), p. 420. Also see Nagano, *op.cit.*, p. 257.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.* Also see Nagano, *op.cit.*, pp. 260-61.

well as Arita Keisuke and Takashima Masuo. At this meeting, it was decided that Sonoda would visit China with two alternative drafts of the "third-country" clause. To seek agreement on dispatching Sonoda, the prime minister contacted the five top party officers on the spot by phone, as well as pro-Taiwan conservatives such as Nadao Hirokichi and Fujio Masayuki of the *A-Ken*. Although the conservatives did not support the idea, the party's Executive Council approved it on August 7.<sup>181</sup>

Sonoda met Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua on August 9 and showed the two alternatives. One was a revised version of their latest proposal: "The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries."<sup>182</sup> The other stated, "That the Contracting Parties conclude the present Treaty and strengthen and develop peaceful and friendly relations shall not impair the interests of third countries."<sup>183</sup> Huang chose the former draft, accepting the word "Treaty" as the subject of the sentence. This was a major concession on the part of China.

On August 10, in Tokyo, acting with great prudence, Fukuda once again met the five top officers to confirm their endorsement to signing the treaty.

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<sup>181</sup> See Kiyomiya, *op.cit.*, p. 200; *Kyodo News Service*, August 7, 1978 in *FBIS-APA-78-152, C2*; and *Tokyo Shimbun*, August 7 (evening edition), 1978, p. 2.

<sup>182</sup> Nagano, *op.cit.*, pp. 267-76. Also see *Asahi Shimbun*, August 8, 1978.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.* Also see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 11, 1978.

At an Executive Council meeting later that day, hawkish members expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the Senkaku issue had not been taken up at Beijing talks. However, no one dared to swim against the tide any longer.<sup>184</sup> The last of Fukuda's lobbying efforts came on August 11 when he briefed party elders. Finally, on August 12, the signing was approved by the LDP top officers at 10 a.m., by the PARC at 10:30, and by the Executive Council at 11 a.m. With all these party procedures completed, a cabinet meeting was held in the afternoon to formalize the decision of the Japanese government. That evening, the five-article treaty<sup>185</sup> was signed by Sonoda and Huang in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

### Analysis

This case began as purely a diplomatic matter within the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. After the disclosure of a Chinese demand concerning anti-hegemony, however, the issue was suddenly transformed into a pluralistic one. A variety of political forces, both domestic and foreign, intervened, and the treaty process became deadlocked. It took almost four years to conclude the pact. The events of this case are revealing in at least three ways: First, this

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<sup>184</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 10 (evening edition), 1978.

<sup>185</sup> For the whole text of the treaty, see Appendix C.

case shows that when the ruling party is divided, it is inevitable that political leaders work as mediators and that policy outcome be acceptable to the opposing elements within the LDP. Second, it demonstrates the importance of economic considerations in Japanese diplomacy. Finally, this chapter also indicates that the United States' policy has significant influence on decisions by the Japanese government.

First of all, this case shows that when the ruling party is divided along ideological lines, administrative officials leave the resolution of the case in the hands of political leaders. When the Japanese government finally decided to pursue the peace pact in the fall of 1977, the greatest difficulty was in obtaining support from pro-Taiwan groups within the LDP. Thus, bureaucrats turned to top political leaders for mediation. At the center of power were Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, and Foreign Minister Sonoda, with the prime minister in a commanding position. Making important decisions, Fukuda always consulted with senior MOFA officials-- Vice Minister Arita Keisuke, Deputy Minister Takashima Masuo, Asian Bureau Chief Nakae Yôsuke, and Treaty Bureau Chief Ômori Seiichi. Ambassador Satô Shôji, predecessor to Arita as vice minister, was also part of this policy-making team when necessary. Finally, Owada Hisashi, originally a

MOFA official but serving at the time as Fukuda's secretary, was always present when Fukuda met MOFA officials.<sup>186</sup>

The cabinet was not part of this process as either a policy- or a decision-making body. Instead, the governing party's intra-party procedures became an essential part of policy process. Cabinet meetings were routinely held twice a week. There, the prime minister made certain that all cabinet members were informed about negotiation developments and sought their cooperation. As an official formality, a cabinet meeting was convened on August 12 to approve the signing of the treaty. By that time, however, all the discussions and decisions had been made within the LDP. Acting on Fukuda's instructions, Abe and Sonoda joined Ôhira Masayoshi, secretary general of the party, in convincing Liberal Democrats through party organizations. On the other hand, Fukuda privately lobbied party leaders, elders, and hawkish members through informal, personal contacts. It was imperative that these political leaders work out a compromise solution acceptable not only to the Chinese but to the conservative Liberal Democrats as well.

Miki Takeo, always considered to be pro-Beijing, had failed to conclude the treaty of peace and friendship. Ironically, it was a pro-Taiwan conservative, Fukuda Takeo, who resumed the negotiations and successfully concluded the treaty. A notable difference between the two prime ministers

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<sup>186</sup> Nagano, *op.cit.*, p. 257. Also see Owada, *op.cit.*, pp. 195-96.

lay in their approach to party procedures. Miki invited fierce criticism from all quarters of his own party by disregarding prior consultations with major LDP figures, whereas Fukuda cautiously sought approval from opposing members of the ruling party--first for reopening the negotiations, then for dispatching Sonoda to Beijing, and finally for signing the treaty. Fukuda exercised a great amount of prudence in obtaining an endorsement from "every one of the opponents. It took six months to convince them all."<sup>187</sup>

Secondly, this chapter demonstrates the extent to which economic considerations carry weight in Japanese diplomacy. At a time when the Japanese needed to develop new sources of raw materials and diversify markets for their industrial products, it was only natural that they held high expectations for their giant neighbor, China. Accordingly, Japanese business circles regularly sent delegations to Beijing. During 1977, they had taken concrete steps for a long-term agreement that would bring \$20 billion of trade. These concerted efforts by Japanese business and the Chinese government did indeed "reverberate within domestic politics"<sup>188</sup> in Japan. By the end of 1977, except for the conservative *Sankei Shimbun*, all major newspapers argued for an early conclusion of the treaty. So did opposition parties other than the JCP.

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<sup>187</sup> Fukuda's words in *Chûdokoron*, October 1980, p. 293.

<sup>188</sup> Putnam, *op.cit.*, p. 454.

To create this reverberation effect, Beijing fully utilized people's diplomacy. In the spring of 1975, for instance, the Chinese successfully convinced the JSP to change its position on anti-hegemony. When Fukuda took office, Liao Zhengzhi, president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, expressed disappointment with Miki and Miyazawa and high expectations for the new prime minister.<sup>189</sup> Yet, this was done, not through official channels, but through a business delegation. Furthermore, in June 1977, when Fukuda appeared too cautious, Liao once again used a meeting with a group of visitors from Yokohama City to criticize Fukuda's indecisive-ness.<sup>190</sup> Beyond that, China's four-point platform that broke the stalemate in Tokyo-Beijing talks was, as earlier discussed, delivered through a Kōmeitō delegation, the second largest opposition party.

Each time treaty discussions appeared to advance, the Soviet Union tried to influence or even threatened the Japanese. The Soviets used the news media, diplomatic channels, and annual fishery negotiations to influence Tokyo. Given its emphasis on omni-directional diplomacy, the Fukuda government tried not to undermine its relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, priority was given to China over the Soviet Union. In fact, despite this diplomatic orientation, MOFA documents indicate that

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<sup>189</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, January 27 (evening edition), 1977, p. 2.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, June 26, 1977.



China began to weigh more and more heavily in Japan's consciousness, especially after the diplomatic normalization in 1972.<sup>191</sup>

Finally, since its inception in January, the Carter administration was taking measures toward improving its own relations with China. If Tokyo wished to avoid another diplomatic embarrassment, it was imperative that it conclude the pending treaty. With the two closest allies of the Japanese government--Japan's business establishment and the United States--thus moving ahead, and with pressing economic necessities at stake, Fukuda made a decision to reopen the stalled treaty negotiations. If economic considerations were the decisive factor, the American decision to improve relations with China was an accelerating factor in this policy decision by the Japanese government.

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<sup>191</sup> See MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō* 1973, p.12; 1974, p.12; and 1976, p. 47.

## Chapter 3

### Textbook Controversy

In the summer of 1982, there was a so-called textbook dispute between Japan and its Asian neighbors. The controversy was about textbook revisions in Japan. Major Japanese newspapers sparked the conflict on June 26, reporting that the Ministry of Education (MOE) had completed revising what it called "excessive"<sup>1</sup> expressions in high school history textbooks for use in the spring of 1983. It was reported, for example, that the Japanese "invasion of North China" was revised to become the "advance into North China."<sup>2</sup> The "rape of Nanjing" was now described as an abnormal happening resulting from Chinese resistance. The forced labor of Koreans in Japan was described as "implementation of the national mobilization order for Koreans."<sup>3</sup> Toward the end of July, the Chinese government began an active campaign against MOE. Shortly thereafter, protests were also filed from South Korea. Distrust of the Japanese government's seeming intention to play down war atrocities was expressed by Western observers as well.

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<sup>1</sup> MOE textbook examiners used this word numerous times, see Shuppan Rōren, *Textbook Report 1982*, pp. 46 & 48.

<sup>2</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun*, and other papers, June 26, 1982.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

At first the Education Ministry asserted that the new descriptions were more “objective”<sup>4</sup> and that “making textbooks was not a diplomatic issue but a domestic affair.”<sup>5</sup> Faced with official protests from the Chinese and Korean governments, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stepped in and pressed MOE to modify the revisions. The *Kantei*<sup>6</sup> went along with MOFA and announced on August 26 that the government would take responsibility for correcting the offending passages. However, because of resistance from conservatives within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the government statement was not explicit about when and how corrections would be made.

The protests from the Asian neighbors transformed what was originally a domestic issue, for which MOE was solely responsible, into a full-scale diplomatic crisis. The foreign criticism not only energized domestic opposition forces but also triggered divisions within both the bureaucracy and the LDP. MOFA took advantage of foreign and domestic protests in an attempt to maintain its free hand to the conduct of diplomacy. MOE officials and the LDP *bunkyô-zoku*<sup>7</sup> strongly reacted against this move and worked

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<sup>4</sup> This word was repeatedly used by the education minister and MOE officials during the 96th Diet sessions (December 1981 - August 1982).

<sup>5</sup> Education Minister Ogawa Heiji told this to Makieda Motofumi, JTU chairman, on July 23. See *Asahi Shimbun*, July 24, 1982 and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 28, 1982.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 13 in Chapter 1.

<sup>7</sup> LDP Diet members who specialize education policies. See footnote 75 in Chapter 1.

together to protect the vested authorities of the ministry. The divisions within the conservative establishment necessitated the mediation by political leaders. The prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, and foreign minister worked as a decision-making body, and a crisis management team was led by the chief cabinet secretary. Ultimately, diplomatic concerns were given priority over domestic education policies, and the *Kantei* went along with the Foreign Ministry. The influence of opposition, however, was not strong enough to totally win over the resistance of the conservative alliance between MOE and the *bunkyo-zoku*.

Why did MOE adhere so much to the textbook authorization system and war-affirming expressions, what was MOFA's agenda when they stepped in, and what were the major concerns of the *Kantei* in formulating its official statement? To answer these questions, this chapter will first examine the textbook authorization system of the Education Ministry in the context of the strongly conservative trend in postwar Japan. It will then explore foreign protests, their impact on domestic voices, and MOE's response to China and South Korea. Finally, it will discuss how the *Kantei* and MOFA handled the situation and how the conservatives struck back.

## Background

The question which evoked the textbook conflict was the screening system of Japanese secondary school textbooks. In an effort to nurture among Japanese people a sense of self-confidence in their own country, this system was adopted in 1948, tightened in the mid-1950s, and further strengthened in the late 1970s. Despite strenuous challenges from the left throughout the postwar years, the Education Ministry and the conservative elements of the LDP consistently worked to eliminate the term "invasion" for the Japanese conduct during the early Shōwa era. Especially in the 1980s, the conservatives placed many programs viewed as nationalistic on their policy agenda. Active campaigns against what they called Marxist-biased textbooks were part of these programs.

In the eyes of the conservatives, Japanese children in the immediate postwar years were learning an American version of their nation's actions in the early Shōwa era; that is, Japan was depicted as an aggressor in Asia. This, the conservatives alleged, was an image that was foisted upon the Japanese people from the occupation authorities. Moreover, there were more than a few textbooks that tended to avoid positive descriptions of modern Japanese society despite its very stable social order and a low crime rate. It was intolerable to the conservatives that these books, written by communist or socialist scholars, carried a left-wing bias. They charged that the textbooks, by

discussing only the shortcomings of capitalist economies, in effect glorified a socialist economy. MOE, with powerful support from the ruling LDP, had worked tirelessly to correct any derogatory bias carried over from the occupation period.<sup>8</sup>

Introduction of the schoolbook authorization system in 1948 was the first step in the ministry's efforts for what they believed to be "normalization"<sup>9</sup> of public education. To prevent school education from being affected by political ideologies, particularly of the left, MOE began to tighten the system after the merger of the conservative parties in 1955. The following year, the ministry established new screening standards: Description in school books should be unbiased and objective, avoiding the subjective evaluation of historical facts.<sup>10</sup> Under this system, all textbooks were to be examined every three years and no book can be used in schools unless it is approved as suitable by the ministry.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Education Ministry was engaged in a broad reform to centralize control over education: Directly elected boards of education in local governments were abolished in 1955; although abortive,

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<sup>8</sup> For a detailed account of MOE officials' reactions to the occupation policies, see Leonard J. Schoppa, *Education Reform in Japan*, pp. 32-39.

<sup>9</sup> Repeating the term that has been used by the conservatives since the early post-war years, the *Jiyū Shimpō*, an LDP organ, printed a series of articles from January through August 1980 entitled, "Textbooks Now--Suggestions for Normalization of Education."

MOE attempted to institutionalize a requalification system for teachers in 1957; and moral education was initiated in 1958.<sup>11</sup> Together with the tightening of the screening system in 1956, these are widely seen as part of the so-called "reverse course"<sup>12</sup> whose aim was to change the course of occupation policies.

It is since this time in fact that the term "advance" had been consistently suggested by MOE textbook examiners to be more objective and appropriate than the word "invasion" to describe Japanese war efforts in Asia in the 1930s and early 1940s. Significant textbook revisions had taken place in numerous cases. According to a survey by the federation of labor unions in the publishing industry (*Shuppan Rôren*), censorship became increasingly strict beginning in 1955. As a result, by 1968 the term "invasion" for the Japanese conduct had almost disappeared.<sup>13</sup> The term was partly restored

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<sup>10</sup> MOE repeatedly expresses this in its annual *Education Policy in Japan*. Also see Education Minister Ogawa's statement on July 30 in *Education Committee Minutes, No. 17*, House of Representatives, 96th Diet, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> Ronald Dore, "Textbook Censorship in Japan," in *Pacific Affairs*, 43:4 (Winter 1970), pp. 549-50. Yamazumi Masami, "Educational Democracy versus State Control" in McCormack & Sugimoto, eds., *Democracy in Contemporary Japan*, p. 97.

<sup>12</sup> In order to demilitarize and democratize Japan, liberal reforms were implemented one after another in the early postwar years. However, with the emergence of the Cold War by 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the government began recentralizing local governments, the education system and the police system. In addition, the Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954, and public employees lost their rights to strike or to bargain. These measures, together with other unsuccessful ones like the revision of the constitution, are collectively known as the "reverse course."

<sup>13</sup> The research was conducted on all the social studies textbooks used during the 26-year period since 1955 and made public in August 1982. See *Shuppan Rôren, Textbook Report 1982 (Extra)*, pp. 12-33.

after diplomatic normalization between China and Japan in 1972, but MOE started tightening the screening again in the late 1970s. Hence, the report concluded that the screening system had been "far from politically neutral but tossed up all the time by the waves of politics."<sup>14</sup>

Not surprisingly, this trend provoked sharp protest from teachers and intellectuals who perceived it to be highly authoritarian and a serious threat to democracy. Since its formation in 1947, the Japan Teachers Union (JTU), one of the powerful interest groups in postwar Japan, fiercely opposed textbook screening, arguing for educational democracy and freedom in teaching activities. JTU, with a unionization rate of more than 80% among public school teachers,<sup>15</sup> played a pivotal role in opposition against this rightward reverse course. The union was joined in this opposition by the Socialists, Communists and many intellectuals. The Ienaga court case was a fair example of this challenge against MOE. Ienaga Saburô was a distinguished historian from Tokyo University of Education. With his high school history textbook rejected in 1963, Ienaga filed a civil suit against MOE in 1965. He claimed that the practice of textbook screening violated the freedoms of

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> A document provided by JTU.



thought and conscience guaranteed by the constitution.<sup>16</sup> The case was still pending in court as of the summer of 1982.

Despite those challenges, by the end of the 1970s, newspapers and magazines started to carry more and more nationalistic views—views which had, since the end of World War II, been suppressed. Japanese society as a whole, in fact, was leaning toward conservatism and nationalism, with the general public giving increasing support to the LDP and showing their preference for the status quo.<sup>17</sup> According to the *Asahi Shimbun* public opinion surveys in 1986, LDP support from both blue and white collar workers rose drastically during the two decades since 1966: from 28% to 46% and from 37% to 53%, respectively.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party, lost significant support among both groups. The figures dropped from 50% to 23% and from 42% to 20%, respectively. During the 1980s, the LDP enjoyed a majority or plurality of support among each of Japan's working classes and all generations. The survey also showed that the people who preferred some change in the political trend had decreased from 53% in 1983 to 41% in 1986. Having obtained affluence and

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<sup>16</sup> Editor's Comment, "Who's in Charge of Social Studies?" in *Japan Echo*, 9:1, 1982, pp. 81-82.

<sup>17</sup> For an inclination of the Japanese public for conservatism and the status quo, see Murakami Yasusuke, "The Age of New Middle Mass Politics: The Case of Japan" in the *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 8:1 (Spring 1982), pp. 29-72. Also see Kent Calder, *Crisis and Compensation*, p. 463.

<sup>18</sup> The poll was conducted for 3,000 voters throughout the nation on May 7 & 8. The recovery rate was 79.4% (2,381 respondents). *Asahi Shimbun*, May 17, 1986, p. 17.

comfortable individual life-styles along with the shift from agrarian to urban society, the Japanese people were generally satisfied with their lives and wished to maintain the status quo.

Significant changes were observed also in the international environment since the mid-1970s--an increased Soviet threat in the Asia-Pacific region and a persistent U.S. demand for Japan's burden-sharing commensurate with its economic power. Taking advantage of these, the Japanese government launched a steadfast defense buildup after the ruling party won decisive majorities in both houses in 1980. The defense budget percentage of the total national budget steadily increased after 1981. It was 5.2% in 1980. It then kept swelling every year and reached 6.5% in 1987.<sup>19</sup> The Japanese defense budget, having surpassed 1% of its GNP in 1987, reached \$44 billion in 1988, if its defense expenditures were calculated according to the formula used by NATO.<sup>20</sup> During the same period, the proportions of almost all other categories, including education and social security, were reduced. Given the austere state budgets during those years, an exceptional allocation for defense cannot be taken lightly.<sup>21</sup> In fact, Japan, whose constitution

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<sup>19</sup> Data of Zaisei Seisaku Kenkyūkai & Bank of Japan cited in Inoguchi & Okimoto eds., *The Political Economy of Japan*, vol. 2, pp. 44-46.

<sup>20</sup> *Economist*, January 23, 1988, pp. 27-28.

<sup>21</sup> The only other exception was a spending for foreign aid, which increased from 0.9% of the national budget in 1980 to 1.2% in 1987, 70% increase by amount.

renounces war, actually became the world's third-greatest military power in terms of spending, only behind the United States and the Soviet Union.

Those years were also the era when the revision of the constitution became once again the talk of many conservatives and when the legality of cabinet members' official visits to Yasukuni Shrine was hotly debated.<sup>22</sup> The 1980s thus seemed to provide a golden opportunity for conservative activism to regain its vigor in the issue of textbook revision. After the LDP's landslide victory in the 1980 elections, LDP hawks,<sup>23</sup> together with other conservatives from the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the business community, became bolder and initiated active campaigns against "biased" textbooks. In an act in concert with this movement, MOE tightened the screening process. During the 1970s, due to the almost evenly balanced power between the ruling LDP and the opposition in the Diet, MOE officials needed to use discretion in examining school books. Now, in the 1980s, they forcibly suggested that publishers and authors change the excessive expressions.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Yasukuni Shrine is the central shrine of Shintō, which was Japan's state religion from 1867 to 1945. It is the place where some of the soldiers who died in W.W.II are enshrined and has been the symbol of militarism. Hence the action of the cabinet members drew criticism that their visits were a violation of the constitution, which proclaims the separation of Church and State.

<sup>23</sup> See footnote 16 in Chapter 2.

<sup>24</sup> Actual suggestions made by MOE textbook examiners are made public annually by Shuppan Rōren in its *Textbook Report*. See, for example, *Textbook Report 1980*, pp. 25-33 and *Textbook Report 1981*, pp. 6-19.

It should be noted that more than a few Western observers also viewed the issue of school book revision as a corollary to Japan's military buildup. The July 28 issue of *Le Monde* reported in detail about the controversy and pointed out that "the conservatives who advocate a military buildup are trying to cross out the signs of atrocities during World War II in their history textbooks."<sup>25</sup> In this connection, reports by both a Canadian and an American journalist concurred:

Tokyo is cranking up a public awareness campaign on national security. By emphasizing the nation's vulnerability and by playing down its past militarism, the government hopes to diminish antagonism to higher military spending..<sup>26</sup>

It is a nice question whether the changes can be called "mistakes" or deliberate alterations, carefully considered for years by conservative officials ... whose aim is to shift the mood in Japan back to the right.<sup>27</sup>

Many observers perceived Japanese education policy as part of a broader government program to revive nationalism or patriotic values among the Japanese public—a goal tirelessly pursued by the conservatives for almost three decades. This seeming resurgence of Japanese nationalism in the early 1980s caused considerable concern among domestic opposition forces and its neighbors in Asia, resulting in vigorous protests against textbook revisions both at home and from abroad.

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<sup>25</sup> Cited in *Ushio*, October 1982, p. 106.

<sup>26</sup> An article by Peter McGill in *Macleans*, August 9, 1982, p. 22.

<sup>27</sup> An article by Henry Scott Stokes in *New York Times*, August 29, 1982, D4:1.

## Domestic Opposition

The resurgence of conservative political strength beginning in 1980 provoked a widespread reaction among scholars and intellectuals. Their protests drew significant media coverage. Particularly, JIU and *Shuppan Rôren* (the federation of labor unions in the publishing industry) kept a close watch on textbook examination and conducted research of their own.<sup>28</sup> With the general public somewhat indifferent, however, the voices of opposition did not have much impact on the education policy.

In the summer of 1981, in the midst of the screening process that would be completed in June of 1982, a group of scholars and intellectuals collected 50,000 signatures. Their petition demanded that MOE make screening criteria public.<sup>29</sup> Allied with labor unions, they further mobilized 20,000 people for a rally on November 13. There, Kobayashi Naoki, a constitutional scholar at the University of Tokyo, argued that the time had come to speak out against the rightward tendencies—a scheme led by people whose thoughts were incompatible with either peace or democracy.<sup>30</sup> Then,

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<sup>28</sup> JIU compares original textbooks and revised ones every year. *Shuppan Rôren* annually reports detailed results of textbook screening in its *Textbook Report*. In 1981, they jointly published *Textbooks in Jeopardy*.

<sup>29</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 5 (evening edition), 1981.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, November 14, 1981.

in January 1982, five months ahead of the media reports that sparked the conflict, *Shuppan Rôren* issued its annual *Textbook Report*. The publication uncovered some of the actual word changes in school books for use in 1983 and described the screening system as "close to thought control and obstructing the freedom of making textbooks."<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile, in August of 1981, the JSP encouraged all its prefectural head offices to create a movement against the LDP's textbook campaigns. The Socialists believed that behind the conservative campaigns lay their desires of constitutional revision and of making Japan a military power. In concert with this movement, JTU prompted its members to use the original textbook wording in teaching their students.<sup>32</sup> When testifying at a hearing conducted by the subcommittee on textbooks of the Central Council on Education,<sup>33</sup> union officials argued that the screening hampered both academic freedom and freedom of expression. They took the position that the right to choose textbooks should be given to teachers instead of boards of education, and that the screening process should be open to the public.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> *Shuppan Rôren, Textbook Report 1982*, pp. 36-51.

<sup>32</sup> A JTU conference in March 1981 of prefectural representatives in charge of education and culture. See its *minutes*, p. 16.

<sup>33</sup> One of the councils that give advice to the education minister. The Council was first set up in 1953 for the purpose of discussing policies on the education system, sciences and culture. About 30 members were chosen from various fields, but no one was ever chosen from JTU as a member till April 1997.

<sup>34</sup> *Nikkyôso Kyôiku Shimbun* (JTU's weekly organ), March 23, 1982, p. 4.

A December 1981 *Mainichi Shimbun* poll of social studies textbook authors showed that 71.1% of the respondents had been requested by MOE to change their wording.<sup>35</sup> A preponderant 83.3% were unhappy about the "advice." They were told by MOE examiners that the description on the Korean annexation in 1910 gave an impression that Japan had acted wrongly. They were reminded that there were different opinions about the Rape of Nanjing, none of which had yet to be academically confirmed. They were also told that the legality of the Self-Defense Forces should be clearly stated in the school books. The authors complained that the problem was less of the system than of the bias of the investigators. Three quarters of the respondents said the censorship should be either relaxed (37.3%) or abolished (38.7%).

Compared with these authors, however, the general public seemed ambivalent. According to a *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll in February 1982,<sup>36</sup> 33.7% of the respondents accepted the screening system. In fact, 14.8% preferred a stronger screening, and another 6.0% even wanted state-edited textbooks. Only 21.5% wanted to either relax or abolish the system. When asked about actual word changes, such as replacing U.S. "bases" with "facilities," 46.9% of the public expressed their opposition to MOE's policy. Still, 22.2% were for it and 30.9% did not have any opinion. The exception was Okinawa, where a

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<sup>35</sup> The poll was conducted for 484 authors in early December of 1981, 62.8% of whom responded. See *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 6, 1982.

<sup>36</sup> The poll was conducted on January 30 & 31 for 3,000 voters throughout the nation, 2,156 of whom (71.9%) responded. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 13 (evening edition), 1982, p. 5.

strong protest was voiced against MOE's mandatory advice. The ministry had demanded that a textbook passage—"about 800 Okinawans were killed by the Japanese army for reasons of being a burden in the battle"—be corrected because the annals edited by the prefecture, upon which the description was based, were not reliable.<sup>37</sup> Protests were first filed by a village assembly, then by Okinawa JTU, labor unions, women's groups, and finally by the prefectural government and assembly.<sup>38</sup> The movement spread throughout the prefecture by the end of August.

The media paid close attention to the screening process, particularly after the conservatives started campaigns against what they called biased textbooks in 1980. All the major newspapers repeatedly pointed out the excesses of textbook examination by the Education Ministry.<sup>39</sup> The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a government leaning newspaper, reported the screening of the previous year<sup>40</sup> and concluded that textbooks were now under tight control of the state. Even the *Sankei Shimbun*, a conservative paper, warned that the tightening of screening could in effect spoil the authorization system and

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<sup>37</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 29 (evening edition), 1982, p. 11.

<sup>38</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 1 & 27, 1982.

<sup>39</sup> See editorials in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 28, 1982, p. 2; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 23, 1982, p. 3; *Asahi Shimbun*, June 26, 1982, p. 5; *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 27, p.4 & July 26, p. 5, 1982; and *Tokyo Shimbun*, August 15, 1981, p. 4.

<sup>40</sup> The books which drew criticism in the summer of 1982 were examined in 1981, approved in June 1982, and scheduled to be used in 1983. The books on which the *Yomiuri* reported here were the ones examined in 1980, approved in 1981, and scheduled to be used in the spring of 1982. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 26, 1981.



held that adequate consideration should be shown for the feelings of other peoples though writing textbooks was a domestic matter.<sup>41</sup> The *Asahi Shimbun*, a relatively liberal paper, strongly argued that textbooks should not be influenced by political intent of any kind and urged MOE to review the authorization system and confront political intervention by the right.<sup>42</sup>

Because of strong support from the conservatives and the seeming lack of public interest, however, the government was able to ignore the domestic criticism. In its view, the entire affair had been created by a sensationalizing press. It was not until official protests came from Asian neighbors that the government took it seriously and hurried to seek a solution.

#### Protests from Asian Neighbors

Official protests were voiced by only two nations—China and South Korea. The media and public in South Korea criticized the Japanese Education Ministry promptly and fiercely, but their government was reluctant to take formal actions due to on-going negotiations for \$4 billion loans from Tokyo. On the other hand, it took three weeks for the Chinese to respond. However,

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<sup>41</sup> *Sankei Shimbun*, editorials, June 27, p. 5 & July 28, p. 8, 1982.

<sup>42</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, editorials, April 9, p. 5 & June 26, p. 5, 1982.

their condemnation of the offending textbooks revealed a well planned and extensive campaign of protest.

Because of historical reasons, South Korea has always been alert to Japanese textbooks, and its academic circles have a long and substantial history of research on the teaching of history in Japan. While China was invaded by the Japanese, Korea was totally colonized: Nobody was allowed to use Korean names, Japanese was to be the official language, men were gathered as workers in Japan or soldiers in the field, and women were forced to serve as prostitutes. In fact, the Japanese treatment of Korea since 1910 had long been a source of resentment. Hence, an active protest against the word changes first broke out in South Korea. Major newspapers reported on July 3 that Japan was trying to justify its military invasion into Korea and China.<sup>43</sup>

Understandably, Korean protest was more fierce than that of any other peoples. Some Koreans protested in front of the Japanese embassy, some others threw stones at it, and many others burned Japanese textbooks or boycotted Japanese goods. A few protesters went further, burning themselves as a demonstration against the Japanese distortion of history.<sup>44</sup> At a protest rally on July 30, a professor of Seoul University attributed the textbook revisions to the values in Japan that had justified the repression of the

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<sup>43</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 22, 1982. *Asahi Journal*, August 13/20, 1982, p. 122.

<sup>44</sup> *Ushio*, October 1982, pp. 101-3. Also see *Nodong Sinmun*, July 25 cited in U.S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (FBIS-APA)* 82-144, D6-7.

Korean independence movement instead of appreciating it as an expression by the Korean people of their sovereignty.<sup>45</sup> North Korea, which does not usually follow Seoul's initiative, joined the protest campaign on July 25 and also viewed the textbook revisions in the context of resurging militarism in Japan.<sup>46</sup>

In sharp contrast to its public and media, Korean officials were unwilling to raise this issue as a diplomatic one and remained quiet for a month. The July 23 issue of an English newspaper in Seoul quoted officials in the Korean education ministry as saying that "it would be desirable for interested academic or private organizations to ask corrections from the publishers of the involved textbooks."<sup>47</sup> It was not until July 26, when Beijing filed an official protest, that Seoul held its first cabinet meeting on the issue. There, the education minister announced that the Korean government was now looking into details of the textbook revisions.<sup>48</sup> As a matter of fact, negotiations between Seoul and Tokyo on \$4 billion loans for 1982-86 were in the final stage that summer and expected to be concluded in September.<sup>49</sup> It is

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<sup>45</sup> *Ushio*, October 1982, pp. 101-3.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Korea Herald*, July 23, 1982, p.1 in *FBIS-APA-82-142*, E3.

<sup>48</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, July 27, 1982 in *FBIS-APA-82-144*, C1-2.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, July 2 & 4, 1982 in *FBIS-APA-82-128*, C1-2 & -82-130, C1, respectively.

quite understandable, therefore, that Seoul refrained from taking formal actions as long as possible.

As events developed, the Chinese reacted slowly. The official *Xinhua News Agency* sent a report from Tokyo without any comment and simply conveyed Japanese press reports of June 26. Inside China, only the *People's Daily* published this report. Then no further stories appeared. After a three-week silence, however, Chinese newspapers launched well-prepared, concerted campaigns against the Japanese Education Ministry. On July 20, the Chinese government expressed for the first time its view against the textbook revisions in the CCP organ and claimed that only by learning lessons from history could Tokyo cultivate friendly relations with its neighbors.

Four days later, many newspapers simultaneously expressed their disapproval of Japan's textbook revisions and reported the voices of leading Chinese. Their main points were: 1. Japan's invasion inflicted tremendous damage on the Chinese people and demanded their sacrifices; 2. Southeast Asian countries, Japan and the Japanese people were also victims of the war; 3. it was impossible to distort the history of Japanese invasion; and 4. the distortion would not fail to arouse great indignation among the Chinese people.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 21 & *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 25, 1982.

Finally, on July 26, the Chinese government delivered an official protest through the Japanese embassy in Beijing. Xiao Xiangqian, the head of Asian affairs, contended that the word changes were against the spirit of the joint statement of 1972 and the treaty of 1978. He demanded that Japan take necessary measures to correct the errors in the textbooks censored by MOE.<sup>51</sup>

From all appearances, these Chinese campaigns had been elaborately planned and orchestrated. For one thing, the Chinese leadership chose July 20 as the opening day of their massive campaigns. This was a day when an LDP trade delegation arrived in Taiwan. The ruling party mission, virtually an official one, was sent to discuss a \$2.5 billion loan to the Taiwanese government.<sup>52</sup> There is no doubt that Beijing was greatly irritated at this interaction in light of Tokyo's abrogation in 1972 of its 1952 peace treaty with Taipei. In fact, China had become extremely sensitive to the Taiwan issue since 1981 when Washington had included FX jet fighters in an arms sale to Taipei.

Another evidence of calculation was provided by Tanaka Akihiko. According to his research, the *People's Daily* published 287 articles on Japan

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<sup>51</sup> See statements by Suzuki Isao, MOE official, on August 4 in *Education Committee Minutes, No. 18, House of Representatives, 96th Diet*, p. 9. The Joint Communiqué partly reads, "The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself." The Treaty confirms that the "Joint Statement constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries" and that its principles "should be strictly observed." For the two documents, see Appendices A & C of this thesis.

<sup>52</sup> Okada Hidehiro, "Kyôkasho kentei wa Chûgoku no naisei mondai da (Textbook screening is China's domestic problem)" in *Chûdôron*, October 1982, p. 88.

from July 20 to September 15. Of these, 81% were related to the textbook issue. The frequency of the campaign described almost a normal curve, which peaked on August 9, 15 and September 1. Significantly, August 15 was a memorial day of Japanese defeat in World War II. September 1 of 1982 was the opening day of the party congress of the Chinese Communist Party—the first in five years. After that, the curve began to decline but attained high points on September 3 and 12. The former was a memorial day for the Chinese of the war victory against Japan, and the latter was the last day of the party congress.<sup>53</sup>

In the Chinese view, the recognition of the history of Japanese militarist aggression against China was a major question of principle in the development of Sino-Japanese relations. Beijing consistently asserted that the Japanese government should not deviate from the basic principles expressed in the communiqué and treaty. Among these principles was Tokyo's stated awareness of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damage to the Chinese people during the war and its deep reproach of itself. Thus, one focus of their campaigns was the aggressive nature of the past Japanese militarism.

Another feature was a concern about then resurging nationalistic trends in Japan. During the summer of 1982, Beijing repeatedly claimed that

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<sup>53</sup> Tanaka, "Kyōkasho mondai o meguru Chūgoku no seisakukettei (Chinese Policymaking in the Case of the Textbook Issue)" in Okabe Tatsumi, ed., *Chūgoku Gaikō*, pp. 198-202.

certain militarists in Japan were "indulging once again in dreams of aggression."<sup>54</sup> One example, a 1983 issue of the *Beijing Review*, held that the Japanese public were concerned about "a regressive tendency" in Japanese politics. The publication noted an increasing pressure for constitutional revision, reviving militarism, Tokyo's intent of becoming a major political power, and a sharp increase in arms exports.<sup>55</sup> It seems highly probable that these concerns were more of the Chinese leadership rather than of the Japanese people. Since the late 1970s, in fact, Beijing kept a very close watch over the internal politics in Japan.

The reactions of Southeast Asian countries were not so strong as those of South Korea and China. This was a time when they aimed at economic growth, following after the Japanese model and with Tokyo's assistance. For instance, "look to the East" was a slogan of the Malaysian government since 1981, and "learn from Japan," the Singaporeans. In early 1981, in fact, the Japanese prime minister Suzuki Zenkô decided to increase the amount of Japan's official development assistance (ODA) to \$21.4 billion for 1981 through 1985, doubling the \$10.7 billion which Japan had granted in foreign aid in the previous five years.<sup>56</sup> Accordingly, many of the Southeast Asian governments eagerly monitored the allocation of Tokyo's ODA.

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<sup>54</sup> *Beijing Review*, August 2, 9, 30 & October 4, 1982.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, August 29, 1983, pp. 9-10.

<sup>56</sup> *Chungang Ilbo*, July 19, 1982, p. 2 in *FBIS-APA-82-142*, E2.

The summer of 1982 was particularly important in their relations with Tokyo because of the earlier mentioned LDP trade delegation. Headed by Esaki Masumi, ex-minister of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the group visited Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Taiwan during July 12-23. A week later, Esaki led another mission to three more ASEAN nations—Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Both missions were designed to help appease complaints about huge trade deficits with Japan that had led to protectionist measures in the region. More importantly, the delegation also discussed technological assistance to local industries, loans, and measures to increase Asian exports to Japan.<sup>57</sup> Given the fact that they were trying to vitalize their economies with Tokyo's assistance, they were understandably reluctant to criticize the Japanese government on this issue.

Nonetheless, sympathy with China and South Korea and concern over the alleged resurging militarism in Japan were common media topics in the region.<sup>58</sup> From the viewpoint of Asian peoples, historical accounts of the Japanese invasion of China and Southeast Asia were not simply Japan's internal affair. The Japanese militarist aggression and atrocities in the early Shōwa era were historical facts which nobody could change arbitrarily—this

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* Also see *Kyodo News Service*, July 12 & 31 in *FBIS-APA-82-134*, C1 & -82-150, O4, respectively; and *ANTARA*, August 6 in *FBIS-APA-82-152*, N1.

<sup>58</sup> The Japanese media was attentive to foreign reports. For their extensive coverage, see, for example, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* July 28, 1982 and *Ushio*, monthly general magazine, October 1982, pp. 103-7.



was the uncompromising principle of the Chinese and Koreans. Many Asians were, no doubt, sympathetic to the two governments as they resisted the distortion of Japan's militaristic past.

### Foreign Impact on Domestic Voices

The feelings of Asian neighbors were shared by a majority of the Japanese, who were well aware of their nation's role as aggressor in the war.<sup>59</sup> Due to a general lack of public interest, however, the voice of opposition forces had little effect. When the media in South Korea and China started to criticize MOE and their governments lodged protests, domestic opposition became greatly encouraged and raised their voice against the screening system. This, in turn, alarmed the conservatives. Hence, opinion leaders from both sides became active during the summer of 1982 with considerable media coverage.

The opposition parties vigorously accused the government of violating the neutrality of education by imposing certain expressions in school books. On June 30, JSP members of the Diet demanded that the screening process and criteria be made public--a demand that was flatly rejected by MOE. When an official protest was presented by Beijing on July 26, all the opposition parties issued their statements: the JSP argued that the authorization system had

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<sup>59</sup> The *Yomiuri* conducted a poll on September 18-19, 1982 for 3,000 voters, 2,123 (70.8%) of which responded. According to the poll, 56.1% of the respondents said the term "advance" was either wrong or inappropriate. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 11, 1982, p. 4.

been subjugated to the LDP's pressure; Kōmeitō claimed that the revisions should be amended so as to accord with the spirit of the joint statement; and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) contended that the revisions were the prettification, even an endorsement, of the past aggression. The DSP, however, simply said that they would cautiously investigate and discuss the issue.<sup>60</sup> Meanwhile, the Parliamentarians League for Japan-China Friendship (*Nitchū Giren*),<sup>61</sup> which comprised 543 Diet members at the time from both ruling and opposition parties except the JCP, also argued for correcting the revisions.

The Japan Teachers Union (JTU) did not waste time, either. By July 21, the union had completed a reform proposal for screening, which JTU Chairman Makieda Motofumi presented to Education Minister Ogawa Heiji two days later. In doing so, Makieda requested Ogawa to pay heed to foreign voices, saying "MOE, which is supposed to be politically neutral, has been distorting the facts."<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, the teachers union issued a textbook report on August 6 which accused MOE of attempting to obscure historical facts concerning Japan's militaristic past. The report also criticized textbook

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<sup>60</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 27 (evening edition), 1982, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> See footnote 73 in Chapter 2.

<sup>62</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 24, 1982.

publishers and authors for submitting to official pressure by exercising "self-restraint" in describing those historical facts.<sup>63</sup>

When the issue developed into a diplomatic problem, media coverage increased. Most papers strongly criticized MOE and the LDP for attempting to tone down textbook language which described the nation's past aggression. They demanded that historical facts be plainly acknowledged.<sup>64</sup> Although the *Sankei* argued against the correction of revised wording under external pressures,<sup>65</sup> all the other papers urged the government to correct expressions that ran counter to the spirit of the Japan-China and Japan-South Korea joint communiqués.<sup>66</sup> The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* defended the authorization system but suggested that, to restore confidence within the international community, Prime Minister Suzuki should admit the aggressive nature of the war and clearly state when and how corrections would be made.<sup>67</sup>

At the end of August, several articles critical of MOE appeared in the *Sekai*, a monthly magazine known for its pro-Beijing tilt. Okazaki Kaheita,

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<sup>63</sup> *Japan Times*, August 7, 1982.

<sup>64</sup> See 1982 editorials in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 23, p. 2; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 28, August 7 & 15, p. 3; *Asahi Shimbun*, July 27 & August 13, p. 5; *Tokyo Shimbun*, July 28 & August 5, p. 4; and a column by a *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* editor, August 9, 1982, p. 2.

<sup>65</sup> *Sankei Shimbun*, editorials, August 14, p. 7 & August 26, p. 10, 1982.

<sup>66</sup> See 1982 editorials in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 23, p. 2; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 12 & 27, p. 3; *Asahi Shimbun*, August 13 & 27, p. 5; *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 27, August 5 & 16, p. 5; and *Tokyo Shimbun*, August 5, 14 & 27, p. 4.

<sup>67</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, editorial, August 23, 1982, p. 2.

advisor to the Japan-China Association on Economy and Trade, argued that a large number of Japanese knew from their personal experience that the war in China had been an invasion. He advised that Japan should act swiftly to remedy its textbook screening so the children would learn the fact of aggression and make a resolve not to repeat the errors of his generation.<sup>68</sup> In the same issue, Katô Shûichi, professor of history at Sophia University, recommended that the offending passages should be revised once again so as to accurately reflect the aggressive character of Japanese militarism.<sup>69</sup>

Foreign pressure had served as a catalyst for domestic opposition. The conservatives were now greatly alarmed. To some Japanese, the protests by China and South Korea appeared to be an interference in Japan's domestic affairs. Given the fact that no nation had ever meddled in the education policies of another nation, the conservatives claimed that giving in to foreign pressure would undermine Japan's sovereignty. This attitude was manifest at a meeting on July 23 when Education Minister Ogawa flatly turned down the request by Makieda, JIU chairman, to give heed to foreign opinion. Ogawa held that the textbook issue was a domestic affair.<sup>70</sup> The education minister's remarks drew vehement censure from the media both in China

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<sup>68</sup> *Japan Echo*, 9:4, 1982, pp. 36-39. Originally the article appeared in *Sekai*, October 1982, pp. 42-45.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 9:4, 1982, p. 18. Originally the article appeared in *Sekai*, October 1982, pp. 46-49.

<sup>70</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 24, 1982.

and South Korea. Despite the risk of inviting more protests, three cabinet members upheld the same view four days later.<sup>71</sup> This nationalistic sentiment was expressed by a wide spectrum of Japanese: business groups, veterans, bereaved families, farmers, and the like. Kobori Keiichirō, professor of literature at the University of Tokyo, was also an advocate of strong defense of Japan's national sovereignty:

If Japan were perceived as a nation that yields to pressure, other neighboring countries would follow China's example. ... We should not bow to demands to rewrite our textbooks.<sup>72</sup>

It was later discovered that the change from "invasion" to "advance" in regard to the war in North China had not occurred in the textbooks examined that year. The June 26 report was, in other words, not totally true, of which the conservatives took advantage. First, on September 2, the weekly magazine *Shūkan Bunshun* exposed the newspapers' error, which was followed by an article by Watanabe Shōichi, professor of English at Sophia University, in the *Shokun*. In the conservative magazine that went on sale on September 3, Watanabe argued that the newspapers had misled the

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<sup>71</sup> The three cabinet members were Matsuno Yukiyasu of the National Land Agency, Nakagawa Ichirō of the Science & Technology Agency and Minowa Noboru of the Posts & Telecommunications Ministry. See *Asahi Journal*, August 13/20, 1982, pp. 122-23; and *Beijing Review*, August 9, 1982, p. 10.

<sup>72</sup> *Japan Echo*, 9:4. 1982, pp. 47 & 49. The article originally appeared in the conservative magazine *Shokun*, October 1982, pp. 46-62.

public.<sup>73</sup> On September 7, the *Sankei Shimbun* explained how the error had happened and apologized for their mistake. Then in the November issue of *Chûô Kôron*, Yayama Tarô, a political journalist, accused reporters of making "a monumental mistake."<sup>74</sup> These conservative writers wrote as if not a single change from "invasion" to "advance" had ever been made for the books for 1983 and tried to create an impression that the whole June 26 report was a mistake. However, the term "invasion of China" was replaced by "Manchurian Incident & Shanghai Incident" that year, if not by "advance." The exact revision from "invasion" to "advance" was made in regard to the war in Southeast Asia, if not in North China.<sup>75</sup> The fact is, the term "invasion" for Japan's activities in the early Shôwa era was not acceptable to MOE, and this policy had been consistently pursued by the ministry ever since 1956.

It is common knowledge that the LDP *bunkyo-zoku* and MOE had been working as one body in pursuing the tightening of censorship, and that the ministry enjoyed fraternal support from many conservative Liberal Democrats. The party's Education Division held a meeting in the morning of July 27, a day after the protest from Beijing. The hawks within the group

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<sup>73</sup> "Kyôkasho mondai: watashi no teigen (The textbook issue - my suggestions)" in *Shokun*, October 1982, pp. 46-62.

<sup>74</sup> Translated in the *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 9:2, 1983, pp. 304-9.

<sup>75</sup> *Akahata Shimbun*, September 8, 1982.

showed firm resistance to the correction of the altered words for reasons such as: Chinese and Korean criticisms of Japanese textbooks constituted an intervention in Japan's internal affairs; a concession to foreign demands would disturb the foundation of education policy; and the opposition camp was trying to overturn the screening system, using foreign pressure.<sup>76</sup> The doves,<sup>77</sup> on the other hand, held that the party should be honest with its promise of political neutrality of education and that they were responsible to tell children historical facts with a firm resolve to pursue peace.<sup>78</sup> However, the inclination of the LDP in the 1980s was that the doves' opinions tended to be wiped out by the literally louder voices of the hawks.

Knowing the complicated nature of the issue, however, LDP hawks, advocates of stronger censorship, were relatively quiet on the issue. It was ironic that many of the hawks, who had worked hard to eliminate Japan's image as an aggressor in war, were pro-Seoul. Being well aware that their nationalistic beliefs would excite negative sentiments among the Korean people, they refrained from overtly insisting on their views.

The Executive Council, whose decisions finalize formal policy-making in the party, took up this issue as an agenda item only once, on July 30. What is more, it was reported, party leaders even exerted influence on the members

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<sup>76</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 27 (evening editions) & July 30, 1982.

<sup>77</sup> Moderate LDP members are called "doves" as opposed to hawks.

<sup>78</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 27 (evening editions) & July 30, 1982.

of the Education and Foreign Affairs Divisions to avoid heated discussion.<sup>79</sup> In their view, a solution to the problem would require a thorough discussion about details of the past war. This would be like opening the Pandora's box, dividing the party into two camps and consuming a great deal of time and energy. "Discussions would become out of control, if candid opinions were exchanged within the party," one unidentified leader was quoted as saying.<sup>80</sup> Hence, the LDP leadership decided to leave the issue to the government's efforts to seek foreign understanding, instead of discussing it at the party's formal forums.

#### Education Ministry Entangled

Education being a domestic issue, the Ministry of Education took charge of response to foreign protests on behalf of the government. One of the most conservative ministries in Japan, MOE had no intention of correcting the revised passages in the already authorized textbooks.<sup>81</sup> Responding to Beijing and Seoul, MOE officials explained that the textbooks were written by the private sector, attaching high values to the spirit of joint statements with the

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<sup>79</sup> *Asahi Journal*, August 27, 1982, p. 6.

<sup>80</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 6, 1982, p. 2.

<sup>81</sup> See statements by Education Minister Ogawa and a senior official, Suzuki Isao, in *Education Committee Minutes*, Nos. 12, 14 & 15, House of Councilors, 96th Diet.



two governments and the 1978 treaty with China.<sup>82</sup> MOE appeared to fail to recognize that the foreign protests were raised against the whitewashing of Japanese militarist history, not against the screening system.

MOE officials strongly believed that the question of the textbook content was a domestic issue, not diplomatic in nature. They argued that screening was based on academic research without any political purposes such as the "distortion of history" or the "prettification of the past,"<sup>83</sup> and that they should not be swayed by any criticism either from abroad or at home.<sup>84</sup> Observing criticisms in major newspapers in South Korea and China and being afraid of the issue developing into a diplomatic problem, however, officials from the Education and Foreign Ministries discussed how to cope with the situation. By the morning of July 22, they came to an agreement that the authorization procedure would be fully explained to remove Korean and Chinese misunderstanding if official inquiries were made by the two countries.<sup>85</sup> The Japanese officials appeared to be convinced that the foreign criticisms were caused by their "misunderstanding" of the Japanese system.

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<sup>82</sup> Testimony by Suzuki Isao on July 30. See *Education Committee Minutes, No. 17, House of Representatives, 96th Diet*, p. 2.

<sup>83</sup> These are the expressions used in the Chinese and Korean media, such as *People's Daily*, June 30 and *Tong-A Daily*, July 31. The Chinese government, too, used the term "distortion of history" in its official protest note of July 26.

<sup>84</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 22 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

In an interview with the *Asahi*, for instance, Suzuki Isao, head of the Primary and Secondary Education Bureau, said: "The Japanese system, in which textbooks are revised by the authors and publishers on their own judgment after freely exchanging their ideas with MOE examiners, may not be easily understood by a country where the state writes textbooks."<sup>86</sup>

Responding to Beijing's official protest, Suzuki Isao explained on July 29 to Wang Xiaoyun, minister at the Chinese embassy: Textbooks were made by the private sector on its own initiative, not by the state, and responsibility for revisions was with authors and publishers, not with the ministry or the government. Since it was left up to the authors whether or not to accept the ministry's recommendations, he claimed, MOE was in no position to demand that the authors and publishers correct revised wording.<sup>87</sup> The MOE official further explained that history textbooks gave accounts of the joint statement of 1972 and the treaty of 1978, and that textbooks on politics and economics were written based upon a pacifistic view and a reproach of Japan's past.

This explanation, however, did not fully stand up to the facts. The truth is that virtually no publishers could ignore the ministry's "advice" if they wished their books to be authorized and adopted. In fact, their financial situation depended on their textbooks' passing the screening test. Thus, it is

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<sup>86</sup> A July 27 interview, *Asahi Shimbun*, July 28, 1982.

<sup>87</sup> Suzuki's testimony during the July 30 interpellation at the lower house. See *Education Committee Minutes*, No. 17, House of Representatives, 96th Diet, pp. 1-2.

not surprising that the ministry was perceived by the Chinese as trying to shirk its responsibility.<sup>88</sup>

Wang was dissatisfied with MOE's explanation. He asserted that the revisions were made as a government policy in Japan, that the censorship violated the spirit of the joint statement and treaty, and that Tokyo's explanation was neither convincing nor acceptable.<sup>89</sup> The *Xinhua News Agency* commented the same day that the offending expressions in textbooks could hardly be overlooked and that sincerity should be proven by correcting mistakes.<sup>90</sup> On August 1, Beijing canceled Ogawa's visit to China that was initially scheduled for mid-September at the invitation of the Chinese education ministry. Then, on August 5, Beijing again demanded a correction of the revisions. This time, Beijing stepped up the level of diplomacy, and the request was made by Wu Xueqian, vice foreign minister, to the Japanese ambassador, Katori Yasue.<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, South Korean officials were offered a similar explanation on July 30 and accepted it. Yi Sangchin, minister at the South Korean embassy, told MOE officials that Seoul would like to avoid a diplomatic confrontation because the screening system was Japan's domestic

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<sup>88</sup> *Beijing Review*, August 9, 1982, p. 10. *Asahi Journal*, August 13/20, 1982, pp. 122-23.

<sup>89</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 30, p. 1; and *Asahi Shimbun*, July 30, p. 1, in 1982.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 5 (evening edition), 1982.

affair. The Koreans, he responded, believed in the conscience of Japan, a friendly nation, that would voluntarily adopt necessary steps. Yi expressed his hope that Tokyo would take satisfiable measures considering the great interest of the Korean people.<sup>92</sup> The Korean government was acting with prudence probably out of consideration for the economic cooperation with Japan.

The media and opposition parties in South Korea were frustrated with this low-key position and pressed their government to take stronger actions. Having observed Beijing's rejection, therefore, Seoul changed its strategy. On August 3, Seoul presented an official protest and requested prompt and concrete measures for correction. In protesting, the Korean foreign minister, Yi Pomsok, now said that Tokyo's explanation had further intensified popular sentiments against Japan.<sup>93</sup> Two days later, Seoul rejected a Japanese proposal to dispatch working level officials, saying that Korea would not accept any proposal from Japan "unless it includes a definite promise to correct" the distortions.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Suzuki's testimony on August 4. See *Education Committee Minutes, No. 18, House of Representatives, 96th Diet*, p. 9.

<sup>93</sup> See *Asahi Shimbun*, August 4, 1982; and *Korea Herald*, August 5, p. 1 in *FBIS-APA-82-151*, E3.

<sup>94</sup> *Yonhap News Agency*, August 6 in *FBIS-APA-82-152*, E2.

MOE nonetheless held a strongly nationalistic stance up to the end of August. During this time, they enjoyed support from advocates for national sovereignty and those who had long been dissatisfied with left-leaning textbooks. The ministry insisted that the textbook issue was an internal affair, and that the screening system should be maintained. Therefore, when Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio promised Seoul on August 12 that the offending passages would be corrected promptly, senior officials of MOE showed strong displeasure. Re-revision was, they claimed, under the jurisdiction solely of the education minister.<sup>95</sup> Yet, MOFA had had its own way without consultation with them. Thus, MOE officials consistently resisted any concession which might cripple the system. Such a concession, they were afraid, would amount to a denial of the whole postwar education policy. In fact, textbook censorship had been one of their pillar policies intent on correcting what they called the "excesses"<sup>96</sup> of the Allied occupation. So intent was the ministry on preserving the system that it failed to recognize that the foreign protests were filed against the whitewashing of Japanese militarist history in the early 20th century, not against the screening system.

As a matter of fact, throughout the postwar years, MOE had frequently been ideologically challenged by JTU. The antagonism between the ministry and JTU for control over education had been so intense and so long that MOE

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<sup>95</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 13, 1982.

<sup>96</sup> Schoppa, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

officials, when foreign protests were provoked, could not put the issue into an appropriate context. Their major concern at the time of the Asian protests was that JIU might be emboldened and resume a campaign against the screening system, which was still being contested in court by Professor Ienaga.

It would be legitimate to say that the ministry, in endeavoring to remove leftist hues in school books, might have leaned too far to the right and become myopic in the defense of its vested authorities. As many observers both domestic and abroad argued, the censorship of textbooks is an internal affair, but how to comprehend the war is certainly not. With their eyes closed to historical facts and with their minds preoccupied with a domestic political conflict, MOE officials tangled with the problem clumsily.

#### MOFA and *Kantei* Step In

The explanations offered by MOE in defense of its textbook screening convinced neither Beijing nor Seoul. Yet, because of the importance of international concerns, the Japanese government was unable to disregard protests from these Asian neighbors. Hence, the *Kantei* decided on August 4 to handle the issue as a diplomatic one. The prime minister, his chief cabinet secretary, and the foreign minister formed a decision-making body. The exclusion of the education minister from this group was a sign that diplomatic concerns were to be given priority over education policies.

Initially, the Foreign Ministry had taken a wait-and-see attitude on the grounds that textbook authorization was under the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry. In addition, this kind of foreign protest against education policies of another nation was unprecedented. Finally, in light of ongoing friendly relations with Beijing and Seoul and because both countries needed Japanese economic and technological assistance, it was presumed that these governments would not develop the issue into a diplomatic problem. However, this is precisely what occurred.

Confronted with Beijing's July 26 protest, Sunobe Ryôzô, vice foreign minister, acted quickly. He was quoted as saying that Japan had restored diplomatic relations with China and South Korea based upon an admission of its past history, and that the facts should be described as they were.<sup>97</sup> When an official protest was also filed by Seoul, Sunobe further emphasized the diplomatic importance of the matter. In his words, "the weight of the international side of this issue has increased."<sup>98</sup> He even suggested that corrections of the revised textbook terminology were necessary, because that a mere public acknowledgment of Japanese responsibility for events during the war would not be sufficient.

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<sup>97</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, July 27, 1982. The vice foreign minister gives a press conference every day, and it is agreed upon between the media and MOFA that his words will be reported as comments by a *Gaimushô shunō* (top MOFA official). All those comments are introduced in this chapter as Sunobe's.

<sup>98</sup> *Tokyo Shimbun*, August 5, 1982, p. 2.

As discussed earlier, MOE's explanation on July 29 and 30 had been a failure. Beijing's withdrawal of its invitation to Ogawa combined with Seoul's official protest alarmed Tokyo so much that Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkô consulted on August 4 with Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi and Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio. They decided to handle this problem as a diplomatic issue and to seek a solution in accordance with the spirit of both the Japanese-Korean joint communiqué of 1965 and the Japanese-Chinese joint statement of 1972.<sup>99</sup> That is, Japan assumed full responsibility for, and regretted, having caused irreparable damage to its neighboring peoples. Suzuki instructed the foreign minister to construct an answer to this problem together with the education minister. Miyazawa was assigned the task of supervising their crisis management efforts.<sup>100</sup> Time was of the essence.

The direct involvement of the *Kantei* and MOFA is evidence of the importance of relations with Asia in general and China in particular. Maintaining good relations with China and South Korea was of utmost concern to MOFA. In fact, Suzuki was scheduled to visit China toward the end of September to commemorate the tenth anniversary of diplomatic normalization between the two countries. As Kiuchi Akitane, director of the

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<sup>99</sup> Uji Toshihiko, *Suzuki Seiken 863-nichi* (863 Days of the Suzuki Administration), p. 308. Also see *Asahi Shimbun*, August 5, 1982.

<sup>100</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 25 in *FBIS-APA-82-165*, C1.



Asian Affairs Bureau, and Sakurauchi testified in the Diet, MOFA was determined to settle the dispute prior to Suzuki's visit to Beijing.<sup>101</sup> A quick solution was essential in order to prevent the controversy from affecting Tokyo's relations with other Asian countries.<sup>102</sup>

Moreover, MOFA wished to maintain its control over foreign policy by insulating it from domestic controversy. In fact, foreign affairs were dominated by the military in the prewar years and later came to be the locus of interministerial rivalries.<sup>103</sup> For foreign policies to best serve the nation, MOFA officials believed that diverse views and pressures should be coordinated by the ministry.<sup>104</sup> Understandably, the ministry was intent on curbing any influence MOE might have on the conduct of diplomacy. In the eyes of MOFA officials, both the textbook case and the obstinacy of MOE impeded their efforts to maintain good relations with other countries. Such behavior also hindered their attempt to rationalize the process of making foreign policy.

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<sup>101</sup> *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 14, House of Councilors, p. 23; and Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 24, House of Representatives, pp. 8-9, 96th Diet.*

<sup>102</sup> Kiuchi's testimony in *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 14, House of Councilors, p. 23.*

<sup>103</sup> For a tag-of-war between MOFA and other ministries over foreign policy initiatives, see Kusano Atsushi, "Taigaiseisaku kettei no kikô to katei (The mechanism and process of foreign policymaking)" in Watanabe Akio, ed., *Kôza Kokusai Seiji: Nihon no Gaikô*, particularly, pp. 64-78.

<sup>104</sup> This is an observation by Fukui Haruhiro. See his "Too Many Captains in Japan's Internationalization: Travails at the Foreign Ministry" in Kenneth B. Pyle, ed., *The Trade Crisis: How Will Japan Respond?*, p. 158.

Suzuki's policy priority was also friendly relations with neighboring countries. He had supported China's seat in the United Nations during the Satô administration.<sup>105</sup> At the time of the Tanaka administration, Suzuki as chairman of the LDP's Executive Council had worked to formulate a party consensus for diplomatic normalization between the two countries. Hence, his concern now was that necessary measures be taken voluntarily, not because of diplomatic pressure. He wished to work out a solution that would allow amendment but would not give an appearance of yielding to foreign pressure--an approach that combined conciliation with firmness.<sup>106</sup> With the foreign protests already filed, however, it was inevitable that any correction of the revised words would be interpreted as "yielding" to external pressure. The only question, therefore, was how much he could solicit a concession from the alliance of MOE and *bunkyô-zoku* conservatives. Thus, going along with the Foreign Ministry was his natural conclusion.

Perturbed by this active involvement by the prime minister and MOFA, MOE senior officials and *bunkyô-zoku* leaders promptly held a meeting in the evening of August 4. Participants were Misumi Tetsuo and Suzuki Isao from MOE and Kaifu Toshiki, Ishibashi Kazuya, Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, Mori Yoshirô and Nishioka Takeo from the *bunkyô-zoku*. They

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<sup>105</sup> Satô Eisaku formed his first cabinet in November 1964 and remained in office till July 1972, when Tanaka Kakuei took over. Tanaka left his office in November 1974.

<sup>106</sup> Uji, *op.cit.*, pp. 309-10.

agreed that the issue should be settled as an educational problem and confirmed their resolve not to yield to the demand for correction.<sup>107</sup> Meeting with his counterpart in MOFA the following day, therefore, Vice Minister Misumi was firm in his opposition to any measure that would affect textbook contents. In the Diet, meanwhile, Suzuki Isao, Primary and Secondary Education Bureau chief, repeatedly stated that the ministry had no intention of making the revisions called for by China and South Korea.<sup>108</sup>

After the meeting on August 4, the prime minister met LDP leaders, such as Nikaidô Susumu, secretary general, and Kaifu Toshiki, former education minister.<sup>109</sup> Nikaidô informed the prime minister that there was no consensus among LDP Diet members as to what should be done about the controversy. In fact, the ruling party was deeply divided. On August 6, Nishioka, a hawkish leader of the *bunkyô-zoku*, invited by Suzuki to give his comments, claimed that no correction should be made because it would affect not only the screening system but also Japan's education policy in general.<sup>110</sup> That same day, the *bunkyô-zoku* in both houses, pro-Seoul Diet members and other groups held meetings. It was reported that the majority of the LDP was

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<sup>107</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 5, 1982, p. 2.

<sup>108</sup> See *Education Committee Minutes*, No. 19, p. 5, House of Representatives; and No. 14, p. 2 & No. 15, pp. 3-4, House of Councilors, both in 96th Diet.

<sup>109</sup> Miyazawa and Sakurauchi were also present at this meeting. See *Kyodo News Service*, August 24 in *FBIS-APA-82-151*, C1.

<sup>110</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 7, 1982, p. 2.

still firm in their position of “no correction under external pressure.”<sup>111</sup>

Conservatives argued that the screening issue was a question related to the sovereignty of a state. If the government now acceded to foreign demands, they said, it would in effect admit its past intervention in the writing and publication of textbooks.

The Foreign Affairs Division held its meeting on August 13. Members of this group were naturally outward-looking and keenly sensitive to diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, their meeting was almost evenly divided: one half believed that education was a matter of national sovereignty that should not be susceptible to foreign interference; the other half held that the party should be open to criticisms from foreign forces.<sup>112</sup>

However, the environment was gradually becoming unfavorable to MOE. At a meeting of politically appointed vice ministers on August 5, the ministry appeared to be under fire from all sides.<sup>113</sup> The same day, Shionoya Kazuo of the LDP, vice chair of *Nitchû Giren*, emphasized to Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa that “there will be no solution other than re-revisions.”<sup>114</sup> On August 6, moreover, after a cabinet meeting, the home

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<sup>111</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 7, 1982.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, August 13 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, August 5 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, August 7, 1982.

affairs minister raised a question: "Should MOE choose to be uncompromising only in defense of the screening system itself?" He pointed out that there had in the past been numerous mistakes in school books.<sup>115</sup> Later that day another cabinet member, the health and welfare minister, also criticized MOE: "It is a historical fact that Japan caused damage to China and Korea, which is something we have to repent."<sup>116</sup> These were the first criticisms of MOE within the cabinet. Even among pro-Seoul members, most of whom were hawkish, concerns were expressed about the way MOE had handled the issue. Yasui Ken, chair of a pro-Seoul group, was quoted as saying that a mere explanation of the screening system would only be perceived as an excuse.<sup>117</sup>

The Foreign Ministry took advantage of this slight change in political climate. On August 9, Foreign Minister Sakurauchi told the lower house that the government should recognize that the war had been internationally condemned as aggression by Japan. Hence, the government should take some kind of steps in accord with joint statements issued with China in 1972 and with Korea in 1965.<sup>118</sup> He also indicated that MOFA was urging MOE to amend the offending phrases, saying that he was "asking the ministries

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, August 6 (evening edition), 1982, p. 1.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, August 7, 1982.

<sup>118</sup> See *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 26, House of Representatives, 96th Diet, pp. 2-4 & 10.*

concerned to deal with the problem properly."<sup>119</sup> Sakurachi spoke again on August 10 before a committee on national security of the upper house: Japan's responsibility for and recollections of past actions should be expressed in the textbooks "as they are in the statements" of 1965 and 1972.<sup>120</sup> Unlike MOE, MOFA had direct access to the *Kantei*. Taking advantage of media reports, their influence began to prevail over that of MOE.

In the afternoon of August 12, the Korean government requested through the Japanese embassy in Seoul a prompt response to its memorandum of August 3. They once again demanded that the distorted versions of modern historical events be corrected and that the correction be made in the books for use from 1983.<sup>121</sup> The prime minister hurriedly consulted with Miyazawa and Sakurachi once again. Together, they decided to convey the foreign minister's view on August 12. This message was forwarded to the Koreans in lieu of an explicitly official government statement. Sakurachi expressed Tokyo's position of regretting its past and added that if the textbooks did not reflect such regret, "the government should straighten itself without delay."<sup>122</sup> Education Minister Ogawa was not

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<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>120</sup> See *National Security Committee Minutes, No. 5, House of Councilors, 96th Diet, p. 11.*

<sup>121</sup> *Asahi Shimbun, August 13, 1982.*

<sup>122</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun & Asahi Shimbun, August 13, 1982, p. 1; and Kyodo News Service, August 12 in FBIS-APA-82-156, C1.*

invited to these top government meetings: neither the August 4 meeting, at which the government decided to handle the issue as a diplomatic one; nor the August 12 meeting, at which an urgent decision was made to promise Seoul that the offending passages would be corrected.

### The Conservatives Strike Back

Through all these events, Suzuki disregarded neither MOE nor LDP conservatives. On the contrary, he paid due attention to opinions within the party and took pains to obtain the consent of the hawks before issuing a government statement. Through discussions with *bunkyô-zoku* leaders, the prime minister realized that it was imperative he guarantee the integrity of the authorization system. He also came to realize that the statement could not be too specific. In fact, the vague terminology of the August 26 statement attested to the strong resistance of the conservatives.

The government decided on August 5 to send high officials from MOE and MOFA to Beijing and Seoul in an effort to find a solution.<sup>123</sup> Seoul refused to accept envoys, but two envoys were sent to Beijing on August 8: a bureau chief from MOFA and another from MOE. On their return from Beijing on August 13, the two envoys met top government officials,

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<sup>123</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 6 in *FBIS-APA-82-152*, C1.

including Suzuki, Miyazawa, Sakurauchi and Ogawa. They reported that Beijing's demand for re-revision had been unchanged, but that the Chinese understood the screening system to be a matter of Japan's national sovereignty. Based upon this report, the top leaders agreed upon two points: 1. A government statement would be issued in which Japan's remorse for past actions would be clearly stated; and 2. the issue of re-revision would be separated from diplomacy, and the details of correction should be left to the Japanese government.<sup>124</sup>

Intense discussions ensued for the next few days within the Ministries of both Foreign Affairs and Education. MOFA officials agreed to incorporate the following three points into the government statement: Japan's responsibility and regret for its past actions, its unchanged diplomatic policy as a peace-loving country, and education practices that reflect these attitudes. They wanted to clearly state their intention of correcting the school text phraseology.<sup>125</sup> On the other hand, MOE remained adamant against any changes. MOE officials were afraid that yielding to Chinese and Korean demands would threaten the screening system fundamentally. They hoped to make necessary corrections within the framework of the system. That is, the term "invasion" would be incorporated three years later when the textbooks at issue were scheduled to be examined again. They wanted to

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<sup>124</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 14, 1982.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, August 15 & 17, 1982. *Kyodo News Service*, August 17 in *FBIS-APA-82-159*, C1.



avoid explicitly stating, and thereby promising, an earlier-than-scheduled correction in the statement.<sup>126</sup>

To break through the impasse between the two ministries, the *Kantei* decided to once again listen to the opinions within the LDP. First, on August 16, Suzuki received a report from Nishioka Takeo on the position of the *bunkyô-zoku*. It indicated that any hurried measures to revise the textbooks would damage MOE's credibility and therefore would not be tolerated. Yet, being well aware that Chinese and Korean criticism should not be taken lightly, *bunkyô-zoku* members were exercising prudence.<sup>127</sup> On August 17, the prime minister met Yasui Ken, Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, and Mori Yoshirô, representatives of pro-Korean Liberal Democrats. These hawks reportedly insisted that corrections should be made within the system.<sup>128</sup> Through meetings with these *bunkyô-zoku* leaders, the prime minister came to realize that the screening system should be left untouched if hard-liners' consent was to be obtained.

This was conveyed to the three top LDP officers--Secretary General Nikaidô Susumu, Executive Council Chair Tanaka Tatsuo, and PARC Chair Tanaka Rokusuke--when Suzuki and Miyazawa met them later that day. The

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<sup>126</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 15 & 17 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>127</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 17 in FBIS-APA-82-159, C1. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 16 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>128</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 18, 1982, p. 1.

prime minister told them that Japan should accept criticism from its Asian neighbors, but that it was important to preserve Japan's textbook screening system.<sup>129</sup> This was generally interpreted as Suzuki's readiness to change the textbooks within the framework of the screening system.

On the morning of August 18, about 100 *bunkyo-zoku* members and proxies filled an Education Division meeting. The debate was heated. Although hard-liners had once enjoyed a comfortable majority in the group, opinions were now almost evenly split, neither side was willing to concede. Yet, it was reported that even the hard-liners now acknowledged that the Japanese-Chinese war was an aggression by the Japanese army. They appeared to be ready to take some measures within the framework of the existing system to settle the dispute.<sup>130</sup>

On the other hand, the Foreign Affairs Division held a leaders' meeting the following morning. Some still strongly argued that "the demands of China and South Korea ... represent interference in Japan's domestic affairs, and the government should not compromise on the matter."<sup>131</sup> Unlike the meeting a week earlier, however, now the majority of

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<sup>129</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 17 in *FBIS-APA-82-160*, C1.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.* Also see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, p. 1; and *Asahi Shimbun*, August 18 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>131</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 19 (evening edition), 1982, p. 1. *Kyodo News Service*, August 19 in *FBIS-APA-82-161*, C1.

the leaders agreed that harmony in diplomatic relations should be the overriding concern. As a whole, the group now leaned toward amending the revised words. Observing this slight shift in opinion within the two key groups, Suzuki and Miyazawa became confident that they could overcome opposition within the LDP. Later that day, the prime minister directed MOFA and MOE to produce a unified solution without delay.

With the circle thus being narrowed, MOE finally offered a compromise on the late evening of August 19. The textbooks in question were scheduled to be re-examined in 1984 and used in 1986, but MOE would advance the plan by one year.<sup>132</sup> In other words, the books would be re-edited in 1983 and distributed in 1985. However, at a meeting on August 20, MOFA insisted the new revision be made as soon as possible and pressed for further compromise. Miyazawa sided with MOFA: if a one-year advance was possible, why not two years?<sup>133</sup> Such a high-handed manner hardened the *bunkyô-zoku* and MOE, and the Education Ministry withdrew its proposal. By August 22, MOFA and the *Kantei* realized that MOE would not make any further concession beyond the one-year advanced revision. Miyazawa prepared a draft statement based upon this premise. Since the two ministries were still in disagreement on whether or not this schedule modification should be included in a government statement, the *Kantei* decided to

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<sup>132</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 20, 1982.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, August 21 & 22, 1982.

postpone the final decision till August 25 when Mitsuzuka Hiroshi and Mori Yoshirô, the two LDP envoys, would return from South Korea.<sup>134</sup>

Mitsuzuka and Mori, hawkish leaders of the *bunkyô-zoku*, had been scheduled to visit Seoul on August 21, virtually as government envoys. However, because MOFA and MOE had failed to reach an agreement on the statement, the two were sent on August 22 solely as LDP delegates.<sup>135</sup> Meeting with them, the Korean education minister, Yi Kyuho, said that "The distortions must be corrected without delay. Our demand will grow stronger as time goes by."<sup>136</sup> The minister also told the delegates that Korea "will never drop the demand in any diplomatic bargaining. ... grave international problems can develop if Japan touches the pride of Korea and other Asian nations."<sup>137</sup> Nonetheless, none of the Korean officials challenged the screening system itself, which was good news for the envoys. On their return to Tokyo on August 25, they reported to Miyazawa that a solution could be sought within the framework of the screening system. Miyazawa reiterated that amendment measures should be expressed in a statement, but Mitsuzuka

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<sup>134</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 23, 1982, p. 1. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 6 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>135</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 21 in *FBIS-APA-82-163*, C1.

<sup>136</sup> *Yonhap News Agency*, August 25 in *FBIS-APA-82-165*, E1. *New York Times*, August 25, 1982, A4:3.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

and Mori objected. The two argued that the government's intention of correcting the revisions should be announced but details, such as the schedule for changes, should not.<sup>138</sup>

In the meantime, Education Minister Ogawa visited Suzuki on the evening of August 24 and reminded the prime minister that his ministry had charge of dealing with the textbook controversy. Ogawa also asked Suzuki to leave detailed measures to the ministry. "We will regret it if we make pledges (to China and South Korea) which we cannot carry out,"<sup>139</sup> Ogawa was quoted as saying. Suzuki's news conference of August 25 proved that the education minister's lobbying effort had been successful. The prime minister told reporters that the government would announce its intention to ensure that textbooks properly reflect the widely accepted interpretation of history. Tokyo would refrain, however, from stating what expressions were to be corrected. The government would formulate general policies. Yet their implementation would be left to the Education Ministry. He also ruled out the possibility of revising the history books before they would be used in the spring of 1983.<sup>140</sup>

The official statement of the government was finally issued by Miyazawa Kiichi the following afternoon. Although in favor of MOFA's

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<sup>138</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 26, 1982. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 6 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>139</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 25, 1982. *Kyodo News Service*, August 25 in FBIS-APA-82-165, C1.

<sup>140</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 25 in FBIS-APA-82-165, C1.

assertion that concrete measures should be explicitly stated in the statement, the chief cabinet secretary had given up the idea after the August 25 meeting with Mitsuzuka and Mori. With the consent of the two envoys, Miyazawa nonetheless added the portion "necessary amendments on the government's responsibility" to the statement.<sup>141</sup> The text of the statement reconfirmed that Japan's awareness of its past mistakes had not in the least changed and that this awareness would be reflected in education practices. The authorization criteria would be revised, and for textbooks which had already been authorized for use in 1983, the education minister would issue a policy statement as an interim measure.<sup>142</sup>

Ogawa held a separate news conference an hour later and gave a detailed explanation. The education minister explained that authorization criteria would be revised within a couple of months so books for use in 1984 would be examined based upon new criteria. For the books in question, he said, the next revision would be conducted one year ahead of schedule and therefore the books would be ready for use in 1985. During the years of 1983 and 1984, when the uncorrected books would be in use, the education minister would notify all schools throughout the nation about new criteria.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, October 6 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>142</sup> See Appendix F for the whole text.

<sup>143</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun & Japan Times*, August 27, 1982.

Seoul accepted this statement the following morning as evidence of Tokyo's respect for the government demands and public opinion in South Korea.<sup>144</sup> Beijing, on the other hand, rejected it on August 28 because the statement did not define what it meant by "necessary amendments," nor did it say when and how the amendments would be made. Wu Xueqian, Chinese vice foreign minister, told Ambassador Katori that Tokyo's "attitude falls far short" of the Chinese demands.<sup>145</sup> Wu called for prompt and clearly stated remedies. After learning that Beijing had not been convinced, Seoul also requested the early implementation of the proposed solution, saying that Tokyo's response on August 26 was not enough to calm public opinion in South Korea.<sup>146</sup>

Facing such a dilemma, the *Kantei* sought to smooth over this reaction through diplomatic efforts, rather than by changing the statement. Such an approach was advocated by both Suzuki and Miyazawa on August 30. The chief cabinet secretary was even ready for a prolonged process: "Even though the dispute may not be settled before Suzuki's visit to Beijing, Tokyo has no problem with it," he was quoted as saying.<sup>147</sup> Meanwhile, the LDP *bunkyo-zoku* held a leaders' meeting on September 1 and confirmed their position:

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<sup>144</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 27 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>145</sup> *New York Times*, August 29, 1982, A20:3. *Asahi Shimbun*, August 29, 1982.

<sup>146</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, August 31 (evening edition), 1982.

<sup>147</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 30 (evening edition), 1982, p. 1.

The proposed solution was the maximum measure possible, and therefore no further concession was necessary other than diplomatic efforts.<sup>148</sup> Since the conservative members of the party had agreed to uphold the August 26 statement, the *Kantei* would have difficulty seeking any solution that would require its change.

In the meantime, in an apparent attempt to do its part in demonstrating Japan's desire for an early solution to the problem, MOE decided to convene the Textbook Authorization Research Council on September 14, three weeks earlier than the original plan.<sup>149</sup> At the same time, additional overtures were made by Ambassador Katori to Wu Xueqian on September 6, and three days later by Gotô Toshio, minister at the Japanese embassy in Seoul, to Choi Dongjin, the head of the Asian Affairs Bureau. Both Beijing and Seoul accepted the latest proposals, which assured that new guidelines for textbooks would be formulated by the end of November and that the Education Ministry would circulate a ministerial statement of guidelines to all primary and secondary school teachers.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1982.

<sup>149</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, September 5 in *FBIS-APA-82-173*, C1-2.

<sup>150</sup> *Japan Times*, September 10, 1982, p. 1.



As Wu stated, there were "still some ambiguous, unsatisfactory points about the concrete measures."<sup>151</sup> Nonetheless, Beijing appreciated the second explanations as a step forward from the previous position and declared a temporary close to the textbook controversy.<sup>152</sup> Suzuki was scheduled to visit Beijing in late September to celebrate the tenth anniversary of diplomatic normalization. It was necessary for Beijing, too, to make his visit a successful one, since Suzuki was to sign an agreement extending another \$250 million in low-interest loans. Both governments had a strong incentive to conclude this new economic accord, an agreement that would bring the total credit line from Japan to over \$1 billion.<sup>153</sup>

### Analysis

This is a case in which protests from China and South Korea transformed a previously domestic problem into a diplomatic issue. This in turn caused "participation expansion"<sup>154</sup> involving a variety of political forces. Thus the case displayed pluralistic characteristics. First, this case demonstrates the

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<sup>151</sup> *Beijing Review*, September 20, 1982, p. 7.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.* Also see *Japan Times*, September 10, 1982, p. 1.

<sup>153</sup> *New York Times*, September 27, 1982, A3:4.

<sup>154</sup> Schoppa, "Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why *gaiatsu* succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others" in *International Organization*, 47:3 (Summer 1993), p. 370.

importance of diplomatic relations over the nationalistic agenda. Second, this chapter shows the conditions under which the resolution of the case requires mediation by top political leaders. Finally, it demonstrates that MOE—normally insulated from the pressure of domestic opposition forces outside the conservative coalition—can be effectively influenced when those forces are joined by foreign criticism.

First, this is a case in which diplomatic concerns prevailed over domestic ones. The maintenance of good relations with China and South Korea was the policy goal of the *Kantei* and MOFA. All the efforts by Suzuki, Miyazawa, and Sakurachi were directed to achieve this goal—to find a compromise solution acceptable not only to the conservatives at home but also to the Asian neighbors. Because of this, the education minister was excluded from the decision-making body. In effect, MOE was reduced to an interest group allied with *bunkyô-zoku* hawks.

Secondly, this chapter shows that when international pressures cause divisions within the ruling coalition, the resolution of the case requires mediation by top political leaders. Opposition parties, JTU, the media, and intellectuals, who had been critical of the MOE policy, became even more vocal after the media reports on June 26. The foreign criticism not only stimulated these opposition forces but also triggered divisions within the government. Immediately after Beijing's protest of July 26, MOFA's vice minister took the position that textbook wording should be based on

historical facts. Furthermore, when MOE failed to convince either Beijing or Seoul, Suzuki and Miyazawa decided to handle the issue as a diplomatic one. Conservatives strongly reacted against this. Senior officials of MOE and *bunkyo-zoku* leaders were adamant against any change that could undermine the existing system. Both the LDP and the bureaucracy were thus internally divided. Hence, the resolution of the matter was left in the hands of top political leaders. The chief cabinet secretary took the lead, on behalf of the prime minister, to manage the crisis, working closely with the foreign minister.

While Miyazawa was mediating between MOE and MOFA, Suzuki tried to solicit the ruling party's consent. Given the unwillingness of the LDP leadership to take up this issue through normal party channels, it was *bunkyo-zoku* influence that particularly weighed on Suzuki's mind. Because of it, the prime minister invited Kaifu Toshiki as well as Nikaidô Susumu, secretary general, to the August 4 meeting with the party. Kaifu was a moderate leader of the *bunkyo-zoku* and the chairman of an education policy study group of the LDP. On the other hand, Nishioka Takeo, to whom Suzuki often entrusted the task of sounding out opinions within the party, was one of conservative *bunkyo-zoku* leaders. In other words, a key to solving this diplomatic issue was whether or not the government was able to appease conservative elements within the ruling party.

Facing intractable resistance from the conservatives, therefore, the *Kantei* had no choice but to exclude the proposed schedule change from the statement. In short, although successfully having solicited a partial concession from MOE and the LDP *bunkyo-zoku*, the impact of the domestic and foreign opposition was not strong enough to overcome this conservative alliance. A compromise solution needed to be worked out that would satisfy not only the Asian neighbors but opponents within the conservative establishment as well. The use of vague terminology in the August 26 statement was a natural consequence.

Finally, this chapter suggests that protests from groups outside the ruling coalition cannot effectively influence government decisions when acting alone. As discussed earlier, textbook authorization had been a point of dispute between MOE and JTU for many years. However, insofar as the criticism came from domestic groups such as the media, opposition parties, and labor unions, the Japanese government gave it little regard, even choosing to ignore it. For more than three decades, MOE remained indifferent to these voices at home. Only after protests were raised from Beijing and Seoul, did the *Kantei* and MOFA step in and diplomatic concerns prevail over domestic policy concerns. In short, domestic influences have a tangible impact on the policy process only when allied with foreign influence.

## Chapter 4

### Tiananmen Incident

On June 4, 1989, news of the repression of pro-democracy demonstrators by the Chinese army at Tiananmen Square spread quickly. It produced a tremendous shock throughout the world. There was no way to know the precise number of casualties, but, according to the Red Cross, the bloody crackdown claimed the lives of about 2,600 students and citizens.<sup>1</sup> This brutal event was a betrayal to nearly all China watchers who had been hoping that the economic reforms and open-door policy of Beijing would facilitate its political relaxation and result in the development of democratic institutions in China.

While many Western nations quickly condemned the flagrant military crackdown on what appeared to be a peaceful movement, the Soviet Union and Asian nations, including Japan, were cautious and slow to react. Falling short of condemning the bloodshed in Beijing, Japanese officials described it as "regrettable."<sup>2</sup> "Seriously concerned"<sup>3</sup> about the situation, they adopted a

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<sup>1</sup> The figure was quoted by Hasegawa Kazutoshi, the Foreign Ministry's Asian affairs bureau chief, during a June 13 interpellation in the Diet. See *Budget Committee Minutes, No. 12, House of Councilors, 114th Diet*, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Shiokawa Masajūrō, chief cabinet secretary, at a news conference in the morning of June 5.

<sup>3</sup> Watanabe Taizō, Foreign Ministry spokesman, used this expression on June 4 and Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke, the following morning.

wait-and-see approach. In doing so, Tokyo invited criticism both from abroad and at home.

Not until June 7, as if goaded by the unexpectedly tough rhetoric of the Western nations, did the Japanese government invite the Chinese ambassador to convey its displeasure with the military repression of unarmed citizens. Another week later, in mid-June, the foreign minister used somewhat sharper language in the Diet to disapprove of the conduct of the Chinese army. Even then, however, the prime minister repeated that his government had no plan for any protest or sanction against Beijing. Only toward the end of June would the Japanese government take the modest steps of halting negotiations on its third loan package to, and minister-level exchanges with, China. Nonetheless, after the Paris summit in mid-July, Tokyo swiftly resumed its second aid package and exchanges of all kinds—political, economic, and cultural. By the end of 1989, Tokyo had lifted all sanctions but the Third Yen Loan and minister-level contacts. Furthermore, even these two were removed all together after the Houston summit of July 1990.

Unlike the other two cases, international pressures did not reverberate within Japanese politics. The issue being external in nature, no well-organized and politically powerful group other than the business community took an active part in the process. Nor was any strong force created within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In the absence of challenges from conservative ranks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) single-handedly

formulated the nation's policy. The entire affair was a typical case of bureaucratic dominance in Japan's policy process.

What were the major concerns of the policymakers in MOFA in their initial response of moderation? What were their concerns when they decided to use stronger rhetoric and even apply economic sanctions to China? What was the main factor that contributed to their decision to resume aid programs long before Western nations, particularly the United States? How did various influences, foreign and domestic, shape each decision? To explain these questions, this chapter will first examine various voices in the international community, followed by the initial response of the Japanese government. It will then explore views of domestic actors on condemnation and punitive actions vis-à-vis China. The investigation will also be extended to Tokyo's efforts to act in concert with the United States. In the final section, however, we will examine why the Japanese government, despite the centrality of the U.S.-Japan relations in structuring its diplomatic posture, moved ahead of Western nations, particularly the United States, in removing all sanctions against Beijing.

### International Outcries

When the news of the Tiananmen bloodshed was reported, it was still the evening of June 3 in Europe and midday in the Western Hemisphere. West

European and North American nations reacted promptly and harshly to the bloody suppression of peaceful demonstrators in Beijing. Those which froze contacts of government officials included France, the Netherlands, Spain and the four neutral nations (Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland). The Swiss banned military sales to Beijing. The United States and England suspended arms sales and high-level military contacts. State visits to China by British and Dutch royal family members were suspended by their respective governments. France canceled a visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng that was planned for the following autumn.

The annual meeting of seven industrial democracies was scheduled to be hosted by France during July 14-16. When the bloodshed erupted, preparatory meetings were already underway in Paris. "The Europeans were especially stern. They contended that the oppression and killing of unarmed citizens who had spoken out for democracy was a gross violation of human rights,"<sup>4</sup> recollected Kunihiro Michihiko, deputy foreign minister for economic affairs, who represented the Japanese government. If Japan had taken a passive attitude toward the events in China, it would very likely invite an attack from all the other six nations.

The French were particularly sensitive to human rights issues because of a historic anniversary being celebrated in the nation. The year of 1989 was

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<sup>4</sup> Tahara Sôichirô, *Heisei Nihon no Kanryô* (Japanese Bureaucrats in the Heisei Era), p. 282.



a bicentennial of the French Revolution. The summit meeting would provide an excellent opportunity for the French to demonstrate the ideals of the Revolution by denouncing the suppression of human rights in Beijing. Hence, President Mitterrand did not waste time in condemning the Chinese authorities and used the toughest rhetoric: "There is no future to the government that has degraded itself to fire at the youth who rose up under the name of freedom."<sup>5</sup> On June 6, the French government froze contacts of government officials at all levels, and Li Peng's visit to France, planned for that fall, was canceled.<sup>6</sup>

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was "appalled by the indiscriminate shooting of unarmed people."<sup>7</sup> Her government canceled a planned visit to China by Prince Charles and Princess Diana, and suspended all arms sales to, and high-level military contacts with, Beijing on June 6.<sup>8</sup> At the summit preparation meetings, an unexpectedly tough stance by the British surprised Kunihiro. Given their concerns about a negative impact of

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<sup>5</sup> Quoted in editorials in *Asahi Shimbun*, June 7, p. 5; *Tokyo Shimbun*, June 7, p. 4; *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 8, p. 5; and the like.

<sup>6</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 7 (evening edition), p. 2; *Sankei Shimbun*, June 7 (evening edition); and *New York Times*, June 7, A10:3, in 1989.

<sup>7</sup> *Japan Times*, June 6, 1989, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 6 (evening edition), p. 2; and *New York Times*, June 7, A10:3, in 1989.

China's economic failure on Hong Kong, the British could have been more lenient.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile, West Germany's official statement was soft. On June 4, its foreign ministry urged China "to return to its universally welcomed policies of reform and openness."<sup>10</sup> Yet, its labor minister, Norbert Blum, issued a stern statement the same day: "A government that scorns human life and tramples on human rights, must reckon with contempt from all civilized states."<sup>11</sup> He also called for a special session of the United Nations to investigate the events.

Other Western countries also joined in these condemnations and punitive measures. On June 4, the Canadian foreign minister called on the Chinese government to stop "the aggressive and senseless killing by its armed forces"<sup>12</sup> and made China's ambassador aware of the Canadian views. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden all issued statements deploring the shooting of hundreds of demonstrators by the Chinese army. On June 5, Australia filed a protest. In Norway, China's ambassador to Oslo was handed an official protest note on June 6. On the same day, the Netherlands and Sweden froze contacts with Beijing at all levels of government, Spain banned

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<sup>9</sup> Tahara, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

<sup>10</sup> *New York Times*, June 5, 1989, A12:5.

<sup>11</sup> *Japan Times*, June 6, 1989, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

high-level government meetings, and Switzerland suspended military sales. The Netherlands also canceled a state visit to China by Queen Beatrix. On June 8, moreover, three neutral nations (Switzerland, Austria and Finland) joined Sweden in freezing diplomatic contacts with China.<sup>13</sup>

In the United States, immediately after the shooting of protesters by Chinese troops, President Bush deplored the Chinese decision "to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss of life."<sup>14</sup> The Chinese ambassador, Han Xu, was called to the State Department to hear an expression of "deep concern"<sup>15</sup> about the killings. On the same day, however, Secretary of States James Baker declined on a Cable News Network (CNN) television program to say whether the Bush administration would take such steps as cutting off sales of American arms to Beijing. He explained, "it would appear that there may be some violence being used on both sides."<sup>16</sup>

Apparently, these words did not satisfy many members of Congress. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, a ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, insisted that "all U.S. military cooperation and

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<sup>13</sup> For the information in this paragraph, see *Japan Times*, June 6, p. 4; *New York Times*, June 5, A12:4 & June 7, A10:3; *Asahi Shimbun*, June 7 (evening edition); *Sankei Shimbun*, June 7 (evening edition); and *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 9, all in 1989.

<sup>14</sup> *New York Times*, June 4, 1989, A21:1.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, June 5, 1989, A12:1.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, June 4, 1989, A21:1.

sharing of technology with the Communist government must be terminated."<sup>17</sup> Representative Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma, the fourth-ranking Republican in the House, dismissed the administration's response as timid and appealed for a moratorium on U.S. support for China. Unless the White House acted, "Congress will do it for him,"<sup>18</sup> said Representative Stephen Solarz, a New York Democrat who was chairman of the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs. Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress thus joined forces to demand that President Bush take steps to punish Beijing. Both the House and the Senate unanimously passed a resolution for condemnation on June 6.<sup>19</sup>

In the face of widespread outrage over the bloodshed and pressure to do more than "deplore," Bush ordered on June 5 a suspension of American military sales to China as well as a halt to the exchange of military delegations. He also announced that the United States would engage in "a sympathetic review of requests"<sup>20</sup> by any Chinese students when their visas expired.

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, June 5, 1989, A12:1.

<sup>19</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 7 (evening edition), 1989, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *New York Times*, June 6, 1989, A15:1.

Still, the president resisted suggestions that he impose economic sanctions on, or withdraw the American ambassador from, Beijing.<sup>21</sup> At a news conference on June 8, he defended his policy on the grounds that economic sanctions "would be counterproductive and would hurt the people."<sup>22</sup> The president also made it clear that he wanted to preserve relations with China both because of the strategic importance of Chinese-American relations and because moderate elements in China might yet emerge triumphant.<sup>23</sup> The Americans appeared to have strong national interests in China that did not allow the administration to give in to mounting pressure for more punitive actions against Beijing.

Meanwhile, international institutions reacted quickly to the bloody events, too. The European Community (EC) issued a statement of protest on June 5 and called on the Chinese government to stop using force against unarmed citizens. Javier Perez De Cuellar, secretary-general of the United Nations, deeply deplored the situation in China in his statement of June 5. He called on the leadership in Beijing "to exercise an utmost self-restraint."<sup>24</sup> It was said to be unprecedented for a secretary-general to comment on internal affairs of a permanent member of the Security Council. The World

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, A1:5.

<sup>22</sup> For the details of the conference, see *New York Times*, June 9, 1989, A22:1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 6 (evening edition), 1989, p. 2.

Bank decided as early as June 9 to postpone examinations for a \$60 million loan to agricultural projects.<sup>25</sup> By mid-June, the amount of loans on hold reached \$450 million.<sup>26</sup> Most of these words and actions of foreign governments and political leaders were quickly and extensively reported by the Japanese media.

### Response of the Japanese Government

When the alarming news of Tianamen traveled around the globe, it was already early morning of June 4 in Japan, only a few hours after the formation of the Uno cabinet. The cabinet was just launched the night before, following the collapse of its predecessor, the Takeshita cabinet, due to the Recruit scandal.<sup>27</sup> The initial response of the Japanese government was somewhat sluggish. Then, on June 6, a crisis management team was formed. After a heated debate, the team reached a consensus: Japan would, as a member of the Western bloc, criticize Beijing for its inhumane actions. Yet it would

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<sup>25</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 10 (evening edition), 1989.

<sup>26</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 20 (evening edition), 1989, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> During the last half of 1988, it was revealed that Recruit Corporation, ranking company in the information industry, had sold stock shares of its subsidiary, Recruit Cosmos, to leading politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, who profited a great deal when Recruit Cosmos went public. Included among the benefited politicians were former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, then prime minister Takeshita Noboru, his cabinet members, other leading LDP politicians, and even opposition party members. The bribery case hence developed into a major political scandal in 1989 and forced Takeshita to leave office prematurely.

oppose sanctions because they would isolate China and thereby destabilize the world.<sup>28</sup> The Uno cabinet remained loyal to this MOFA decision.

Responding to the incident in Tiananmen Square, the Foreign Ministry issued its official statement on June 4: Japan was very much concerned about the bloodshed and strongly hoped that the situation would not deteriorate any further.<sup>29</sup> During the first three days, MOFA officials maintained that Japan would carefully monitor the course of events and refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs.<sup>30</sup> A statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiokawa Masajûrô on the morning of June 5 echoed MOFA's stance: "The great loss of life brought about as a result of the army's exercise of force is truly regrettable."<sup>31</sup> Later that day, Shiokawa told a news conference that Japan had no intention of protesting China's crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrators.

On June 5, Prime Minister Uno delivered his first speech as head of the government to the Diet, in which he uttered not a single word on the bloody

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<sup>28</sup> Tahara, *op.cit.*, p. 286.

<sup>29</sup> See *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 1989. Also see *Kyodo News Service*, June 5 in US Department of Commerce, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, East Asia* (FBIS-EAS)-89-107, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> See comments during the first three days by Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka Hiroshi and MOFA Spokesman Watanabe Taizô, *Kyodo News Service*, June 5 in *FBIS-EAS-89-107*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5 (evening edition), 1989. Also see *Kyodo News Service*, June 5 in *FBIS-EAS-89-107*, p. 1.

events in Tiananmen Square.<sup>32</sup> It was reported that the draft had been completed on June 3, a few hours before the military suppression.<sup>33</sup> Given the fact that its capital had been placed under martial law since May 20, the exclusion of the China issue from the speech was quite inexplicable. Speaking to reporters the following day, he simply expressed his concern: China would become isolated in the international community, and such a development would worry Japan as a neighbor.<sup>34</sup>

No words of condemnation were found in any of these comments. Japanese war activities in China in the 1930s and early 1940s were referred to as the reason. For instance, in the Diet, Uno ruled out sanctions because Japanese-Chinese relations were, due to Japan's past aggression in China, different from American or British relations with China.<sup>35</sup> Watanabe Taizô, MOFA's spokesman, also attributed Japan's relatively mild reaction to historical sensitivities. The two countries had so many difficulties in the past that "we are very careful in choosing proper words,"<sup>36</sup> he explained to foreign correspondents.

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<sup>32</sup> For his speech, see *House of Representatives Minutes, No. 17, 114th Diet*, pp. 565-68.

<sup>33</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 8, 1989.

<sup>34</sup> *Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun*, and other papers, June 7, 1989.

<sup>35</sup> For Uno's statement, see *House of Representatives Minutes, No. 18, 114th Diet*, p. 578.

<sup>36</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, June 6 in *FBIS-EAS-89-107*, p. 2.



Despite the restrained language, however, some administrative measures were taken. On June 4, the Foreign Ministry advised Japanese travel agencies, airline companies and businesses to refrain from visiting Beijing. The following day, MOFA and the Japan International Cooperation Agency suspended their plans for sending about a dozen development examination teams to China on the grounds that the situation in China would not allow the teams to carry out their mission.<sup>37</sup> On June 6, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) also postponed ten missions of economic cooperation out of concern for the safety of the mission members.<sup>38</sup> In addition, many plans for economic cooperation and cultural exchange were either canceled or postponed.

In the morning of June 7, MOFA advised Japanese citizens to leave China. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiokawa announced that any foreigner living in China would be permitted to enter Japan without a visa and that visa extension applications from Chinese nationals in Japan would be "flexibly" handled.<sup>39</sup> During the three days from June 7, the Japanese government made ten special flights available to evacuees from China. By June 9, most of some 3,100 Japanese nationals in Beijing had returned to

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<sup>37</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 6, 1989, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, June 7, 1989, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> *New York Times*, June 7, 1989, A10:1; and *Kyodo News Service*, June 7 in *FBIS-EAS-89-108*, p. 2.

Japan.<sup>40</sup> Hence, Japanese officials asserted that while the rhetoric used by Japan may not be as heated as those of Western countries, there was no difference in its substance other than suspending arms sales, in which Japan had not been engaged.<sup>41</sup>

More importantly, Vice Foreign Minister Murata<sup>42</sup> suggested on June 5 that the implementation of Japan's Second Yen Loan to China (470 billion yen for 1984-89), only 40% of which had been disbursed by May 1989, could be further delayed due to the confusion in the recipient country.<sup>43</sup> As MOFA officials often explained, however, Tokyo did not publicly describe these and other measures as sanctions. Instead, they argued that these were the result of "the physical incapacity to implement"<sup>44</sup> due to the disorder in China. The Japanese government tried to avoid an impression that those steps had been taken to express its protest or criticism vis-à-vis the Chinese authorities.

To handle the situation, senior officials of the Foreign Ministry huddled together each day since June 4. This group was officially launched

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<sup>40</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, June 9 in *FBIS-EAS-89-110*, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> Hasegawa Kazutoshi, Asian Affairs Bureau director, told the Diet this on June 16. See *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 4*, House of Councilors, 114th Diet, p. 16. Also see remarks by Watanabe Taizō cited by *Kyodo News Service*, June 9 in *FBIS-EAS-89-111*, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> The vice foreign minister gives a press conference every day, and it is agreed upon between the media and MOFA that his words will be reported as comments by a *Gaimushō shunō* (top MOFA official). All those comments are introduced in this chapter as Murata's.

<sup>43</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 6, p. 9 and June 7, p. 9, 1989.

<sup>44</sup> Watanabe Taizō on June 9. See *Kyodo News Service*, June 9 in *FBIS-EAS-89-111*, p. 2. For a similar comment by Murata, see *ibid.*, June 7 in *FBIS-EAS-89-108*, p. 2.

on June 6 as the "Special Investigation Center on the Situation in China." The team was headed by Murata Ryôhei, vice minister, and consisted of several high officials of the Ministry: Kuriyama Takakazu and Kunihiro Michihiko, deputy ministers; Hasegawa Kazutoshi, Tanino Sakutarô and Anami Koreshige, director, counselor and China Division chief, respectively, of the Asian Affairs Bureau; Arima Tatsuo, Togô Takehiro and Yamashita Shintarô, directors of the bureaus for North American affairs, Eurasian affairs, and information and research, respectively.<sup>45</sup> It was reported that their opinion was split into two: one group argued that Japan's response should be placed under proper checks and restraints, and the other contended that it would work more to Japan's advantage in international arenas if they adopted clear measures as a member of the Western bloc.<sup>46</sup>

Tahara Sôichirô described this deliberation within MOFA in more detail.<sup>47</sup> The cautious and prudent response was favored by officials of the Asian Affairs Bureau. The substance of their position can be summarized as follows: The Europeans can appeal to ideals of justice since these events are occurring in a country distant from them; owing a historical debt, so to speak,

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<sup>45</sup> For the creation of, and debate within, the team, see Tahara, *op.cit.*, pp. 279-302.

<sup>46</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 8, 1989.

<sup>47</sup> Tahara is a journalist and writer who is well acquainted with the inside of politics, bureaucracy and business in Japan. His writings include *Japanese Bureaucrats*, *New Media Wars* and *An Intelligence War between Japan and America*. When I interviewed a MOFA

Japanese cannot adhere simply to questions of principle; many of the former French colonies in fact believe human rights issues to be a mere ploy of the bourgeois nations; if human rights suppression was used as a criterion of economic or military cooperation, more than a few Asian nations would end up being ostracized; and Asian countries desire that Japan, the only summit participant from their region, act as representative on their behalf in Paris.<sup>48</sup>

These arguments stood in direct contradiction to those of officials in charge of American and European affairs. Arima and Togô maintained that Japan should keep pace with the Western nations. Basing their position on an appeal to the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, they held that comments on human rights matters in no way constitute interference in another nation's internal affairs.<sup>49</sup>

Agreement did not come easily, but the assertions by the Asian Affairs Bureau eventually gained ground – since driving China into a corner would bring about an adverse result for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan should adopt diplomatic measures of its own that would avert China's isolation.<sup>50</sup> Thus the special team reached a consensus that Tokyo, as a

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official in May of 1993, diplomatic regulations did not allow him to freely respond to my questions; instead, he suggested I read Tahara's *Heisei Nihon no Kanryô*.

<sup>48</sup> Tahara, *op.cit.*, pp. 283-85.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 7, 1989.

member of advanced democracies, would stand for human rights but go against harsh condemnation or sanctions. Komori Toshisada, MOFA's China Division official, later explained the rationale of this stance: Many countries in Asia are still in the process of realizing political stability and socio-economic development.<sup>51</sup> He questioned the wisdom of uniformly applying Western standards to Asian countries.

Thereafter, comments by government officials clearly reflected this decision. Prime Minister Uno criticized the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for the first time on June 7 at the plenary session of the lower house: "Firing at its own people is a grievous thing that shouldn't have happened."<sup>52</sup> Nonetheless, he made it clear at the same plenary session that his government had no intention of applying sanctions against Beijing. He gave the following reasoning: 1. Japan caused great trouble to China in the past war; 2. information on China is incomplete; 3. a cautious response is required to help 8,300 Japanese nationals out of China.<sup>53</sup> At a June 7 meeting between the government and LDP leaders, Uno further reiterated his cautious view: "Today's relations between Japan and China have been cultivated against

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<sup>51</sup> Komori Toshisada, "*Chûgoku Mondai ni Taisuru Gaimushô no Taiô* (MOFA's Response toward the China Issue)" in *Gaiko Forum*, August 1989, p. 71.

<sup>52</sup> *House of Representatives Minutes, No. 18, 114th Diet*, p. 578.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

various historical odds. It is not appropriate for Japan to use similar expressions to those of the United States or EC nations."<sup>54</sup>

MOFA was also consistent in this regard. On June 7, Murata called Chinese Ambassador Yang Zhenya to his office and conveyed Tokyo's official stand on the issue: 1. Although Japan has restrained its comments on China's internal affairs, the Chinese government's actions can not be accepted from a humanitarian viewpoint; 2. Japan has no intention of interfering in China's domestic issues, but it strongly requests Beijing exercise self-restraint.<sup>55</sup> This was stronger language than previously used by the Japanese government on China in recent years. So much so that David Sanger of the *New York Times* reported from Tokyo that "Japan today ended four decades of unwillingness to criticize the Chinese Government publicly."<sup>56</sup> However, the note was carefully worded to avoid interference in China's internal affairs.

Moreover, the vice minister told a news conference later that day that Japan would not side with Western nations on sanctions at the summit in Paris: "We will keep step with them on humanitarian issues but doubt that China bashing or an isolated China as its result will be conducive to Asian stability."<sup>57</sup> A week later, Murata reiterated his point: Japan would condemn

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<sup>54</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 7 (evening edition), 1989.

<sup>55</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 8, 1989.

<sup>56</sup> *New York Times*, June 8, 1989, A14:4.

<sup>57</sup> *Sankei Shimbun & Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 8, 1989.

the actions of the Chinese authorities from a humanitarian point of view on such occasions as the Paris summit and U.N. conferences. Yet, he added that Tokyo would continue its economic assistance to China to help its modernization.<sup>58</sup>

The MOFA officials realized the necessity of taking a stand on human rights to keep pace to Western nations, thereby avoiding criticism from, or a clash with, those allies. At the same time, stability in Asia, therefore an orderly China, was equally important given Japan's emphasis on economic growth.<sup>59</sup> As a result, Tokyo adopted the no-sanction policy. Such measures as the cancellations of various mission groups and the suspensions of aid programs were often accompanied by assurances that they were not measures of protest, but that the disorder in China interrupted the implementation of original plans.

#### Public Opinion and the Press

Although the government was restrained in its rhetoric, public awareness in Japan was very high. This occurred for two reasons. First, Chinese nationals and the human rights groups in Japan were very active in protesting against

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<sup>58</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 13 (evening edition), 1989, p. 1.

<sup>59</sup> MOFA attempted to maintain balance between these two elements. See Komori, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

both the Chinese and Japanese governments. Second, the Japanese media devoted extensive time and space to the incident. Much of the coverage openly criticized Tokyo's soft approach. However, it should be noted that the criticism was directed toward the mild wording of the government, not at the lack of punitive actions.

Enraged at the military suppression, Chinese nationals in Japan took actions quickly and vigorously. In Tokyo, Chinese students formed a support group for the democracy movement in China and organized rallies on June 4 and 7, each of which was attended by thousands of people, mostly Chinese nationals. They denounced the inhumane massacre in mainland China and demanded greater democracy and the resignation of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng.<sup>60</sup> On June 8, the group made a request to Uno that Japan impose economic sanctions on, and freeze ties with, Beijing.<sup>61</sup> Protest rallies and marches were held across Japan by Chinese students and scholars to express their anger.

Among Japanese citizens, the most active protests came from human rights groups. The Japan Civil Liberties Union, a Tokyo-based human rights group, for example, issued a statement that strongly condemned the PLA's actions as "extraordinarily cruel and inhumane."<sup>62</sup> It also appealed to the

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<sup>60</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 1989, p. 30; and *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 8, p. 26.

<sup>61</sup> *Japan Times*, June 9, 1989, p. 3. Also see *Kyodo News Service*, June 8 in *FBIS-EAS-89-110*, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> A document provided by Satō Suguru, official of the Union, September 30, 1993.



Chinese government and army for an end to the military oppression. In the Kantô area, the Center for Human Rights Protection was set up in 19 universities to help Chinese students, and a similar group was formed in five colleges in the Kansai area. To these two groups, the earlier mentioned support group of Chinese students in Tokyo, a group for women in Asia, the Foundation for Human Rights in Asia, the Tokyo office of the Japan Socialist Party, Amnesty Japan, and several law firms joined to form a network in protest against human rights suppression in China.<sup>63</sup> Among their activities were fund raising, collecting signatures for petitions, requesting the ministers of justice, education, and foreign affairs to improve visa renewal procedures, and giving advice to Chinese students and trainees.<sup>64</sup>

Meanwhile, Amnesty International appealed on June 4 to the Chinese authorities "to take all possible measures to prevent any further killing."<sup>65</sup> In addition, it published in its newsletter, *Urgent Action*, the addresses of Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun, urging citizens all over the world to send pleas to Beijing. Amnesty Japan translated this newsletter every time it was issued by the head office in London and distributed it widely beyond its membership, calling on readers to send protest letters, telegrams

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<sup>63</sup> A list of groups that joined the "Network" was provided by Kitai Daisuke, official of Amnesty Japan.

<sup>64</sup> A document provided by Satô Suguru, official of the Union.

<sup>65</sup> *Urgent Action*, ASA 17/25/89, June 5, 1989.

and telexes to the Chinese leaders. They also organized gatherings to write letters. By mid-October, 16,000 signatures were collected for a petition that asked for, among other things, the release of demonstrators without delay or reservation. The petition also insisted on their right to fair trials.<sup>66</sup>

Unlike human rights organizations in other countries,<sup>67</sup> those in Japan did not take a stand on the sanction issue. Instead, they directed their activities solely for the protection of human rights. They continuously called for the extension of visas and the improvement of refugee recognition procedures. Yet, their impact was not strong enough to affect the Japanese government's position. Justice Minister Tanikawa Kazuo told the Diet in mid-June: "After careful consideration of various circumstances, flexible actions will be taken" on a case-by-case basis.<sup>68</sup> Even after the G-7 nations agreed at the Paris summit "to extend the stays of those Chinese students who so desire,"<sup>69</sup> Tokyo still maintained its position of not giving its word for all the Chinese students but of examining each case carefully.

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<sup>66</sup> A response to my questionnaire from Kitai Daisuke, Amnesty Japan official, September 1, 1993.

<sup>67</sup> For example, Freedom House, an American human rights organization founded in 1941, demanded that President Bush undertake an immediate review of the full range of economic and military cooperation between Washington and Beijing. See *New York Times*, June 5, 1989, A12:1.

<sup>68</sup> For his statements in the 114th Diet, see *Judicial Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 4*, pp. 3 & 23; and *Audits Committee Minutes, No. 3*, p. 22, House of Representatives.

<sup>69</sup> For the declaration text, see MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō*, 1989, p. 323.

The Japanese media dedicated a great deal of time and space to these movements in Japan as well as statements and actions of foreign governments and political leaders, which aroused the Japanese public to a strong reaction against the Chinese government. Nakajima Mineo, professor of international relations at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, described the situation as follows:

All of Japan is really shocked, especially the younger generation ... most Japanese people are now angry at Chinese leaders for taking these actions.<sup>70</sup>

According to opinion surveys by the *Jiji News Service*, those who named China as their favorite country dropped from 17.3% in May to 4.9% in June. In sharp contrast, those who chose China as a hateful nation increased from 5.4% in May to 27.1% in June.<sup>71</sup> Sentiments and distaste toward the Chinese leaders shown by the Japanese public were quite phenomenal given its normally self-complacent and apolitical nature. Nonetheless, those sentiments were not expressed in any passionate form. Hence, Chinese and

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<sup>70</sup> Nakajima was quoted by an American journalist, Steven R. Weisman. See *New York Times*, June 7, 1989, A10:1.

<sup>71</sup> Two thousand voters nationwide were asked to name three countries for each category. The recovery rates were 74.5% for May and 74.1% for June. See Prime Minister's Office, ed., *Yoron Chōsa Nenkan 1990*, pp. 556 & 563.

other foreign nationals in Japan expressed their frustration with the lack of support from Japanese citizens.<sup>72</sup>

Some of the major newspapers were highly critical of the Japanese government's restrained reaction. The *Mainichi Shimbun* did not spare sharp words. In its editorials on June 5 and 8, the paper made a strong protest against the "brutality with which the Chinese tanks ran over bullet victims."<sup>73</sup> It criticized the Japanese government as "consistently unwilling to take concrete measures for urging China's self-restraint."<sup>74</sup> The *Tokyo Shimbun* also claimed that the government should, for the sake of human rights protection, more definitely urge China to self-restraint. The paper criticized Uno's statement as "too abstract and unsatisfactory,"<sup>75</sup> referring to his June 6 remark that China may become isolated and such a development would worry Japan. The *Sankei Shimbun*, as well, disapproved of the government position. The conservative paper argued that the government's approach to the dreadful incident in which a number of victims had been

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<sup>72</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 8, p. 26 and June 11, p. 27.

<sup>73</sup> The paper has the third largest circulation after the *Yomiuri* and *Asahi*. It often presents candid views that might be inconvenient to the conservative establishment. See its editorial, June 8, 1989, p. 5.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> A local paper in the Tokyo metropolitan area. See its editorial, June 7, 1989, p. 4.

sacrificed was hardly understood, and that its summoning the Chinese ambassador on June 7 came too late.<sup>76</sup>

On the other hand, the *Asahi Shimbun*<sup>77</sup> and the *Yomiuri Shimbun*,<sup>78</sup> the two largest papers in Japan, had a much softer tone. The *Asahi* did "strongly hope and request"<sup>79</sup> for democratic measures and rational judgment by Chinese leaders but carefully avoided offensive words. After mentioning protest measures by the United States and France, moreover, the paper approved Tokyo's response during the first three days: "The Japanese government, too, has already expressed its concerns."<sup>80</sup> It should be noted here that the editorial was written before Tokyo summoned the Chinese ambassador to its foreign ministry. In regard to endorsement of the carefully controlled wording of the government, the *Yomiuri* took a similar position. Referring to June 7 statements by Uno and Murata, the *Yomiuri* held that "the Japanese government should continue to urge the Chinese authorities to exercise self-restraint."<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> The smallest of the five major newspapers in Japan. Its views are conservative and often nationalistic. See its editorial, June 9, 1989, p. 2.

<sup>77</sup> The paper has the second-largest circulation among Japanese newspapers and is considered to be relatively liberal, although all the Japanese media maintain a cozy relationship with the Government. See footnote 110 in Chapter 2.

<sup>78</sup> The paper has the largest circulation and is regarded as conservative.

<sup>79</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, editorial, June 5, 1989, p. 5.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, editorial, June 7, 1989, p. 5. Underline added.

<sup>81</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, editorial, June 8, 1989, p. 3. Underline added.

This made an interesting contrast with the *Mainichi* and *Sankei* editorials. The former argued that "Prime Minister Uno went no further than simply to describe it as a grievous thing that cannot be allowed."<sup>82</sup> The latter deplored the "voiceless" Japan. The conservative paper reasoned out that the government was excessively nervous about intervention because remarks by Japanese cabinet members on the war against China had often created tension between the two countries in the past.<sup>83</sup>

Despite these differences in their tones, all these newspapers agreed that the past aggressive war should not hinder Japan from expressing its own views. By contrast, the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* warned the Japanese government against emotional reactions. Instead of criticizing either Tokyo or Beijing, Japan's financial newspaper calmly analyzed the situation in China, pointed out mistakes made by its leadership, and requested prudence on the part of the Chinese government.<sup>84</sup>

Furthermore, a closer examination indicates that even those papers who urged their government to take a stronger stand toward Beijing failed to explicitly recommend what kind of "concrete measures" should be taken. In

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<sup>82</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, editorial, June 8, 1989, p. 5. Underline added.

<sup>83</sup> *Sankei Shimbun*, editorial, June 9, 1989, p. 2.

<sup>84</sup> Japan's equivalent of the *Wall Street Journal*, the paper is regarded as well informed on conservative politics. It has the fourth-largest circulation in Japan after the *Mainichi*. See its editorials, June 5 & 8, 1989, p. 2.

fact, when it came to sanctions, even the *Mainichi* and *Sankei* were not positive about the idea. The *Sankei* editorial read, "We do not think that Japan should go along with the West in taking punitive actions ... A cautious approach is a rational conclusion if we take into consideration the stability of East Asia, which is indispensable to Japan's security."<sup>85</sup> The *Mainichi* also supported the government's argument that "careful analysis is necessary if we wish to maintain a long lasting friendship."<sup>86</sup> Even after June 21, when three workers who had participated in antigovernment demonstrations in Shanghai were executed, none of the newspapers argued for sanctions.

In short, Japanese people agreed that the PLA's action deserved condemnation and that their government should clearly express disapproval of Beijing. On punitive actions, however, there seemed no strong consensus among them against their government's policy. What is more, the very media that expressed its dissatisfaction more or less at the government's limited language stood unanimously by the government on the sanction issue.

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<sup>85</sup> *Sankei Shimbun*, editorial, June 9, 1989, p. 2.

<sup>86</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, editorial, June 8, 1989, p. 5.

### Political Parties and the Business Establishment

In fact, the necessity for good relations with China was almost universally accepted by Japanese people. So much so that strongly denouncing the Chinese authorities, it appears, was not considered as a serious possibility. Taken by surprise, the Japanese, from the general public to politicians and to businessmen, uneasily watched the developments in China. A cautious and nervous wait-and-see atmosphere prevailed in political circles. On the other hand, business leaders quietly awaited to resume business, believing that China would maintain its open-door policy.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) quickly denounced the PLA for suppressing peaceful demonstrators by force. In an official statement of June 4, the party condemned Beijing for "an act of violence that tramples on socialist democracy."<sup>87</sup> Six days later, in an interview with the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Party Chairman Fuwa Tetsuzô criticized China again: "Their indifference to the countless casualties proves their brutality, which is unpardonable in the light of Socialism. Unfortunately there remains a feudalistic autocracy that has nothing to do with Socialism."<sup>88</sup> Given the fact that the JCP had broken off with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 22 years earlier because of policy differences, it is not surprising that Fuwa exercised no

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<sup>87</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 8, 1989.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, June 11, 1989.



restraint in denouncing Beijing. Not only that, it was vitally important that the Japanese Communists make a clear distinction between the two Communist parties lest the crackdown should affect the JCP's popularity in Japan.

On the other hand, the statements issued by other major opposition parties were not much different from the government's: the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) said the incident was "truly regrettable," and Kōmeitō "deeply deplored" it.<sup>89</sup> Still, Kōmeitō and the DSP took up the human rights issue, saying that the bloodshed was inexcusable from a humanitarian point of view. Kōmeitō then decided on June 7 that they would take a tougher stance exactly because of their close relationship with Beijing.<sup>90</sup>

Initially, the JSP, the largest opposition party, did not go any further than hoping that "the Chinese government and the CCP will make every effort to settle the situation."<sup>91</sup> Facing criticism from inside and outside of the party, however, the Socialists soon hardened their party stance. First, on June 7, Party Chair Doi Takako said at the lower house that her party could not

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, June 8, 1989.

<sup>90</sup> Kōmeitō played a key role in the diplomatic normalization of 1972 between China and Japan. First, the normalization was possible because the Japanese government accepted conditions that were agreed upon in June 1971 between the Chinese government and the party's first delegation to China. In addition, Party Chair Takeiri Yoshikatsu helped finalize the process by working as a messenger between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei.

<sup>91</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 8, 1989.

pardon China's military suppression and the slaughter of innocent people. She demanded that the Japanese government take "a resolute attitude."<sup>92</sup> Then, on June 8, Inoue Issei, the party's International Bureau chief, met Minister Tang Jiaxuan at the Chinese embassy and filed a protest: "The use of force as a means of conflict solution is not allowed under any circumstances."<sup>93</sup> Yet, Doi did not elaborate what she meant by "a resolute attitude." In fact, none of these political parties, not even the JCP, called for sanctions.

The LDP was totally quiet on this issue. It was reported on June 7 that LDP hawks had started to criticize the government as being too hesitant in denouncing Beijing.<sup>94</sup> Yet, these were conservative Liberal Democrats who had been displeased anyway with being on good terms with the Communist nation. Moreover, their voices were not in the least strong enough to create an influential force within the party. Neither the Executive Council nor the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), the party's decision-making and policymaking organs, respectively, was mobilized.

The Parliamentarians League for Japan-China Friendship (*Nitchû Giren*),<sup>95</sup> made up of Diet members from both ruling and opposition parties, held meetings on June 6 and 7. Their resolution said the incident was

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<sup>92</sup> *House of Representatives Minutes, No. 18, 114th Diet, p. 576.*

<sup>93</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun, June 8 (evening edition), 1989.*

<sup>94</sup> *Asahi Shimbun, June 7, 1989, p. 3.*

<sup>95</sup> See footnote 73 in Chapter 2.

"regrettable from a humanitarian viewpoint" and hoped that the Chinese government "will settle the situation by a peaceful measure and regain the confidence of the international community."<sup>96</sup> This resolution, too, fell short of clearly criticizing the Chinese authorities. In all probability, there was a fear of impairing the friendly relations with China which they had worked so hard to cultivate. Thus, a cautious and nervous wait-and-see atmosphere prevailed in political circles.

The outlook of business leaders was quite different. Sustaining good relations with China was such an axiom that businessmen did not seem to be disturbed much by the crackdown. Miyazaki Kuniji, chairman of the Federation of Bankers' Association of Japan, was quoted as saying, "Although the use of force is deplorable, we will support China as long as the country maintains its economic open-door policy."<sup>97</sup> The following comment by Haruna Kazuo, chairman of Marubeni Corporation,<sup>98</sup> well explains the common view shared by business leaders: "I hope they will make an effort to regain international confidence. It is not wise to exclude China by applying

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<sup>96</sup> A League document provided by Watanabe Ichirō, then vice chair of the League.

<sup>97</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 7, 1989, p. 9.

<sup>98</sup> Marubeni is a trading company and one of the leading investors in China.

sanctions. In the light of China's important role in the Asia-Pacific era, Japan should continue to give advice as its friend."<sup>99</sup>

This is not to say a different voice was unheard of among business leaders. At a monthly news conference held on June 6, Ishihara Takashi, chair of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (*Keizai Dōyūkai*),<sup>100</sup> urged the government to articulate in its official statement that the PLA's conduct deserved criticism. He was quoted as saying that the bloodshed "is a humanitarian issue and the Western nations are harshly condemning it. ... the Cabinet was just formed, but its response should be unequivocal."<sup>101</sup> It should be reminded, however, that Ishihara was a minority in business circles.

An overwhelming number of corporate executives were critical of a hasty and emotional response. The Investment Protection Agreement, which would ensure Japanese companies equal status and treatment as Chinese firms, was signed in April 1989 and came into effect a month later. The pact was beginning to bring about a positive impact on Japanese direct investment in China, which had plummeted from \$1,226 million in 1987 to \$296 million

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<sup>99</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 5, 1989, p. 3.

<sup>100</sup> Formed in 1946. Business owners join the group as individuals, not as representatives of their corporations, and exchange candid opinions that are free from their own business concerns.

<sup>101</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 7, 1989.

in 1988.<sup>102</sup> Trade was also recovering from two years of stagnation in 1986-87. Mindful more of putting the situation in a longer perspective than of responding hastily, many businessmen, including Tokyo Electric Power President Hiraiwa Gaishi and Bank of Japan Governor Sumita Satoshi, advocated a reasoned response different from the Western nations.<sup>103</sup> Considering the fact that China was the most populous country and its economy was the fastest growing in the world, they were prepared to resume business in China as soon as possible and to render necessary assistance to the Chinese government.<sup>104</sup>

When it became clear that conservative reformers had assumed the helm of the Chinese leadership, therefore, Japanese businessmen began returning to Beijing.<sup>105</sup> Top leaders of the Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keidanren*)<sup>106</sup> defended this practice at a news conference on June 22. Since the situation had settled down at any rate, "there is nothing to be criticized about an early return of businessmen,"<sup>107</sup> Vice Chair Kawai Ryōichi

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<sup>102</sup> For investment and trade figures, see Appendix H.

<sup>103</sup> For Hiraiwa's interview, see *Gaiko Forum*, October 1989, p. 3; and for Sumita's comment, see *Japan Times*, June 6, p. 12 and June 7, p. 10, 1989.

<sup>104</sup> See comments by Miyazaki Kuniji, chairman of the Federation of Bankers' Association of Japan, in *FBIS-EAS-89-161*, p. 8.

<sup>105</sup> On June 14 and 15, 74 and 85 businessmen, respectively, returned to Beijing. See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 16, 1989, p. 6.

<sup>106</sup> See footnote 105 in Chapter 2.

<sup>107</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 23, p. 9; and *Japan Times*, June 23, p. 1, 1989.

was quoted as saying. Chairman Saitô Eishirô advocated against hastily denouncing Beijing: "The Chinese government calls it 'a riot.' The truth is that reports are confusing and we do not have a clear picture."<sup>108</sup> It is worthy of notice that the top leaders of *Keidanren*, the most influential group in the business community, accepted the "riot" explanation by the Chinese leadership, avoided evaluating its actions, and supported the cautious approach of the Japanese government. Their statements acquire a deeper significance when we consider the fact that the news conference was held a day after the executions of three workers.

When seven more protesters were executed on June 22, political parties became more critical of the Beijing authorities. For instance, Kaneko Mitsuhiro, chief of the JCP's Secretariat, asserted in his response to a *Japan Times* poll that Japan should impose economic sanctions against, and immediately halt economic assistance to, China.<sup>109</sup> Yamaguchi Tsuruo, secretary general of the JSP, informed the Chinese embassy on June 23 that his party would not carry out exchange with the CCP for the time being.<sup>110</sup> On the same day, Nagasue Eiichi, chairman of the DSP, submitted a proposal for Prime Minister Uno that demanded that "the government should file a

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<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> *Japan Times*, June 25, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>110</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 24, 1989, p. 9.

strong protest against the Chinese government and take certain measures.”<sup>111</sup> At a news conference immediately after this, Nagasue told reporters that the “certain measures” would not exclude economic sanctions.<sup>112</sup> This time around, even pro-Beijing legislators started to express their voices for sanctions.<sup>113</sup>

However, opinions were still divided among political figures who had endeavored to develop friendly relations between Japan and China. Tagawa Seiichi, a LDP splinter and long-time pro-Beijing politician, argued that it was important to make a clear distinction between right and wrong despite the past relations.<sup>114</sup> A Socialist, Tanabe Makoto, contended that the repression of citizens by the authorities was all the more unbearable given the slaughter of Chinese people by the Japanese army.<sup>115</sup> In contrast, Kosaka Zentarô, former foreign minister, advocated a “realistic response”: Japan should prudently watch over the developments so China would not change its open-door policy.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> For various voices of Diet members, see *Japan Times*, June 24, 1989, pp. 1 & 4.

<sup>114</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 23, 1989, p. 3.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

To summarize, many Diet members, including those who were friendly to Beijing, began to argue for sanctions after the executions in China. Within the ruling party, however, the powerful Executive Council and PARC were not mobilized, and no force was created to push the government toward punitive actions. Moreover, businessmen were firm in their stand. In short, there was no serious challenge domestically to the government policy of taking a stand on human rights but refraining from applying sanctions.

#### Western Responses to Subsequent Executions

Nonetheless, toward the end of June, the Japanese government employed stronger language and even suspended economic assistance to Beijing. To find an explanation for this shift, we must turn our eyes to external factors. During interpellations in mid-June, senior MOFA officials repeatedly told the Diet that their economic aid policy would be based on two factors--the policies of Western nations and the situation in China.<sup>117</sup> Since China appeared to be still in defiance, let us examine Western, particularly American, actions in this section.

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<sup>117</sup> See statements by Hasegawa Kazutoshi and Matsuura Kōichirō, bureau directors for Asian affairs and economic cooperation, respectively, in *Budget Committee Minutes, No. 17*, p. 40; *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 4*, pp. 25 & 38; and *Finance Committee Minutes, No. 12*, p. 4, House of Representatives. Also see *Budget Committee Minutes, No. 12*, p. 32, House of Councilors.



Three protesters in Shanghai were sentenced to death on June 15 and eight more on June 17. In reaction to these sentences, the United States took a second set of actions. Ambassador Han Xu was called again to the State Department on June 19 and handed a formal petition from the Bush administration appealing for clemency for those sentenced to death and to jail terms. Following this, the White House announced on June 20 that it was suspending high-level exchanges of government officials with China and that it intended to request that international financial institutions postpone consideration of loan applications by Beijing.<sup>118</sup>

At the hasty executions of ten demonstrators on June 21-22, more Western nations took tougher measures. To protest Beijing's violation of human rights, Belgium froze a government loan (\$7.5 million) to China, halted financing for new development projects, and suspended high-level contacts with Beijing. Italy suspended grants and loans to China.<sup>119</sup> In West Germany, the lower house unanimously passed a resolution on June 23 that would reject development aid and loan endorsements to China. The national assembly also requested the World Bank to halt loans to Beijing.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> *New York Times*, June 21, 1989, A1:2.

<sup>119</sup> The amount is not clear, but it was reported that Italy had approved a \$260 million program in grants and credits for the three years from 1987 to 1989, most of which had already been passed along. See the *New York Times*, June 25, 1989, A11:1.

<sup>120</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 24, p. 7; *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 24 (evening edition); and *New York Times*, June 25, A11:1, in 1989.

A week later, its government actually ordered aid experts and advisers to return home and grant negotiations to be halted, and froze more than \$110 million in development aid. Canada also announced on June 30 its withdrawal from \$9.1 million development projects.<sup>121</sup>

Multi-national institutions took actions, too. In winding up a two-day summit meeting in Madrid, the leaders of 12 EC member nations issued a special statement on June 27 to express dismay that earlier appeals by many countries to end the executions had been ignored. They announced a series of new punitive measures: suspension of military cooperation, arms sales, and high-level contacts; postponement of new cooperation projects; prolongation of visas for Chinese citizens; and agreement to raise the question of human rights in China at international forums.<sup>122</sup> Responding to these international outcries, the World Bank decided on June 26 to indefinitely postpone \$780 million in new loans, \$450 million of which had already been put on hold by mid-June.<sup>123</sup>

It should be noted, however, that the Western nations did not act without prudence in applying economic sanctions to China. In fact, the EC statement carefully avoided the term "sanction." Moreover, the United

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<sup>121</sup> *New York Times*, July 2, 1989, A6:5.

<sup>122</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 28, p. 9; *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 28, p. 7; and *New York Times*, June 28, A10:4, in 1989.

<sup>123</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 20 (evening edition), p. 2; and *Japan Times*, June 28, p. 9, in 1989.

States and Britain showed no enthusiasm for economic sanctions. Prime Minister Thatcher ruled out trade sanctions on June 22 on the grounds that such an action could cause a great panic in Hong Kong.<sup>124</sup> President Bush and State Secretary Baker of the United States were also firm in their decision that any more sanctions would be unproductive.<sup>125</sup>

The American leaders emphasized the geopolitical and economic importance of the Chinese-American relationship. Beijing had been an important American strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union since the improvement in Chinese-American relations in the 1970s. Although both the United States and Britain banned arms sales to China, American Congressional sources were quoted as admitting that the American ban would have no immediate impact because no arms sales were pending at the time between Washington and Beijing.<sup>126</sup> British high officials were also quoted: Britain's arms sales figure was so small that it was negligible.<sup>127</sup> In short, the arms ban was possible because their relations with Beijing would not be affected much by the suspension.

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<sup>124</sup> *New York Times*, June 23, 1989, A5:6.

<sup>125</sup> For Bush's remarks, see *New York Times*, June 27, 1989, A1:1. For Baker's, see *New York Times*, June 22, A10:4 & June 23, A5:1, 1989.

<sup>126</sup> *New York Times*, June 5, 1989, A12:3.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, June 7, 1989, A10:3.

China also carried considerable weight economically given its 1.1 billion consumers, its thirst for foreign capital and expertise, and its ability as a low-cost production site. Well aware of the potential benefits of preserving relations with Beijing, the president of the United States-China Business Council, which had 300 member companies, endorsed the cautious approach of the Bush administration. He was quoted as saying that emotional response now would be costly in the long run.<sup>128</sup> After all, the economic allure of China was too strong to be abandoned.

Their interests in China were so strong that even when three workers in Shanghai were sentenced to death on June 15, White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told reporters that the United States was willing to do business with "whatever leaders are in charge of China."<sup>129</sup> Thus, at the heart of American policy was the administration's concern with how to preserve its long-term strategic and economic interests in China while easing public and Congressional outcries at home.

Hence, Bush sent a secret envoy to Beijing in early July, when his suspension of high-level exchanges between the two governments was still valid. When CNN disclosed it on December 18, the White House issued a statement: The national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, had undertaken the mission in July "to personally underscore the U.S. shock and concern

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<sup>128</sup> *Japan Times*, June 23, 1989, p. 11.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, June 18, 1989, p. 1.

about the violence in Tiananmen Square and to impress upon the Chinese Government the seriousness with which this incident was viewed in the United States."<sup>130</sup> The statement further explained that the president "felt this face-to-face mission ... was necessary to show the sense of purpose and direction of the U.S. Government."<sup>131</sup>

However, in a meeting with a Japanese delegation on September 17, Premier Li Peng indicated that while imposing some sanctions, the United States had also sent a signal of friendship.<sup>132</sup> The following day, the new Chinese party leader, Jiang Zemin, also suggested to the same group that relations between China and the United States were improving.<sup>133</sup> It may be plausibly argued that Washington's true "sense of purpose and direction" was to repair the damage caused by their ostensible stance and to maintain a friendly relationship. Differences in public posture notwithstanding, the Japanese and American governments were in the same boat; that is, both desired to avoid economic sanctions and to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese government.

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<sup>130</sup> The White House statement in *New York Times*, December 19, 1989, A9:1.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> An interview on April 20, 1993 with Watanabe Ichirō, one of the five-member delegation. Also see *Asahi Shimbun*, September 18, 1989, p. 1; and *Kyodo News Service*, September 18 in *FBIS-CHI (China)-89-179*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

### Coordination with the United States

Still, there was a considerable gap between the measures taken by the two countries. The United States had by June 20 suspended high-level government contacts and requested international institutions to postpone new loans. To avoid isolation or a clash on China policy at the G-7 summit in July, it was imperative that Tokyo exchange its views with Washington and find a common ground in advance. Hence, the Japanese government started to use stronger language and ultimately suspended its Third Yen Loan to, and minister-level contacts with, Beijing.

In the morning of June 13 (Japan time), the *Kyodo News Service* reported from Washington that the Bush administration was making unofficial inquiries among Western nations and Japan about the possibility of their joining the United States in imposing economic sanctions on China.<sup>134</sup> MOFA Spokesman Watanabe Taizô and a Japanese diplomat in Washington denied this report,<sup>135</sup> but a substantial shift in the Japanese position was observed immediately after this. On June 14, the Japanese government decided to advance the date of Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka's visit to the

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<sup>134</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 13 (evening edition), 1989, p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, June 13 in *FBIS-EAS-89-112*, p. 5; and *Asahi Shimbun*, June 24, 1989, p. 3.

United States, from early July to late June.<sup>136</sup> On the same day, Mitsuzuka told the lower house that Tokyo would not accept the conduct of the PLA.<sup>137</sup> Two days later, he further stated that the tightening of control over dissidents was incompatible with democratic values in Japan.<sup>138</sup> At the same committee, the foreign minister expressed displeasure with the resumption of business travel to Beijing. Mitsuzuka told legislators that MOFA had received a number of complaints from foreign diplomats that Japanese firms were "trying to make money like a thief at a fire."<sup>139</sup>

Furthermore, on June 20, Watanabe told foreign correspondents in Tokyo that Japan would not relax its restrictions on economic assistance "even after confirming the physical stability in China and a Chinese willingness to go ahead with business."<sup>140</sup> Thus, the Foreign Ministry decided to suspend negotiations on its third yen aid package of 810 billion yen (\$5.5 billion),<sup>141</sup> which were scheduled to be launched in the summer of 1989. This was a clear break from previous Japanese statements that measures taken by

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<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, June 14 in FBIS-EAS-89-113, p. 4.

<sup>137</sup> *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 4, House of Representatives, 114th Diet, p. 2.*

<sup>138</sup> *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, No. 4, House of Councilors, 114th Diet, p. 1.*

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>140</sup> *Kyodo News Service, June 20 in FBIS-EAS-89-118, p. 2.* Also see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* and *Asahi Shimbun*, June 21, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>141</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 21, 1989, p. 1.*

the government were not punitive ones with any "political implications,"<sup>142</sup> but simply the result of implementation problems because of the disorder in China. The tougher language prior to Mitsuzuka's trip to Washington (June 25-28) was generally interpreted as measures taken by Tokyo to make it easier for the foreign minister to find a common ground with the United States government.

In a series of meetings with American officials, Mitsuzuka made one point clear: China's military suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators and the subsequent crackdown on dissidents were regrettable from a humanitarian viewpoint. He also argued, however, that sanctions would further isolate China and therefore should not be imposed if peace and stability in Asia were to be ensured.<sup>143</sup> Bush responded that "we would continue trying to convince the Chinese leadership that it is in their interests to keep reform moving forward,"<sup>144</sup> according to a written statement by the White House.

To keep pace with Washington, the Japanese government took a further measure. A day after the foreign minister's return to Tokyo, Vice Minister Murata announced that Japan would suspend minister-level

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<sup>142</sup> Watanabe Taizô on June 6, *Kyodo News Service*, June 6 in *FBIS-EAS-89-107*, p. 2.

<sup>143</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, June 28, 1989.

<sup>144</sup> *Japan Times*, June 28, p. 1.



contacts with Beijing and join the other G-7 nations at the Paris summit in condemning the military crackdown.<sup>145</sup>

Initially, all the other G-7 nations were very tough on China. France, West Germany, Italy and Britain had joined with other EC nations on June 27 in announcing a tougher statement and new punitive measures. Canada and West Germany had withdrawn their development loans by the end of June. During the preparatory meetings for the summit, the Japanese representative, Kunihiro, argued that they should avoid expressions of harsh reproach or new sanctions to avert China's isolation. Yet his voice fell on deaf ears. However, in the evening of July 14--the first day of the three-day summit, he found that all the six nations had suddenly softened their position. Tahara Sôichirô contends the American president played the key role for this abrupt change:

The attitude of the American summit staff took a very different turn after President Bush's arrival in Paris.

Furthermore, at a meeting with Uno in the afternoon of July 14, Bush supported Japan's assertion that the seven nations avoid China's isolation and refrain from rubbing it the wrong way. Bush told Uno that he would make efforts to convince European nations.<sup>146</sup>

It was reported that Bush told Uno in the morning of July 15 that his country shared with Japan a mutual interest toward China and wanted to

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<sup>145</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 30, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>146</sup> Tahara, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

keep close contacts with Tokyo on the China issue.<sup>147</sup> In fact, Uno, Bush and Thatcher aligned with each other at the summit gathering in opposing Mitterrand's efforts to toughen the communiqué's language on China.<sup>148</sup>

Thus, the strong language in the French draft was significantly toned down in the political declaration adopted at the Paris summit. It condemned the PLA's "violent repression" of the peaceful movement and urged the Chinese leadership to "cease action against those who ... claim their legitimate rights to democracy and liberty."<sup>149</sup> However, the term "brutal oppression" in the draft was replaced by "violent repression," and the declaration simply recalled appropriate measures already taken by various nations, with all the new sanctions in the draft deleted.<sup>150</sup> In addition, the communiqué adopted the portion insisted on by Tokyo: "We look to the Chinese authorities to create conditions which will avoid their isolation and provide for a return to cooperation."<sup>151</sup>

Given the previously unyielding posture of the other nations, this was quite an accomplishment for the Japanese government. Japanese diplomacy

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<sup>147</sup> *Japan Times*, July 16, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>148</sup> *New York Times*, July 16, 1989, A16:2.

<sup>149</sup> For the text of the political declaration, see MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō*, 1989, p. 323.

<sup>150</sup> Tahara, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

<sup>151</sup> MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō*, 1989, p. 323.

bore fruit as the result of Tokyo's effort to act in concert with Washington, which also wished to preserve its strategic and economic relationship with Beijing in spite of the popular and Congressional indignation with the Chinese authorities.

### Japan Hastens to Improve Relations

After the Paris summit, however, the Japanese government moved ahead of the Western nations to relax restrictions on its sanctions. The ban on business travel in China and freeze on the Second Yen Loan of 470 billion yen (\$2.1 billion) were lifted in mid-August.<sup>152</sup> Immediately after making these decisions, the "Investigation Center" was dissolved. By the end of 1989, Japan ended all its restrictions--political, economic, and cultural--excepting only its Third Yen Loan and minister-level contacts. The force behind these moves were none other than the business community and the LDP.

Political and economic exchanges were reinaugurated in the fall of 1989. On September 17, a five-member delegation of the *Nitchû Giren* visited China. On his return home, Itô Masayoshi, delegation head and former foreign minister, emphasized the importance of Tokyo's economic assistance to China's open-door policy.<sup>153</sup> Restrictions on travel to Beijing, which was

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<sup>152</sup> *Kyodo News Service*, August 17 in *FBIS-EAS-89-159*, p. 7.

<sup>153</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19 & 20, 1989, p. 1.

still under martial law, were removed on September 25. This opened a path for a series of business missions. About 20 business leaders, together with delegations from other nations, attended a symposium sponsored by a Chinese bank during October 2-3.<sup>154</sup> In mid-November, dozens of business leaders, including Saitô and Kawai of the *Keidanren*, visited Beijing "to find out how best Japan could help the Chinese economy."<sup>155</sup> Through these exchanges, Chinese officials repeatedly requested that the third loan package be implemented as originally planned.<sup>156</sup>

At this point, the U.S. Congress remained hostile toward Beijing and was attempting to limit World Bank loans to China.<sup>157</sup> In addition, Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, when sent to Washington for the second time in May 1990, learned from Brent Scowcroft, American national security adviser, that the United States did not welcome a speedy enactment of Japan's loans to China.<sup>158</sup> In fact, the United States did not relax its position until December 1990 when it abstained in the vote on the World Bank's first non-

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<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, October 3, 1989, p. 1.

<sup>155</sup> K.V. Kesavan, "Japan and the Tiananmen Square Incident" in *Asian Survey*, 30:7 (July 1990), p. 677. Also see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 14, p. 1; and *Japan Times*, November 14, p. 1, in 1989.

<sup>156</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, p. 1; and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 14, p. 5, in 1989.

<sup>157</sup> Quansheng Zhao, *Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics*, p. 174.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 175.

humanitarian loan to China since the Tiananmen incident.<sup>159</sup> Under these circumstances, Tokyo had no choice but to be cautious.

Domestically, however, pressure was mounting to remove the ban on loan programs. After the World Bank resumed its lending to China for humanitarian aid in October 1989, Japan's business community put pressure on the government. Corporate executives began to complain that the hold on loans was seriously hurting exports to China.<sup>160</sup> To boost China's purchasing power, Tokyo's capital was essential. Hence, the second loan package was disbursed in full by March 1990—the end of fiscal 1989.<sup>161</sup> By late spring, moreover, influential politicians such as Ozawa Ichirō, secretary general of the LDP, and Watanabe Michio, former PARC chair, were advocating the release of the third package "even if countries like the United States do not take a similar action."<sup>162</sup> At the end of June, the Mitsubishi Trust Bank released a new loan of \$126 million to China with the approval of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).<sup>163</sup> This was the first loan by a Japanese commercial bank after the Tiananmen incident. This means that all the three

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<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 167 & 170. Also see Kesavan, *op.cit.*, p. 676.

<sup>161</sup> MOFA, *Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo*, vol. 2, 1991, p. 87.

<sup>162</sup> Ozawa was cited in *Japan Times*, April 17, p. 1. Also see its weekly international edition (May 28 - June 3), p. 1, both in 1990.

<sup>163</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 1, 1990, p. 1.

members of the ruling triumvirate—the LDP, the bureaucracy, and the business—joined forces together in this matter.

Hence, when Kaifu Toshiki met George Bush and Margaret Thatcher in July in Houston, the new prime minister indicated that his government was considering releasing its Third Yen Loan of 810 billion yen (\$5.5 billion) to China. According to Kaifu's spokesman, Ôshima Tadamori, Bush listened carefully to the premier's presentation but made no response one way or the other.<sup>164</sup> The following day, MOFA Spokesman Watanabe told reporters that Thatcher had not challenged Kaifu's position, either.<sup>165</sup> With this tacit approval, Kaifu announced at the summit meeting that Japan would gradually disburse its aid package. He told his summit partners that China's human rights record was insufficient by their standards but that releasing the loan would encourage those who were pushing for economic reforms in China.<sup>166</sup> In the Japanese view, this would eventually lead to political reforms in China and help develop economies in Southeast Asia as well as China.

Strong opposition was expressed by countries such as France and Canada.<sup>167</sup> Yet, as a compromise, it was agreed that each nation would pursue

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<sup>164</sup> *Japan Times*, July 9, 1990, p. 1.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, July 10, 1990, p. 1.

<sup>166</sup> For the summary of Kaifu's presentation at a working dinner of July 9, see *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 11, 1990, p. 2.

<sup>167</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 11 (evening edition), 1990, p. 2.

its own China policy. Moreover, the political declaration of the Houston summit accepted language proposed by the Japanese: The measures adopted at the Paris summit would be kept "under review for future adjustments to respond to further positive developments in China."<sup>168</sup>

A week later, Tokyo granted the Chinese request that 60 billion yen each would be offered in September 1990 and February 1991. Then, in December 1990, 36.5 billion yen (\$270 million) was released as aid for public and industrial infrastructure.<sup>169</sup> This was the first implementation of the Third Yen Loan, which had been scheduled for release in April 1990. To keep step with Washington, Tokyo delayed the implementation by eight months. Yet, under increasing pressure from both business and political circles, the Japanese government lifted its sanctions against China long before other nations, particularly the United States.

Insofar as the aid issue is concerned, the United States was unable to find allies within Japan's conservative establishment. All the three components of Japan's governing tripartite supported the removal of sanctions. In such a case, American influence had its limit.

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<sup>168</sup> For the text of the political declaration, see MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō*, 1990, p. 350.

<sup>169</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 19, p. 1; and *JEI Report*, No. 40B, October 19, p. 11, 1990.

## Analysis

In the Tiananmen case, international pressures did not reverberate within Japanese politics. Hence, MOFA officials were able to pursue their pragmatic stance through to the end. First, this case demonstrates the importance of China in Japanese diplomacy. This chapter also shows the conditions under which MOFA has a free hand in shaping the nation's foreign policy. Third, this case indicates that only when combined with external pressure, can domestic opposition effectively influence the formation of policy. Finally, it also shows the limit of foreign influence when allies are not found within Japan's conservative establishment.

First of all, explicitly denouncing Beijing was early excluded as a policy option. Japanese officials were concerned that driving China into international isolation would have an adverse result for stability in the Asia-Pacific region. To cultivate a constructive relationship, Japan should help China both maintain its open-door policy and advance its internal reforms--this was MOFA's position.<sup>170</sup> Given its emphasis on economic growth, Tokyo could not afford to jeopardize its relations with Beijing by either harsh condemnation or economic sanctions.

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<sup>170</sup> Owada Hisashi, *Gaikō towa Nani ka? (What is Diplomacy?)*, p. 187.



Secondly, unlike the other two cases, there was no serious challenge within the conservative quarter. LDP members were generally in a state of inertia and passivity. Party organs such as the Executive Council and PARC were not mobilized. Nor were pro-Taiwan members able to create a strong anti-Beijing force within the party. On the other hand, business leaders were calmly awaiting the restoration of order in China. The continental neighbor was a growing market and low-cost production site for Japanese industrial products as well as a supplier of raw materials. With their eye on the long-term business relations, corporate executives supported a restrained response by the government. The issue being purely diplomatic, there were no challenges from other ministries, either.

Consequently, the locus of the resolution process was the foreign ministry. The crisis management team consisted solely of senior MOFA officials and was led by the vice foreign minister—the top bureaucrat of the ministry. MOFA officials fully exercised their capacity as policymakers without interference from either politicians or other administrative agencies. Neither the *Kantei*<sup>171</sup> nor the foreign minister played active roles in this process. The policy process was both efficient and brief.

Thirdly, this chapter confirms not only Tokyo's indifference to domestic opposition forces but also the conditions under which it pays heed

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<sup>171</sup> See footnote 13 in Chapter 1.

to critical opinion. The crisis team decided to go along with Western nations on the humanitarian issue but to break with them in regard to economic sanctions. Yet the Japanese policy fluctuated twice after this. The first change was observed during the second half of June. The foreign minister and MOFA officials started to use tougher language in mid-June. They even hinted that restrictions on Official Development Assistance (ODA) were *de facto* sanctions. Moreover, on June 29, the vice minister announced that Japan would suspend minister-level contacts with Beijing. As discussed earlier, these changes were made not as a response to domestic voices but as a result of Tokyo's efforts to act in concert with Washington.

Inside Japan, owing to intense media coverage, public awareness was very high. There was undoubtedly a widespread opinion that their government should denounce the Chinese leadership. Those groups who took a stand on human rights and criticized Beijing included Chinese nationals, human rights organizations, and most of the major opposition parties. However, facing questions from lawmakers and reporters, Uno repeated that his government had no plan for any protest, criticism, or sanction against China. The voices of those groups outside the LDP's coalition were not producing any effect.

The shift in Tokyo's stance coincided with the foreign minister's trip to Washington. To avoid a clash on China policy at the upcoming G-7 summit meeting, it was imperative that Tokyo coordinate its policies with Western

nations, particularly the United States. Hence, the Japanese government not only employed tougher rhetoric against Beijing but also suspended the third aid package and minister-level contacts. Given the fact that there was no unified voice for economic sanctions domestically, it is plausible to conclude that these gestures of protest were prompted by Japanese concerns about possible isolation at the Paris summit in July 1989.

In the final analysis, however, foreign pressure alone is not sufficient to influence government decisions. In an effort to coordinate its policies with Washington, Tokyo had put a hold on its aid programs. Nonetheless, a month after the summit, Tokyo quickly moved to relax restrictions on its sanctions. By the end of 1989, all sanctions except those concerning the third loan and high-level exchanges were removed. Remarkably, the second loan was promptly and fully disbursed by March 1990 despite the fact that it was far behind schedule as of May 1989. What is more, at the Houston summit in July 1990, Tokyo announced that it would release its third aid program to China. Thus, actual delay of its implementation amounted to only eight months. With universal domestic support, MOFA conducted successful negotiations internationally. In fact, Japan's business community was pressing its government for a full restoration of relations with Beijing. The Finance Ministry and influential Liberal Democrats joined forces with it. Hence, despite the centrality of the U.S.-Japanese relations in Japan's

**diplomatic conduct, lacking support from Japan's conservative establishment,  
American overtures had failed.**

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion

Throughout the postwar period, relations with the United States have been central to Japan's diplomatic position. After the normalization of its relations with China, however, Japan's Foreign Ministry began to aim at a "balanced" and "multi-directional" diplomacy.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in the mid-1970s, the ministry explicitly pronounced Japan's dual identity: a member of the advanced Western democracies, on the one hand, and a country in the Asian region, on the other.<sup>2</sup> Since that time, Japanese relations with China have also been "one of the major pillars"<sup>3</sup> of Tokyo's diplomacy. Because of this, any attempt to analyze Japan's foreign policy, particularly in the post-Cold War era, must include its special relationship with China.

In examining the transaction of affairs between the two countries, this dissertation has focused on non-economic issues. The reason is that a large portion of the existing literature has already been devoted to the areas of trade and finance. The three cases discussed here—peace treaty negotiations, the textbook controversy, and the Tiananmen incident—cover issues of both

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<sup>1</sup> MOFA, *Waga Gaikō no Kinkyō*, 1973, p. 12 and 1974, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1976, p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> An essay by Komori Toshisada, MOFA official, in *Gaiko Forum*, August 1989, p. 71.

internal and external orientations, and each exhibits an interaction of domestic and international concerns. In the following pages, I will first summarize the findings of this study. I will then consider the contributions of this thesis to understanding Sino-Japanese relations and the mechanism of decision-making in Japan.

### Findings

The findings of this study pertain to two areas. One is a typology contrasting cases in which the ruling coalition is unified and cases in which conservative ranks are divided. The other has to do with the circumstances in which foreign and domestic interest groups can combine to influence policy decisions in Japan.

First of all, this study confirms that when ruling elites are united, the Foreign Ministry assumes a natural autonomy in shaping the nation's foreign policy. This is true despite a shift in the system from a bureaucrat-dominated polity to an increased influence of party politicians, and from elitist to pluralist processes. As Robert A. Scalapino has put it, we "should not depreciate the role of the Japanese bureaucracy."<sup>4</sup> In fact, when the

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<sup>4</sup> "Foreword" by Scalapino in Quansheng Zhao, *Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics*, p. x.

conservative establishment is in consensus, the bureaucracy remains the locus of resolution process.

In the case of peace treaty negotiations, for example, the issue was purely diplomatic at first. With no one meddling in the process, MOFA was at the helm of negotiations with the Chinese. Prospects seemed good for promptly concluding the treaty until late January of 1975. Only when conservative pro-Taiwan members of the LDP began to argue against the treaty was the ministry forced to step aside.

The textbook controversy, although an internal affair, presents another case in which an administrative agency was insulated from outside influences. Domestically, there had been strenuous opposition against MOE's screening of school textbooks from a wide range of sources, including the Japan Teachers' Union, intellectuals, and the media. Nonetheless, for more than three decades, MOE paid no heed to this domestic opposition. On the contrary, with a fraternal support from LDP hawks, the ministry maneuvered to tighten the textbook authorization system after the inception of the LDP in 1955. This situation changed only when foreign protests triggered divisions within both the bureaucracy and the ruling party in the summer of 1982.

The Tiananmen incident is yet another example. Business leaders firmly supported the restrained response of the government. Other than the business community, none of the well-organized and politically powerful societal groups took an active part in the process. No strong force was created

even among LDP conservatives. Unlike the other two cases, there was no challenge from either the LDP or the bureaucracy. Hence, the crisis team was led by a top bureaucrat, not by political leaders. The team was composed solely of senior MOFA officials, and the newly-born Uno cabinet acquiesced in the bureaucrat-made policy. In the absence of challenge from conservative ranks, bureaucrats maintained control throughout the process.

Secondly, this study demonstrates that when the ruling coalition is divided, the policy process becomes more complicated. In contrast to the cases in which the conservatives are in unity, a variety of political actors, both domestic and foreign, become involved. This is what Leonard J. Schoppa calls "participation expansion."<sup>5</sup> The issue becomes so antagonistic and volatile that responsibility over the matter is relinquished by administrative agencies and given over to top political leaders. Mediation by the prime minister and his chief cabinet secretary becomes indispensable. Consequently, such a case displays pluralistic characteristics, and the process becomes protracted.

In the treaty negotiations, for example, both pro-Beijing and pro-Taipei elements of the LDP took active parts in the process after the Chinese demanded an anti-hegemony clause. This "participation expansion" transformed the diplomatic issue into that of an intense political confronta-

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<sup>5</sup> Schoppa, "Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why *gaiatsu* succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others" in *International Organization*, 47:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 370-73.



tion. Thus, compromise became extremely difficult. Moreover, this debate occurred when the Sino-Soviet dispute was at its height. Both countries were attempting to influence Japanese decisions. Pro-Taipei hawks used Soviet opposition as a pretext to hinder treaty talks. Yet, Japan's powerful business community forced the Japanese government to resume negotiations by concluding, on its own accord, a trade agreement with the Chinese government. Because of these complications, Fukuda needed six months to win over opponents within the LDP. Eventually, a compromise solution was worked out that was acceptable not only to the Chinese but to the conservative Liberal Democrats as well.

The textbook issue is a case in which "participation expansion" transformed a previously domestic problem into an international one. After provoking criticism from Asian neighbors, the opposition camp became extremely vocal and active, and media coverage intensified. More importantly, MOFA attempted to deter MOE's influence on the conduct of its diplomacy. The conservative members of the LDP *bunkyo-zoku* strongly reacted to this and strenuously worked hand in hand with MOE officials to protect vested authorities of the ministry. Both the ruling party and the bureaucracy were thus internally divided in this case. Hence, the crisis team was led by the chief cabinet secretary, who mediated between MOE and MOFA. Meanwhile, the prime minister focused his effort on obtaining consent from LDP conservatives. The use of vague terminology was required

in the August 26 statement by the Japanese government<sup>6</sup> to appease both Asian neighbors and the MOE-*bunkyô-zoku* alliance.

Moreover, the outcome of each case in this dissertation reflects the principle that the maintenance of good relations with China is an absolute fundamental of Japanese foreign policy. In every case, Japanese officials were at great pains to achieve a result amenable to Beijing. Therefore, explicitly denouncing the Chinese government immediately after the Tiananmen massacre, for example, was excluded as a policy option. Similarly, when the strong rhetoric of conservative Liberal Democrats threatened to undermine relations with China, as were the cases in the treaty and textbook issues, political leaders worked tenaciously to obtain concessions from the militants. In such cases, policy outcomes must placate conservative elements at home, though their overriding object is invariably conciliation with Beijing.

The other finding has to do with the type of alliance to which the Japanese government is susceptible. On the one hand, this dissertation has shown the propensity of the Japanese government to ignore opposition from domestic actors outside the policy process. Unless allied with foreign influence, the voices of opposition forces tend to fall deaf ears. The textbook dispute is a fair example of this. The issue did not suddenly spring up in 1982. Throughout the postwar years, in fact, there was a deeply divided ideological

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix F.

conflict in Japan between progressives and conservatives. Despite a long-standing challenge from labor unions, intellectuals, and the media, MOE and *bunkyô-zoku* hawks continuously worked together to strengthen control over the making of school books. Only after the Chinese and Korean governments filed official protests did MOFA step in and capitalize on this opportunity to force MOE to moderate its policies that were offensive toward Asian neighbors.

The evidence of this indifference of the Japanese government toward the voices of domestic opposition was also observed in the Tiananmen case. Many domestic actors--human rights groups, Chinese nationals, the media, and politicians--expressed their dissatisfaction with the softly worded statements of their government. Nonetheless, political and MOFA leaders remained firm in their position: Japan would speak out for humanitarian matters but refrain from harsh condemnation or an imposition of sanctions. When the vice foreign minister conveyed Tokyo's displeasure with the crackdown, therefore, the note was carefully worded to avoid interference in China's internal affairs. Moreover, even though many cultural and economic missions were either canceled or postponed, MOFA officials were careful to assert that those were not measures of protest but unavoidable consequences of the disorder in China.

Nonetheless, toward the end of June, the Japanese government not only started to use harsher language, it suspended high-level contacts and

decided to impose economic sanctions as well. This change in course seems to have taken place not simply because of concerns over domestic opinion but because a public outcry was combined with Tokyo's diplomatic concerns as a member nation of the G-7. In short, domestic opposition forces need to be combined with foreign pressures to make government responsive.

On the other hand, this thesis has also demonstrated that external pressures alone are not sufficient for such a result. To influence policy outcomes effectively, it is crucial for foreign actors to find allies within Japan's ruling establishment. In each of the three cases discussed in this thesis, China was invariably on the winning side. The evidence seems to suggest that the reason for this was that Beijing consistently found allies among Japan's conservative ranks. Chapter 2, for instance, described how the Chinese government skillfully used people's diplomacy to gain allies among Japan's various societal groups, in particular business circles. Chapter 3 demonstrated how protests from China and South Korea not only provoked Japan's opposition camp but also triggered MOFA's interference in education policy, which is normally under MOE's jurisdiction. Chapter 4 shows how Beijing again found staunch allies among Japanese business leaders. In the spring of 1990, moreover, influential LDP leaders joined this alliance and began to advocate an early release of the Third Yen Loan.

At the same time, events after the Paris summit indicate that without allies among conservative members, it is very difficult even for the United

States to bring about its preferred policy outcomes. For example, to keep pace with Washington, Tokyo had suspended its loan packages. However, in the face of pressure from the business community, the Japanese government decided before the Houston summit of July 1990 to lift all its sanctions. Unable to find any ally within the conservative camp, American influence had proven to be limited in its effect.

### Contributions and Implications

The findings of this study help us to better understand two things. First, the relationship between two leading countries in Asia, Japan and China. Second, this dissertation also provides a precise perspective for understanding Japan's foreign policy process--in particular, its susceptibility to influences by interest groups, foreign and domestic.

First of all, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of Japanese-Chinese relations in two ways. One is by shedding light on the importance of China in Japan's diplomacy. The central importance of the United States in the Japanese world view is well known, but since 1972, in fact, relations with China have been the other axis in Tokyo's diplomatic considerations. The Tiananmen case is an especially good example of the attempt to balance these two key factors in shaping Japanese policies. That is, maintain amicable relations with Beijing while coordinating policies with Washington.

The other is by explaining a difference between Western and Japanese approaches to Beijing's crackdown on the democracy movement. Tokyo's soft approach after the Tiananmen massacre was criticized by Western observers as "governed by economic motives."<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, Japan's political and administrative officials often alluded to their own country's past aggression as the reason for their restrained language vis-à-vis Beijing. In addition to these factors, however, there was an underlying difference between Western and Japanese evaluations of social and political development. Based upon an understanding that many Asian countries, including China, still retained undemocratic systems and regimes, the Japanese doubted the wisdom of too readily applying Western standards to the problems in the region. Instead, Tokyo was inclined to show tolerance, while searching for a way to help China continue its reform and open-door policies.<sup>8</sup>

The second contribution of this thesis has to do with the conditions under which Japanese policy makers respond to or are insulated from the forces of political actors outside the government. Kent E. Calder claims that the key determinant of government responsiveness is crisis. During crisis periods, government flexibly responds to popular demands, and policy

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<sup>7</sup> See K.V. Kesavan, "Japan and the Tiananmen Square Incident" in *Asian Survey*, 30:7 (July 1990), p. 669. Also, an American journalist Colin Nickerson wrote: "Japan seems more concerned with protecting its economic interests by not offending its giant neighbor than with taking a stand on human rights." See *Boston Globe*, June 19, 1989, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> See Komori, *op.cit.*, p. 71 and Owada Hisashi, *Gaikō towa Nanika (What is Diplomacy?)*, p. 187.

innovation occurs. In periods of non-crisis, on the other hand, the bureaucracy often dominates the policy process and conservative insensitivity becomes pronounced.<sup>9</sup> By "crisis," he means crises from within and crises from without. The former is a challenge from conservative ranks, and the latter is a threat from domestic opposition or foreign pressure.<sup>10</sup> During the 1970s, the government was highly responsive to a broad range of popular views. This is largely attributed to the threat to the LDP posed by opposition parties as a result of the near-parity between the two camps in the Diet.<sup>11</sup> The salience of external influences in Japanese policymaking, particularly since the 1980s, has been also pointed out by many researchers.<sup>12</sup>

This study does not contradict those findings but provides a more precise explanation regarding the effectiveness of threats "from without." According to Calder, political threats can be presented either by conservatives or by domestic or foreign opposition forces. However, the cases in this

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<sup>9</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation*, Chapter 4, pp. 156-230.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, pp. 37-70.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Calder, *op.cit.*, Chapter 11, especially pp. 470-75; Ellis Krauss and Ishida Takeshi, "Japanese Democracy in Perspective" in Krauss and Ishida, eds., *Democracy in Japan*, p. 334; Masumi Jurnosuke, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, p. 255; and Muramatsu Michio, "Patterned Pluralism Under Challenge: The Policies of the 1980s" in Allinson and Sone, eds., *Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan*, pp. 57-59.

<sup>12</sup> See Calder, *op.cit.*, p. 463; T. J. Pempel, "The Unbundling of 'Japan, Inc.'" in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 13:2 (Summer 1987), p. 293; and Muramatsu and Krauss, "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism" in Yamamura and Yasuba, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan: vol. 1*, p. 549.

dissertation have suggested that it is the presence or absence of conservative divisions that determines the effectiveness of threats from actors outside the government. When conservative constituents are divided and challenge the government, a threat from either domestic opposition or foreign pressure is sufficient to make government responsive. By contrast, when the ruling coalition is united and a threat or challenge comes only from outside, neither foreign nor domestic influence alone is sufficient. Domestic and external opposition forces need to ally with each other, and must ultimately cause divisions among conservative ranks.

Examining trade negotiations between Japan and the United States, Leonard J. Schoppa has found that Japanese concessions are more likely “when latent support for foreign demands can be found at the elite or mass level or both.”<sup>13</sup> In other words, Schoppa argues that support from the mass alone may be enough to win concessions from Tokyo. However, evidence in this thesis suggests that support from the mass—groups outside the LDP coalition—is not sufficient when conservatives are in consensus. Foreign actors must cause divisions within the ruling elite and ally with one or another element of it to make government responsive.

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<sup>13</sup> Schoppa, *op.cit.*, p. 373. In Schoppa’s definition, “elite” includes government agencies, interest groups such as retailers, and LDP politicians. These correspond to what I call the “ruling coalition” or “conservative establishment.”



There is, of course, danger in the easy generalization. However, concerning cases in which domestic opposition forces ally with the fragments of the ruling coalition, similar observations are made across the breadth of scholarly examination. In the case of welfare programs implemented in the early 1970s, for instance, "anti-mainstream LDP politicians ... , with little to lose and much to gain from embracing novel policy proposals, often acted in concert with local opposition politicians."<sup>14</sup> To give another example, in the spring of 1986, opposition parties successfully stalled the LDP's attempt to pass a tax reform bill. This was possible because not only opposition parties and labor organizations but traditional LDP supporters actively opposed the tax as well. "Retailers and wholesalers, in particular, were vehement in their opposition"<sup>15</sup> and threatened to stop financial contributions to the LDP, observes Hayao Kenji.

With regard to a case of foreign pressure supported by a member of the conservative establishment, Frances Rosenbluth's work on financial deregulation provides a good example. Japan's financial liberalization in the 1980s, she argues, was the result of political pressures from foreign governments coinciding with the "grudging recognition" by Japanese banks "that they must

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<sup>14</sup> Calder, *op.cit.*, Chapter 8, pp. 349-75.

<sup>15</sup> Hayao Kenji, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, Chapter 4, pp. 68-95.

relinquish certain kinds of protection.”<sup>16</sup> These are instances in which foreign or domestic actors who are normally outside the policy process successfully influenced government decisions by allying with part of the ruling coalition.

Finally, however, it must be noted that this dissertation has discussed only three cases—all in the area of Tokyo’s dealings with China. Its assertions should be tested by examining a broader range of issues. When Japan deals with other Asian countries or European nations, does the pattern change? What if events are less momentous? What will the evidence show when the research is expanded to areas such as economic, security, energy, and environmental matters. Will it still withstand such scrutiny? A question that particularly needs to be addressed is under what conditions do divisions occur within the ruling forces? To answer these questions, we must await further empirical studies.

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<sup>16</sup> Rosenbluth, “Financial Deregulation and Interest Intermediation” in Allinson and Sone, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 107-29.

## APPENDICES

## Appendix A

### Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China

At the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ôhira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaidô and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ôhira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communiqué of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighbouring countries, separated only by a strip of water, with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communiqué is issued.

2. The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's

embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of

concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

At Peking, this twenty-ninth day of September, 1972.

Tanaka Kakuei (Signed),  
Prime Minister of Japan

Zhou En-lai (Signed),  
Premier of the State Council,  
People's Republic of China

Ôhira Masayoshi (Signed),  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Ji Peng-fei (Signed),  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
People's Republic of China

## Appendix B

### Joint Statement of the Delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association and the Sixth Delegation to China from the Japan Socialist Party

The sixth delegation to China from the Japan Socialist Party with Mr. Tomomi Narita, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Japan Socialist Party, as its leader visited Peking, capital of the People's Republic of China, from May 5 to 12, 1975 at the invitation of the China-Japan Friendship Association.

During the visit of the sixth delegation to China from the Japan Socialist Party, Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien met all members of the delegation and had a conversation with them in an atmosphere of friendship.

During the visit, talks were held between the delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association with Liao Cheng-chih, president of the association, as its leader and the sixth delegation to China from the Japan Socialist Party with Chairman Tomomi Narita as its leader.

Taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were also: Chang Hsiang-shan (vice-president of the China-Japan Friendship Association), Lin Li-yun (council member), Sun Ping-hua (secretary general), Li Fu-te (council member), Lin Po (council member), Chin Li (council member), Liu Chih (council member), Wang Yin and Yeh Chi-yung.

Taking part in the talks on the Japanese side were Kanji Kawasaki (secretary-general of the delegation, member of the Central Executive Committee, director of the International Affairs Bureau), Arirô Kitayama (member of the



Central Executive Committee, in charge of policy study), Riki Suzuki (member of the Central Executive Committee, chairman of the Finance Committee), Tôgo Yoneda (member of the Central Executive Committee, director of the Educational and Propaganda Bureau), Shigeru Itô (member of the Central Executive Committee, director of the National Movement Bureau), Takatoshi Fujita (secretary-general of the Japan-China Special Committee), Toshio Ôtsuka (chief of the Editorial Department of the Party Organ Bureau) and Kenji Hattori (member of the International Affairs Bureau).

During the talks, the two sides stated their respective views on the international situation and questions of common interest and, in the spirit of seeking the common grounds instead of stressing the differences between them, reached a unanimity of views on a number of major questions.

The two sides point out: The latest developments in Indochina are most exhilarating. With the complete liberation of Cambodia and South Vietnam one after the other, the peoples of Cambodia and South Vietnam have, through protracted heroic fighting, won great victories of far-reaching historical significance and set a brilliant example for all the oppressed nations and peoples in their struggles for liberation. Progress in the situation in Indochina proves once again that no force whatsoever can stop this historical trend - countries want independence, nations want liberation and people want revolution.

The two sides hold that the current international situation is marked by increasing turbulence and unrest, that all the basic contradictions of the world are sharpening, and that the situation is developing in a direction more and

more favourable to the people of all countries of the world and unfavourable to colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism.

The United States is, to this day, bolstering up the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique in its reactionary rule over the people in South Korea and vainly trying to hang on in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. In Japan, it attempts to further strengthen its military bases, infringing on the independence and sovereignty of that country. The Soviet Union flagrantly sent its troops to invade Czechoslovakia, occupies the territories of other countries, including Japan's Chishima Islands, and is peddling everywhere a so-called "system of collective security in Asia." As the two nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are locked in an arms race and contend with each other everywhere, there is no tranquility in the world. The two sides, therefore, unanimously hold that it is essential to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers.

The delegation from the Japan Socialist Party emphasizes that, proceeding from the policy of neutrality based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, it opposes power politics and is ready to establish and develop relations with all countries.

The two sides express: firm support for the Korean people in their just struggle for the independent peaceful reunification of the fatherland free from any interference from the outside; firm support for the Arab people in their just struggle against interference by imperialism and against Israeli aggression and expansion and for the recovery of their lost territories and for the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people; firm support for the liberation struggles of the peoples of southern Africa for national independence and against white racist rule; firm support for the struggles of

the peoples of various European countries to defend democracy and safeguard their vital rights and interests and to oppose control and interference by the big powers; firm support for all just struggles of the people of the world.

The Chinese side expresses admiration for the just struggle conducted by the Japan Socialist Party, together with the people of Japan, for the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. "security treaty," the dismantlement of military bases and the recovery of the northern territories, and appreciates the energetic efforts and contributions made by the Japan Socialist Party in promoting the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and in developing China-Japan friendship by upholding the banner of China-Japan friendship and inheriting and carrying forward the Asanuma spirit.

The delegation of the Japan Socialist Party praises the tremendous successes achieved by the Chinese people in socialist revolution and construction under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tsetung and the Communist Party of China.

The two sides note with pleasure that, thanks to the joint efforts of the two peoples, there has been fresh progress in the friendly relations between the two countries and the cause of friendship between the two peoples since the establishment of China-Japan diplomatic relations, and that the important task at present is to conclude the China-Japan treaty of peace and friendship at an early date. The two sides unanimously hold that the treaty to be concluded must be a step forward from the basis of the joint statement of the governments of China and Japan, and that no backward step is permissible. The two sides express their readiness to make joint efforts to remove every resistance and promote the realization of this at an early date, so as to further

**consolidate and develop the good-neighbourly relations of friendship between the two countries.**

**The two sides express the wish to further strengthen the exchanges and friendly cooperation between them and continuously make fresh contributions to the cause of China-Japan friendship.**

**The two sides hold that the current visit to China by the delegation of the Japan Socialist Party is highly beneficial to the promotion of the militant friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples.**

**Liao Cheng-chih (Signed),  
leader of the delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association**

**Tomomi Narita (Signed),  
leader of the sixth delegation to China from the Japan Socialist Party**

**Peking, May 12, 1975**

## Appendix C

### Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China

Japan and the People's Republic of China,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Statement in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis,

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Statement constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Statement should be strictly observed,

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected,

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world,  
For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Japan: Sunao Sonoda, Minister for Foreign Affairs

People's Republic of China: Huang Hua, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

#### Article I

1. The Contracting Parties shall develop durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

2. In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Contracting Parties affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

#### Article II

The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

#### Article III

The Contracting Parties shall, in the good-neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

#### Article IV

The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.

#### Article V

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.

For Japan: Sonoda Sunao  
(Signed)

For the People's Republic of China:  
Huang Hua (Signed)

## Appendix D

## Japanese-Soviet Relations: Two Decades since 1956

October 1956	Joint declaration. Agree on the return of Habomai and Shikotan Islands after concluding a peace treaty.
July 1966	Gromyko visits Tokyo. Agree to start the Periodic Consultation of Foreign Ministers (PCFM).
July 1967	Foreign Minister Miki visits Moscow. The first PCFM.
January 1972	Gromyko visits Tokyo for the second PCFM. Agree to start negotiations on a peace treaty.
October 1972	Foreign Minister Ôhira visits Moscow for the first talk on a peace treaty.
October 1973	Prime Minister Tanaka visits Moscow for the second talk on a peace treaty. Agree to solve unsettled problems before concluding a peace treaty.
January 1975	Foreign Minister Miyazawa visits Moscow for the third PCFM. The third talk on a peace treaty.
February 1975	Brezhnev proposes a treaty of amity and cooperation.
January 1976	Gromyko visits Tokyo for the fourth PCFM.
September 1976	MIG-16 dissents.
May 1977	Provisional Agreement on Fisheries.
January 1978	Foreign Minister Sonoda visits Moscow for the fifth PCFM.

(After this, the sixth PCFM was not held till January 1986.)



## Appendix E

LDP Division  
concerning the Peace TreatyPro-Treaty

Fukuda Faction  
Hori Shigeru (later indep)  
Sonoda Sunao  
Abe Shintarô

Tanaka Faction  
Tanaka Kakuei  
Nikaidô Susumu  
Nishimura Eiichi

Ôhira Faction  
Ôhira Masayoshi  
Kosaka Zentarô

Miki Faction  
Miki Takeo  
Kômoto Toshio  
Kaifu Toshiki

Shiina Faction  
Hamano Seigo

Independent  
Kôno Kenzô

Anti-Treaty

Fukuda Faction  
Fukuda Takeo  
Kishi Nobusuke  
Hamada Kôichi  
Tamaki Kazuo  
Fujio Masayuki  
Machimura Kingo  
Mori Yoshirô  
Mitsuzuka Hiroshi

Nakasone Faction  
Nakasone Yasuhiro  
Nakao Eiichi  
Watanabe Michio

Ishii Faction  
Ishii Mitsujirô  
Nadao Hirokichi  
Hasegawa Takashi

Mizuta Faction  
Mizuta Mikio  
Nakagawa Ichirô  
Nakayama Masaaki  
Ishihara Shintarô

Shiina Faction  
Shiina Etsusaburô  
Hasegawa Shirô

Funada Faction  
Funada Naka

## Appendix F

### Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary on History Textbooks

August 26, 1982

1. The government and people of Japan are deeply aware that Japanese actions in the past have inflicted great suffering and injury on the peoples of Korea, China, and the other countries of Asia. We have embarked upon the path of a nation of peace in the penitence and determination that such events must never be repeated. Japan has affirmed this stance in the 1965 joint communiqué with the Republic of Korea as "Japan is deeply contrite over the aberrancy of past relations" and in the joint communiqué with the People's Republic of China as "the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself." These statements were affirmation of the penitence and determination of Japan, and this awareness is not in the least changed even today.

2. The spirit of this Japan-ROK joint communiqué and this Japan-PRC joint communiqué should obviously be respected in Japanese education and textbook authorization. Yet there has recently been criticism of Japanese textbook accounts on this point by the Republic of Korea, China and other Asian countries. Japan will pay full heed to this criticism in promoting friendship and goodwill with the nearby countries of Asia, and the government will undertake on its own responsibility to make the necessary amendments.

3. Accordingly, for future textbook authorization, the authorization criteria will be revised in the Textbook Authorization Research Council and care will be taken that the above gist is duly realized. For textbooks which have already been authorized, measures will be taken to realize the same gist promptly, and, as an interim measure until such can be effected, the minister of education will issue a policy statement and will see that the gist of Section 2 above is fully reflected in actual education.

4. Japan desires to continue to develop relations of friendship and cooperation and to promote mutual understanding with the peoples of these countries and to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and the world.

## Appendix G

LDP Division  
concerning Textbook RevisionsScreening Sceptics

## Fukuda Faction

Tanaka Faction  
Sekô Masataka  
Okuda Keiwa

Suzuki Faction(former Ôhira)  
Miyazawa Kiichi  
Shirakawa Katsuhiko

Nakasone Faction  
Sakurauchi Yoshio  
Morishita Motoharu  
Ôishi Senpachi  
Yamazaki Taku

Miki Faction  
Kaifu Toshiki  
Shionoya Kazuo

Independent  
Mihara Asao

MOE Supporters

Fukuda Faction  
Mitsuzuka Hiroshi  
Mori Yoshirô  
Ishibashi Kazuya  
Tamaki Kazuo  
Fujio Masayuki  
Kamei Shizuka  
Mori Kiyoshi

Tanaka Faction  
Minowa Noboru  
Matsuno Yukiyasu

Suzuki Faction(former Ôhira)  
Ogawa Heiji  
Nishioka Takeo  
Itagaki Tadashi

Nakasone Faction  
Nakao Eiichi  
Watanabe Michio

Nakagawa Faction(former Mizuta)  
Nakagawa Ichirô  
Ishihara Shintarô

Independent  
Nakayama Masaaki

## Appendix H

Japan's Trade, Direct Investment, & Bilateral ODA  
vis-à-vis China

FY	Trade <sup>a</sup> (%)	FDI <sup>b</sup> (%)	(in Millions of Dollars)	
				ODA <sup>c</sup> (%)
1970	823 ( 2.2)	-----		-----
1971	901 ( 2.1)	-----		-----
1972	1,100 ( 2.1)	-----		-----
1973	2,014 ( 2.7)	-----		-----
1974	3,289 ( 2.8)	-----		-----
1975	3,790 ( 3.3)	-----		-----
1976	3,033 ( 2.3)	-----		-----
1977	3,486 ( 2.3)	-----		-----
1978	5,079 ( 2.9)	-----		-----
1979	6,653 ( 3.1)	-----		2.6 ( 0.1)
1980	9,402 ( 3.5)	-----		4.3 ( 0.2)
1981	10,387 ( 3.5)	-----		27.7 ( 1.2)
1982	8,863 ( 3.3)	-----		368.8 (15.6)
1983	10,000 ( 3.7)	-----		350.2 (14.4)
1984	13,175 ( 4.3)	114 ( 1.1)		389.4 (16.0)
1985	18,960 ( 6.2)	100 ( 0.8)		387.9 (15.2)
1986	15,509 ( 4.6)	226 ( 1.0)		497.0 (12.9)
1987	15,650 ( 4.1)	1,226 ( 3.7)		553.1 (10.5)
1988	19,335 ( 4.3)	296 ( 0.6)		673.7 (10.5)
1989	19,662 ( 4.0)	438 ( 0.6)		832.2 (12.3)
1990	18,184 ( 3.5)	349 ( 0.6)		723.0 (10.4)
1991	22,809 ( 4.1)	579 ( 1.4)		585.3 ( 6.6)
1992	28,902 ( 5.0)	1,070 ( 3.1)		1,050.8 (12.4)
1993	37,838 ( 6.3)	1,691 ( 4.7)		1,350.7 (16.5)
1994	46,248 ( 6.9)	2,566 ( 6.3)		1,479.4 (15.3)

\* Sources a: MITI, *White Paper on International Trade*  
b: Japan Economic Institute, *JEI Report*  
c: MOFA, *Japan's ODA: Annual Report*

\* The figures in the parentheses are China's share in Japan's total trade, FDI, and bilateral ODA.

## Appendix I

### Questionnaire for Human Rights Groups

1. Did you take any action to protest Japanese or Chinese government? If you did, when and what kind of action did you take? How did the government respond?
2. Did you hold protest rallies? If you did, what were their date, nature, and the number of participants?
3. Did you call on like-minded scholars, politicians, and others to lobby the Japanese government?
4. Please describe media coverage in Japan concerning your activities.

### Questions for the Foreign Ministry

1. The "Special Investigation Center" was formed on June 6 and dissolved on August 17 of 1989. Were these decisions made within the Ministry? If elected officials were involved, at what point?
2. On June 20, 1989, the news media reported that Japan would suspend negotiations on its Third Yen Loan. I would like to know if this report was accurate. More specifically, who would have made such a decision—MOFA officials or elected officials—and in what form would it have been announced?
3. Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka visited Washington toward the end of June. Was this a MOFA or political initiative? What was the purpose of his trip?
4. Given the Bush administration's wish to maintain good relations with Beijing—despite its strident rhetoric—did MOFA expect American assent toward Japan's more reasoned position?

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HC: Plenary Session. Foreign Affairs Committee.

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HC: Education, Foreign Affairs, and National Security Committees.

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Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report (FBIS):

Asia and Pacific, East Asia, China, and the Soviet Union

#### <Japanese>

Asahi Journal, Asahi Shimbun, Gaiko Forum, Mainichi Shimbun, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkyōso Kyōiku Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, ect.

#### <English Translation>

Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)

Daily Summary of the Japanese Press (DSJP)






## CURRICULUM VITAE

Katsumi Sohma earned a bachelor's degree in secondary education from Nagasaki University, Japan. She has worked as a teacher and as a business editor and translator in Tokyo. After deciding to pursue her scholarly and writing interests in earnest, she came to the United States for graduate studies. Katsumi received her master's degree in international relations and doctorate degree in political science, both from Boston University.

Throughout her graduate studies, she has been especially concerned with Japanese-Chinese relations. Her interest in this particular subject was fostered by two influences. First by her parents, who were stationed in North China during World War II. Second by Buddhist leader, Daisaku Ikeda, who has long been a strong public advocate of friendly relations between Japan and China.

Through the influence of these people, Katsumi came to realize the importance of Sino-Japanese relations not only for Japan itself but for peace and stability in Asia as well. Her studies have centered on the often frictional relations between the two countries and on Japan's policies toward China.

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